Globalaffairs

By Guy Burton
Issue 21/July - September 2010

The past decade has seen a push towards separation and unilateralism on both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Following a decade of engagement under the Oslo process, the shift occurred after the outbreak of the second Intifada. It was a shift initially led by the Israelis under the premiership of Ariel Sharon (2001-06), during which construction of the Separation Wall began and an evacuation of Jewish settlements in Gaza took place.

The Palestinians’ drive for separation is more recent: August 2010 will mark the first anniversary of that official position, based on Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s programme for government. If fulfilled the plan, “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, will see a unilateral declaration of independence by the Palestinians by the end of next year. This marks a significant change from previous model to achieve Palestinian self-government through the Oslo process, which included Israeli involvement.

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Issue 20/April-June 2010
By Glen Ruffle

The situation in the Middle East is, as ever, moving from one crisis to another. With America annoyed at Israel, increasing tension in Gaza, and the general malaise over land, there remain few solutions to the problems that will stop the violence.

Israel and the US - a lovers tiff

There has been much fuss about a falling-out and serious breach in the relationship between America and Israel [1]. This is, of course, simply journalists trying to make a story. Whilst the announcement of new building for settlers in East Jerusalem, which the Palestinians want to make their future capital, prompted anger and outrage from them, and the withdrawal of their delegation from US-managed peace talks [2], the truth is that Israeli-US relations remain strong.

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Issue 18/December-January 2010
By Jamsheed K. Choksy

Successes, missteps, opportunities, and prospects

Rebuilding civil society has emerged as an essential path to reversing impacts of strife. Reestablishment of infrastructure, employment, services, administration, and security - all emphasizing local responsibility - are central to stability irrespective of culture, faith, or location.

Reconstruction of civil society in the approximately 10,500 sq. mile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is desperately needed [1]. Local populations face intimidation from armed militants [2]. Common administrative and legal norms are lacking. Constructive tribal, intellectual, and economic cooperation across the FATA’s border with Afghanistan require augmentation. So economic opportunities have declined and, consequently, less than one-third of FATA’s nearly 5 million inhabitants live above poverty-level. Literacy has fallen to a lowly 17.4 percent because access to quality education became limited too, especially for women [3]. Consequently, “fundamentalist madrasas lure hopeful people with promises of knowledge and wealth, and then turned them into lawless hate-filled thugs” lamented one local FATA leader.

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Issue 17/October-November 2009
By Glen Ruffle

Obama’s recent announcement that he will abandon George Bush’s missile defence shield and the positioning of missiles in Eastern Europe, along Russia’s borders, supposedly aimed at Iran, has been welcomed in Moscow, and secretly, will have been welcomed by the US Treasury.

At a time of financial crisis, and with an enormous deficit and debt, the US cannot really afford to press ahead with such an expensive, unproven and destabilizing programme [1]. There is no proof the missiles will work, and Russia, with a large stabilization fund full of money to spend, would launch an arms race the US could ill-afford. Obama knows that it is far better to have Putin and Medvedev on side in dealing with the real problem of Iran, because of their influence [2].

Elections

The recent elections in Iran have seen Ahmadinejab retain his grip on power, with the blessing of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Together, they have reversed the slow trend to modernisation and openness begun under President Rafsanjani and continued under Ahmadinejad’s predecessor, President Khatami.

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Issue 16/August-September 2009
By Tannaz Bandukwalla

Summers have traditionally been the most lethal fighting months in Afghanistan because most Taliban fighters and other guerrillas limit their activities during the long and severe winters but this July has proved to be the deadliest month for U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan since they arrived there at the end of 2001, with 70 foreign troops - including 42 Americans - killed. Six more U.S. soldiers were killed on the first two days of August.

Three factors that have made this summer especially deadly. One was President Obama’s decision to send 21,000 additional troops to the country, including a Marine expeditionary brigade now conducting operations in Helmand Province, one of the most dangerous regions of Afghanistan. The second reason is that the guerrillas’ increasing skill at using improvised explosive devices and the third factor is the upcoming Presidential elections on 20th of August.

