Globalaffairs

Issue 7/February-March 2008
By Soraya Carvajal Barona

Columbia lives and breathes debate on account of many different factors. Of these, several stand out, such as humanitarian agreement, its difficult relationship with the Venezuelan government and the protest against kidnapping and the Farc.

On the 4th of February, hundreds of thousands of Columbians protested in the country and in several cities around the world (Sydney, Rome, Madrid, Buenos Aires, New York amongst others), against kidnapping and the Farc guerrilla force. This “march” was organised on the social networking site Facebook, by citizens tired of the excesses of the insurgent group. It came about from a desire to make the international community listen – and specifically NGOs and other organisations that support and legitimise the actions of the guerrilla – in order to make them recognize the effects that the armed group generates amongst the Columbians, who are those who have to deal with the daily drama of the war.

The idea that the protest was drawing support from political parties, businesses, the media and the Columbian government, was what was interpreted by those against the initiative as a spin in favour of the government of President Alvaro Uribe. The consequent political use of the initiative and attempt to centre the debate around the Farc, leaving in second place the complex causes and different actors– paramilitaries and drug traffickers – of the long Columbian armed conflict has, in passing, dealt a blow to the possibility of a humanitarian agreement permitting the liberation of the politicians and members of the military kidnapped by the guerrilla group, some of which have been held for 10 years.

As the idea of the protest gained dynamism, the military uprisings around it were elevating in tone and began to listen to divergent voices that invited to the protest “against the drug-terrorists of the Farc”, as well as others that disqualified the initiative as an “Uribista” strategy, in the middle of an environment of aggressiveness.

The debate that at moments translated itself in misinformation and manipulation continued on the net, where supporters of one or the other side got entangled/embroiled in a critical debate in which they even linked the Columbian opposition party, the Polo Democratico Alternativo, to the Farc, and assured that the Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez had the capacity to influence the election of the next president of Columbia, thanks to thousands of Columbians who live in Venezuela. For their part, the detractors of the protest argued as reason not to protest, the need to protest against all types of violence and the different armed perpetrators without distinction, not just against one in particular, and not to become part of the game of President Uribe’s followers. They asserted that the protest against the Farc was a smoke curtain to remove attention from the legal proceedings that are being carried out against the paramilitary.

In the middle of this scene of gossip, where ordinary citizens, politicians, intellectuals and journalists, amongst others, they stated their attitudes in favour or against the protest, in some cases even in a deep and emotional form, other voices called for tranquillity. They found initiative valiant, because further more than the existence or not of underground intentions, they valued as important the uprising against violence and violations of International Humanitarian Law, in a society that has traditionally been rendered insensitive and lethargic due to daily pain and suffering.

Consequences of the protest

In the initiative that started the debate about the Columbian armed conflict, both representatives and detractors of the cause could manifest their positions openly. It vindicated the legitimate right of the people to protest against the armed perpetrators and the violence that affects them every day. This initiative could be interpreted in several ways.

There was an important coup d’état of opinion against the Farc which made it clear that this insurgent organisation did not have significant support of the people in Columbia, rather on the contrary, the general consensus revolves around the damage that this guerrilla organisation has done to the country and the unanimous disapproval of kidnapping as a strategy of war and financing.

However, it is important to do a complete interpretation of the Columbian armed conflict, because, as historians and analysts have noted throughout the years, it is evident that this does not end with “the evil of the Farc” and their actions. This conflict has been going on for 50 years, and it is much more complex than that. It has its origins in social injustice, structural inequality of the Columbian system, exclusion of the majority of the population, lack of an agricultural reform, poverty, lack of political spaces, the failure of opportunities for everyone, the leading classes’ patrimonial conception of the State, among other aspects.

And this explanation makes sense, because if the government or those who believe that arms are the only way to solve the conflict capitalise politically on the protest, this would be in contrary to the intentions of the organiser. Paradoxically, this civil initiative in favour of peace could generate a new cycle of war and death.

In this sense, analysts consulted by the press agency IPC such as Fabio Giraldo, director of the Institute of Political Studies of the University of Antioquia, have warned that they see “The possibility of a humanitarian agreement becoming more remote. On one side there is the military offensive of Uribe, and on the other, sadly, the guerrilla who see kidnappings as a way of keeping themselves in the public agenda.”

This explains why the families of the kidnapped people opted to, in spite of the protest, continue avoiding declaring themselves in favour or against it. They understand that showing themselves to be on one or the other side could be seen as going against the government or the guerrilla, which would complicate even more the situation of their loved ones. Because of this, they decided to take part in a homily and reiterate calls to reach a humanitarian agreement.

In the same way, the families of the victims state crimes and paramilitary groups made their position against the protest clear, showing signs of a lack of solidarity and the consideration that the protest illustrates that in Columbia there are victims of first and second category. In this way, specialist lawyer in human rights and member of the National Movement of Victims of State Crimes, Ivan Cepeda Castro, has signalled that “the announcement that is being made against one form of violence excludes other logics and it could be said that there are two types of victims: those of kidnapping and those of the guerrilla, and others who have become inexistent victims.”

