Globalaffairs

Issue 21/July-September 2010
By Juan Carlos Triviño Salazar

The Colombian presidential election of 2010 will be remembered for its brief and intense campaign, marked by a rhetoric that never ceased to revolve around the importance of maintaining the legacy of outgoing President Alvaro Uribe. With approval ratings of almost 70% (1), the outgoing president has been recognised for his obsession with putting the state at the forefront of the fight against leftist guerrillas, which has characterized Colombian politics for the past 50 years. 2010 marks the end of Uribe’s second term and the election of now President Juan Manuel Santos, former Defence Minister, which confirms that Uribe’s mark is here to stay. Beyond the choice of Santos as president, this election confirmed that the country is unified around Uribe’s discourse; that despite other priorities, internal security is on the minds of Colombians when voting and that an important challenge for the incoming government is to correct the actions undertaken during Uribe’s administration.

With the promise of ending an illegal armed groups threatening the country, president Uribe based his mandate on showing himself as the strongman that many Colombians thought was key for fixing a decades-long internal conflict. Under a policy known as ‘democratic security’ aimed at strengthening the military with US aid and involving common citizens as intelligence informants, his government focused on reducing the armed conflict to a frontal struggle against the leftist guerrillas of FARC and ELN and regaining territorial control (2). Moreover, Uribe’s policy also focused on deterring extreme right self-defence groups - linked to rural elites, regional politicians and drug traffickers - to lay down their arms and surrender to a negotiated solution (3). Based on this scheme, Uribe’s policy has paid off in lowering crime rates in large parts of the country and diverting the conflict into more remote areas (3). This relative military success led to a change in the constitution so he could run for a second term in 2006. In 2010 Uribe tried to run again for a third term by calling for a referendum to reform the constitution, however, the Constitutional Court thwarted his intention by determining that the referendum was unconstitutional.

Although the decision of the Court left Uribe out of the race, his influence in these elections remained intact. The popularity of the president and his enormous political capital made the elections a process not to decide which political platform was the best but which candidate was most able to carry Uribe’s legacy. Only the candidates from the Liberal Party (center-left) and Democratic Pole (moderate left) tried to distance themselves from the alleged hard and conservative Uribe line (4).

Amid the search for Uribe’s affections, it was a surprise that second place was awarded to Antanas Mockus, the two-time mayor of Bogota and candidate for the newly formed Green Party. Obtaining a considerable amount of votes and without significant political alliances, his success was the result of the gradual growth of the non-partisan vote and his invitation to rethink democratic institutions beyond security. Mockus came to answer the call of broad sectors of the population by demanding a purge of the country’s traditional political practices and the presence of a clear and truly inclusive social policy. His proposal was focused on promoting education and the application of the rule of law as a qualitative leap towards a modern society.

Alvaro Uribe Vélez, President of Colombia, addresses a press conference, at UN Headquarters in New York. UN Photo/Ryan Brown

In the end, Juan Manuel Santos, President Uribe’s former defense minister responsible for unprecedented military successes in fighting leftist guerrillas, was able to better understand the search of the electorate for a figure that would continue Uribe’s policies without Uribe. Santos’ recognition as an effective manager in all his public posts and his understanding of the strings of power gave him sufficient merit to be elected Uribe’s successor (4). Coming from one of Bogotá’s most traditional political families and well formed in renowned U.S. universities, the elected president is known for his pragmatism and adaptability to any setting.

As said in his victory speech, the incoming president owes much to Uribe and is quoting as saying ‘This is your triumph and all those who want to preserve your legacy’ (5). Though his mandate, the outgoing president paved the way for Santos to become president.

The choice of Santos and its proximity to Uribe shows that a successful security policy in a country like Colombia has high political returns despite scandals in the exercise of power. Despite serious investigations of the outgoing government for cases such as ‘falsos positivos’ (civilians murdered by the armed forces and presented as guerrilla fighters killed in combat), shady contracts given to people close to the presidential circle, the para-politics scandal (6) (Congressmen and politicians linked with extreme right self-defense private armies), among others, Colombians still endorsed Uribe’s policies by choosing Santos. The simple reading of this reality is that the scourge of guerrilla and the harsh response to it by the government deserves citizens’ support, even if the government uses its position of power for personal gain or for committing offenses against certain sectors of the civilian population. It is understood then that the benefit of national security is greater than the cost of institutionalism or legality.

Part of Uribe’s popularity, capitalized by his political allies, is that he knew how to unify the country against a common enemy as the guerrillas and any actor who supported them. Backed by almost all political, economic and social sectors, President Uribe was able to advance a political agenda characterized by its conservatism in social matters, its liberalism on economic issues and its strong stance against any diverging view. On this last point, the outgoing President overcame the stigmatization of some critics to his government by homogenizing the citizenry around his vision. This situation led to a simplification and polarization between being pro-Uribe and a patriot or being anti-Uribe and a traitor under the government’s interpretation of social cohesion.

In addition to this, the Uribe’s phenomenon had an impact on the Colombian partisan scenario by turning political parties into chameleons which supported Uribe’s political project as a survival strategy. A clear example of this is the assistance that the Conservative Party, even against the party’s ideology, lent out the outgoing government, echoed by the Liberal Party’s adherence to the Great Agreement of National Unity proposed by the incoming president. Although the logic behind these agreements is to facilitate governance through broad consensus, historical reality, the National Front (7) disproves this.