The Presidential election has stirred into action and once again brought Afghanistan in fore-front news. The Taliban in Afghanistan warned that they would attempt to derail the presidential election, calling on Afghans to boycott the poll and urging them to “join the trenches of jihad”. A statement issued by the Taliban’s leadership council and posted on a website it uses (www.alemarah1.net), said the election was a U.S. “invention” and urged voters to join them instead of taking part in a poll labelled as a farce. The statement was the first of its kind issued by the Taliban urging the direct disruption of the election.

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Issue 16/August-September 2009
by Arif Shiri

The recent official birth of democracy in Afghanistan has introduced a few questions regarding the democratic government of Afghanistan and the way in which government has handled the presidential election. Most commentators and scholars has never theorised and analysed in a way to give a broader picture of the contemporary political situation in Afghanistan. Simply, the situation has been viewed from individual’s perspectives and political ideologies were simply ignored. In other words, most scholars has been adopted a historical description position rather a social scientific explanations. However, this article would rather offer a third-way explanation to the current situation in Afghanistan. This explanation based on different approaches of political theories and, also it theorises and analyses the role of actors in contemporary Afghan affairs such as media, newspapers, journalist’s reports and individuals’ speech. Also this article aims to engage with other commentators and scholars on Afghan domestic politics.

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Issue 15/June-July 2009
by Enrico Labriola

“If you interpret reform as a movement within the government, I think yes, this is the end. But if you regard it as a social phenomenon, then it is still very much alive.”
-Reza Yousefian, former Majlis member after Ahmadinejad election

The horizon of Iranian politics is, as always, far to be clear. Surprisingly, the complexity of this society is the mirror of the background over the curtain of this Islamic Republic. But walking in the streets of Tehran the political debate is one of the most vivid in Middle East: everyone has a way to solve Iran’s problems. The rule for public speech is to accept everything but the nature of the Republic, that has to remain Islamic (and ruled by clerics). The 12th June the 46,7 million of voters will be called to express a preference for one of the 8 presidential hopefuls. The main actors in this long run are the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the last Prime Minister of Iran (in 1989 the post was abolished), Mir-Hossein Mousavi. It is a struggle of two different views about the prospects of this 66 million citizen-country. Ahmadinejad won the 2005 elections with the 61% (after a pale 19% in the first round), against the former president Rafsanjani in a run-off that cut off all the reformist candidates, with the two main candidates, Karroubi and Moeen stopped to the 3rd and the 4th places. Ahmadinejad, former major of Tehran and considered an outsider in the 2005 elections, become the first president in 24 years who is not an Islamic cleric.

Ahmadinejad is believed to have won mainly because of his populist views, especially those regarding the poor and their economic status. But despite the propaganda the economic situation is not so good, and the progress (the GDP grew of 7.8% in 2007 and 6.5% in 2008) was not seen by the poor. Iran is a strange country: appalling conditions in the countryside for the rural population coexist with big cities with an open-minded middle-class, influenced by the Great-Devil cultural models. Even though a woman witness count half of a man’s one, and women are penalized in the marriage and inheritance, women are an active part of Iran: they are judges in the tribunals, teachers in universities, the 70% of the students enrolled in the universities, they are MPs and have a woman as UN vice-representative and one as Presidential candidate. Although, they have big problems to divorce (but man can repudiate one of the wives just with a statement) and they can’t travel without a man’s permission and wear appropriately the scarf, without showing any hair.

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Issue 13/ April-May 2009
By Andrea Bonzanni

The distorted image of Dubai as a metropolis where everything is luxury and the Emirati GDP growth of 8.5% in 2008 [1] make worries about the future of the economy and the very word “crisis” sound improbable when associated to the Emirate. Nonetheless, economic forecasts are not bright. The Egyptian investment bank EFG Hermes has even predicted a restrain of the GDP in absolute term [2] – a really hard hit for one of the fastest growing economies until last year. Businessmen and policymakers in Dubai are profoundly concerned and emergency action is being taken.