For their part, the Association of Indigenous Cabildos of Northern Cauca, ACIN, a strong organisation that claims their right to neutrality in this conflict and their desire to live in peace, refused to participate in the protest because they saw clear indications that it was being used politically. However, they did indicate that they affiliate themselves with “the impartial and emphatic of those who have manifested their rejection of kidnapping and its executors, but that also reject the state crimes and crimes of the regime. We are united with these voices, but we do not need to repeat our position on the war and its armed perpetrators, because this has already been made clear in the word that we carry out. They do not manipulate the pain of the people to drive us to hate. We do not allow them tomanipulate us; this protest is not for liberty of those kidnapped nor against the war, it is to continue seeding hate and to clear our consciences.”

In this way, the wait to find out what results the protest will produce on the 4th of February still remains. For the moment the armed group announced on the 31st of January the released of another three kidnapped – of those held to ransom– as a new gesture of “recognition” of the “persistent efforts” of the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, and of the Columbian senator, Piedad Cordoba.

And although this announcement is encouraging, political analysts dismiss any possibility that the Farc would liberate all those kidnapped in a unilateral way as a response to the protest. We must not forget that this guerrilla, in addition to being a hard contender in the military field and an expert agent of propaganda, does not act for emotive reasons nor humanitarian ones, and even less does it believe in the initiatives of the Columbians. Because of this in the Anncol portal that spreads news of this organisation, there was recently published an article that in addition to devirtualising the protest, registered itself on Facebook as “a military wing of espionage and destabilisation, created by the more extreme right-wing sectors to get information on users and manipulate this for geopolitical and strategic uses.”

Only time will tell what consequences the protest will bring to the rejection of the Farc and kidnapping, but what is no secret is that, in the medium or long term, the solution of the prolonged Columbian armed conflict will have to pass by political negotiation. It is the only way out.

The difficult relationship with the Venezuelan government

Even if there is a general consensus amongst the Columbian population of the necessity of mediation to achieve the release of those kidnapped considered as “able to be cashed in on” by the Farc – some of which have been living in inhuman conditions for 10 years –, the tone and defiant attitude of president Chavez is not accepted, who on numerous occasions disqualified the Columbian government with all types of slurs and insults, which, contrary to its intentions, has caused the popularity of the Columbian Head of State to reach 80% in favour, according to the latest surveys. As usually happens in these cases, Chavez’s actions have been seen by the majority of the Columbians as an intervention in internal affairs and a threat, driving followers, and even opponents of Uribe to round up in “defence of national interests.”

Many Columbian analysts see the mediation of Chavez necessary. The guerrilla has responded to his moves, be it because of affinity, sympathy or to share political ideals; but they also understand that any type of mediation must be framed by a process in which there is confidence, equilibrium and human reasoning come out on top. Here is where the matter fails, as it is clear that in the case of humanitarian agreement, many private and strategic agendas are being promoted.

This explains that the mediation of Chavez, which began as an intervention promoted by the Columbian Senator, Piedad Cordoba with the authority of the Columbian government and then later abruptly cut by President Uribe, is defined today by the guerrilla as “unmovable”, necessary to advance in the humanitarian agreement. Equally, the clarity of the Columbian municipalities of Florida and Pradera, seeking to ingratiate themselves with the government and a good part of the Columbian population.

To this is joined the media circus around the failed liberation of the child Emmanuel and the later liberation of Clara Rojas and Conseulo de Perdomo, used by Chavez as propaganda, and the uprising of the Venezuelan Head of State, which has stated its position as clearly in favour of the Farc, assuring that it respects its political project and even proposing that the international community grant them the status of belligerence and retire them to the list of terrorist groups, having been entertained in Columbia as an example of interventionism and an attack on its national interests.

In addition, the high-flying declarations of Chavez denouncing plots of the North American and Columbian governments, one day one, another day both also; as well as the predicting an imminent attack by Columbia and the military action Venezuela should take, have generated the rejection of different Columbian sectors that see in the Venezuelan president an eager interventionist and expansionist.

All of this situation has begun to generate fear amongst the Columbian population, where some voices warn of a possible attack from Venezuela, an invasion attempt and annexing by Chavez’s government or of the possibility of the start of a regional armed conflict of unfathomable magnitude, more if you take into account that the Uribe government has characterised itself on its indisputable alliance with the North American government; it is heard that the president Chavez has tight links with the Iranian president Ahmadineyad and that Venezuela has been arming itself as an alternative deterrence against any possible external aggression, more specifically, North American.

In the face of these calls to war, recently a group of Columbian and Venezuelan intellectuals, led by Gabriel Garcia Marquez and Ramon J. Velasquez, signed a declaration calling for harmony and asking “remember the historical fraternal links that united our two nations in order to prevent the imposition of a discord emanating from conflicting interests in the highest levels of power.”

On the other hand, accepted analysts, like Alfredo Rangel, reject any possibility of armed aggression of the Venezuelan government because of factors such as the rejection that this type of action would generate amongst the Venezuelan opposition, the risk of isolation from the European Union, the slight possibility of military and political triumph of the Farc. For strategy, Rangel asserts that for Chavez, good relations with Columbia are important, especially in the energy sector, in order to bring to a good close his project of hydrocarbon extraction from the Columbian Pacific to sell to Asia, leaving aside the USA market.

This is how things are, to the Columbian and Venezuelan populations, they are only left with demanding and waiting for sanity and logic to be imposed, over even the leaders’ desires.

Soraya Carvajal
Columbian journalist, specialist in International Relations

Global Affairs is not liable for author’s opinion