Undoubtedly Santos is Santos and Uribe is Uribe. By achieving the Great Agreement of National Unity with political parties present in the legislative (9) and obtaining 9 million votes (8), Santos got political allies equivalent to 80% of the National Congress and a strong popular platform to continue with the essence of Uribe’s policies without following Uribe’s will (9). In turn, the Santos style, more conversational and less confrontational, secures a different approach to several thorny issues present in the outgoing administration. The incoming government will prioritize its international agenda with the focus of restoring and strengthening relations with neighboring countries and placing Colombia in a position of regional leadership. Moreover, the economic agenda will be deepened and based on principles that seek the internationalization of the country as a destination for investment.

What is undeniable is that Uribe’s impact on an important issue such as security will occupy a great space in the Colombian political arena for long time. The idea of a strong state which does not abdicate to terrorism underscores the primary fear of Colombians of armed conflict - key in consecrating the Uribe’s government security policy. The notion of a strong state with strong armed forces became a dogma during Uribe’s administration and it is something that Colombians take for granted in any upcoming government.

Santos’ challenges are not small but different from those faced by Uribe in his first term - among them, to regain the credibility and respect to the checks and balances affected by the interference of the outgoing government, assume an effective management of the state not based on the exchange of favors and privileges, restore battered relations with Venezuela and consolidate relations with Ecuador. Moreover, the new government has to start establishing economic foundations for growth but accompanied by a redistributive social policy which goes beyond welfare (10).

Finally, the Santos government will have to prove that the State’s security policy will continue but taking care of not repeating the serious human rights violations from the past. Additionally, his government will need to define the direction of the offensive against criminal gangs formed by former members of the extreme right self-defense groups (11) will take. Also, the Santos government will need to address growing crime in urban areas which is partly a consequence of these gangs. Aside from this, the incoming president should start thinking about a possible scenario of a negotiated peace agreement with the guerrillas. This would include cooperation with difficult neighbors such as Venezuela and Ecuador and organizations such as UNASUR and the OAS.

From the early days of independence, Colombia has only known a bloody history where innocent people and promising figures have been killed because of ignorance and intolerance. To interpret the solution to the Colombian conflict through security fails is to recognize its social roots, a consequence of a tremendously unequal society. Colombians want peace but they also want responsible institutions which respond to their needs. In addition to this, Colombians expect courageous measures which make any truly efficient reparation and act of post-conflict reconciliation a cleansing of the political class and a real agreement between the elites for a national project that includes all. If Colombia wants to make its war a chapter in the history books it must move towards democratic prosperity proposed during Santos’ campaign, but not forgetting that true democracy is inclusive and based on the right to be different.

Juan Carlos Triviño Salazar
Research Assistant, CIDOB-Barcelona

Sources

(1) EL UNIVERSAL “Asciende a 68% la popularidad de Uribe a meses del fin de su mandato.” 6 May, 2010. http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/05/06/int_ava_asciende-a-68-la-po_06A3866851.shtml (Visited 28/07/2010)

(2) INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. “Poner fin al conflicto con las FARC en Colombia: jugar la carta correcta” Latin America Report N°30, 26 March, 2009, Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/030-ending-colombias-farc-conflict-dealing-the-right-card.aspx?alt_lang=es (Visited 28/07/2010)

(3) ORTIZ, Román, “La estrategia de seguridad de la administración Uribe: un balance de oportunidades y retos”, Instituto ElCano, ARI Nº 46/2004, 2004

(4) Based on three principles: democratic security, investor’s trust and social cohesion, the so-called Uribe’s Policy (Uribismo in Spanish) has been taken a place as a mix of all and nothing. A policy guided by a strong interest on strenthening the State’s security sector and to put national interest, and the interpretation of it by the government, above everything. In few year and based on Uribe’s popularity, wide parts of the political Colombian class have been united around his project, allowing him to create the National Unity party which have speeded up the legislative process.

GUTIÉRREZ, Gonzalo, “Uribismo, corriente sin “homogeneidad coherente”, El Nuevo Siglo, 27 May, 2010, Available at: http://elnuevosiglo.com.co/politica/politica-nacional/3705-uribismo-corriente-sin-homogeneidad-coherente.html (Visited 28/07/2010)

(5) MENDOZA, Beatriz, “Santos: ‘Presidente Uribe, este es su triunfo’”, El Mundo, 31 May, 2010, Available at: http://www.elmundo.es/america/2010/05/31/colombia/1275269910.html (Visited 28/07/2010)

(6) EL ESPECTADOR, “Por parapolítica investigarán a senador Víctor Renán Barco”, 23 July, 2008, Available at: http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo-parapolitica-abren-investigacion-preliminar-contra-victor-renan-barco (Visited 28/07/2010)

(7) The National Front was an agreement between the two Colombian traditional parties- Liberal and Conservative- to alternate power after the fall of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla dictatorship (1953-1957). Such agreement lasted from 1958 to 1974.

(8) WIELAND, Carsten, “El reto de Santos es la reconciliación de Colombia” DW World, entrevista, 21 June, 2010, Available at: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5714886,00.html (Visited 28/07/2010)

(9) REVISTA SEMANA, “¿Sin Oposición?”, 27 June, 2010, Available at:
http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/oposicion/140896.aspx (Visited 28/07/2010)

(10) EL TIEMPO, “Los 5 Grandes Retos Que Le Esperan Al Nuevo Presidente”, 21 June, 2010, Available at: http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-4019265 (Accesado 28/07/2010)

(11) VARGAS VELASQUEZ, Alejo, “El Problema es el conflicto armado”, El Colombiano, 28 July, 2010.

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