Amongst the problems that every economy has to cope with in these times of financial crisis, the situation is worsened in Dubai by the dramatic slump in oil prices. The drop of the barrel by nearly two thirds from the peak registered last summer can indeed have important economic and social consequences in the Emirate. Contrary to the case of other small Gulf economies, this would hardly bring about financial disruption and deterioration of public accounts, since Dubai gets only a tiny 6% of its GDP from the activity of hydrocarbon extraction [4]. Substantially low prices for are prolonged period of time – by cutting off the steady inflow of rents in foreign currency – are however likely to reduce the ability of the Emirate to collect capital fast and cheaply, depriving the economy of Dubai with one of its main comparative advantages. Oil rent also serves an important socio-political function: being it solidly controlled by the Al Maktoum ruling family and then distributed to citizens, it has helped build the existing structure of Dubaian society and shape the relationship between the government and the people [6]. This mechanism – foundation of all the so-called oil-states – has been the main source of legitimacy for the existing elite in Dubai and its deterioration is likely to bring about some cracks in a rule whose stunningly stability has shocked democracy activists and charmed investors accordingly.

Long term fluctuations of oil prices are hardly foreseeable. Being the factors which caused prices to skyrocket until 2008 mostly structural, it seems reasonable to assume a comeback of expensive oil when the winds of recession stop blowing, even though too many factors are at play to make predictions without a sensible degree of uncertainty. Anyhow, Dubai – being unable to do much for affecting the price trends alone – should just not concentrate on this point. It is Saudi Arabia, which can take actions – also unilaterally – to influence the cost of the barrel. Therefore, policymakers in Dubai are rightly not even pushing on oil prices, focusing instead on other issues and industries and trying to make up for the important losses in the hydrocarbon sector.

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Issue 13/ February-March 2009
By Mazen Raydan

Not even the Mediterranean waves that melt on Gaza shores could carry hope or the breeze of freedom they dream to breathe, with Israel controlling the strip’s airspace and territorial waters, beside the wired borders on the northern –eastern side.

The Egyptian borders became the breathing apparatus that pump life to this isolated sector, but even this side closed in March 2006, after the free election of Hamas starting a blockade, isolating Gaza from the rest of the world.

For two years people of Gaza asking the same Question why? Why they have to suffer for a choice they have made, meanwhile lessons of democracy were playing in their regions; why the fuel and water pump, electricity, and Rafah borders should be closed.

The answer was the rockets Hamas is firing, but why we don’t suppose that these rockets were the voice of the suffocating people inside of Gaza, raising their voices, that we are still alive.

The siege suffocated Gaza for two years and the world shut its ears and watched in silence, they watched 3900 factories closed, 65 thousand employees losing their jobs, 1million dollars loss each day, forcing 90% people to rely on the humanitarian aids to survive.

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Issue 12/December-January 2009
By Enrico Labriola

The surest thing about the 15th October election was, not as usual, the outcome. All political analysts observed that the confirmation for the incumbent Ilham Aliyev, was out of doubt. The result, with the 88,73% of the votes casted for Aliyev (1), confirmed what the pundits said months ago. No one of the other 6 candidates passed the 3%, showing that the popularity of the current president is very high. Around 75,6 % of voters, according to the official turnout figures, entered the polling stations in the sunny day of 15th October. Some bloggers defined the elections a mere formality for the head of New Azerbaijan Party (2). When he was elected for the first time, in 2003, the vote was regarded by international observers as not meeting the international standards, putting a shadow on the 77% the Central Electoral Commission assigned to him(3). Son of the ‘national hero’ Heydar Aliyev –whose potraits are everywhere in the streets of the country-, Ilham has now another plebiscite in his favour, even bigger than before.

Veteran opposition leaders and their respective parties—the Musavat Party’s Isa Gambar, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan Party’s (PFAP) Ali Kerimli, and the Democratic Party’s Sardar Jalaloglu—stayed out of this presidential election, after grouping in a “Joint front of democratic forces” on 5 september(4). Some negotiations were held to find a common candidate and a platform and participate in the elections, but were unsuccessfull (5). The boycott could be seen as a move to avoid a count of their vote share and claim all the people that will stay at home as their supporter. This move was pointed out as non-sense by Embassador Boris Frlec, the head of OSCE/ODIHR mission, because staying out of the race meant for them not benefiting of the legal protection guaranteed by rules, and not showing in the electoral campaign that they are present and active. Moreover, if they feared violations of their rights, they could denounce them to the observation missions present.

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