Globalaffairs

Issue 18/December-January 2010
By Jamsheed K. Choksy

Successes, missteps, opportunities, and prospects

Rebuilding civil society has emerged as an essential path to reversing impacts of strife. Reestablishment of infrastructure, employment, services, administration, and security - all emphasizing local responsibility - are central to stability irrespective of culture, faith, or location.

Reconstruction of civil society in the approximately 10,500 sq. mile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is desperately needed [1]. Local populations face intimidation from armed militants [2]. Common administrative and legal norms are lacking. Constructive tribal, intellectual, and economic cooperation across the FATA’s border with Afghanistan require augmentation. So economic opportunities have declined and, consequently, less than one-third of FATA’s nearly 5 million inhabitants live above poverty-level. Literacy has fallen to a lowly 17.4 percent because access to quality education became limited too, especially for women [3]. Consequently, “fundamentalist madrasas lure hopeful people with promises of knowledge and wealth, and then turned them into lawless hate-filled thugs” lamented one local FATA leader.

According to Pakistani and Western representatives, these and other important issues need to be addressed vigorously to re-establish the FATA’s civil society [4]. USAID and the U.S. departments of State and Defense are partnering with the Government of Pakistan. The USAID commitment has grown six-fold since its inception in November 2007 [5]. E.U. organizations likewise involved include England’s Department for International Development (DFID) and Germany’s Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) [6]. UNHCR, UNDP, and WHO, among other U.N. agencies, are providing reconstruction assistance there as well, together with intergovernmental agencies such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) [7].

Development projects and humanitarian missions in the FATA are among the most important operations that the United States and its Western partners are undertaking [8]. In particular, USAID and U.S. State Department projects “assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government” whereas U.S. Defense Department projects “support efforts to defeat terrorist and insurgent groups” as outlined in the draft metrics for evaluating progress in Pakistan (and Afghanistan) presented on September 16 by the Obama Administration to the U.S. Congress [9]. U.S., E.U., and U.N. aid is aimed at enhancing Pakistan’s local capacity in the range of civil society activities so as to create sustainable communal and economic growth to ensure that counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts will eventually be mostly successful [10].

Successes

Pakistani officials, such as Owais Ghani the current governor of the adjacent North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and residents of the FATA have observed most young Pashtuns enlist with the Taliban and other militias for financial reasons - to obtain monthly wages in exchange for armed service - rather than for religious or ideological ones [11]. Skilled and unskilled workers in the FATA who receive civil society related employment have commented they do not object to salaries being paid through U.S. and E.U. funded projects. They value those occupations for permitting them to “feed, clothe, and shelter” their families “without shedding blood.” Comments like “we would rather build homes, hospitals, schools, and roads than fight” are frequent. Such sentiments emphasize a basic level of daily material stability is fundamental to social rejuvenation. Those words also underscore why appropriate employment is an important link between Pashtuns, other Pakistanis, Americans, and Europeans in successfully engineering civil society. Moreover, over 100,000 micro-enterprises in the FATA have been built up via USAID to ensure economic independence from militants [12]. FATA officials and residents believe expansion of Western support for livelihood development in the FATA would yield even higher dividends through continuing reduction in enlistment with militant groups while strengthening commitment to state institutions, reports from the FATA indicate.

Rapid, well-publicized, internationally-funded responses to natural disasters have proven extremely effective as well in curtailing the dissatisfaction that fuels militantism [13]. For instance, aid to Pakistani earthquake victims has generated hospitality and respect - even in Pashtun communities - for Americans, Britishers, and Germans. So has assistance from USAID, DFID, GTZ, WHO, and the World Bank directed at residents and internally displaced persons in the Bajaur and Mohmand tribal agencies (or administrative units). Expansion of such efforts is likely with the enhanced fiscal commitments that the U.S.A., England, Germany, and the U.N. are making toward restoring civil society in the FATA. Essentially, a lesson learned successfully from the FATA is that socioeconomic assistance which materially enhances the lives of residents builds bridges of empathy across the chasm of fundamentalist hatred. Such support is appreciated even more when extended in hazardous circumstances.

Initially, much internal criticism ensued about Pakistan’s waging a seemingly American war against terror in the FATA. Then the bombing of the Marriot Hotel at Islamabad, in September 2008, was linked by prominent local politicians to violent Islamists akin to those who assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto [14]. Next, the Taliban’s flogging a young woman of the Swat valley (in the NWFP) for allegedly fraternizing with an unrelated man in April 2009, threatening girls for seeking education, and destroying schools in the FATA and NWFP demonstrated that fundamentalist actions really were not based largely on anti-Western sentiments [15]. Simultaneously the Taliban’s occupation of most of the FATA and extension of its political authority to the settled regions of SWAT and Buner (also in NWFP) highlighted to Pakistanis that indigenous militants threatened the entire nation [16].

Those and similar incidents generated a more nuanced perspective locally by demonstrating the struggle against domestic terrorism is intrinsically a Pakistani one. More Pakistanis began to see the battle against militancy as a national interest shared with the U.S. and E.U., their military as capable of victory, and external resources as necessary for social reconstruction [17]. Now the FATA’s security situation is slowly improving because Pakistan’s government is successfully taking the initiative to quash interlinked Muslim militant groups like Tehrik-e Taliban, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, Lashkar-e Islam, and Sepah-e Sahaba [18]. But the terrorists are fighting back viciously, brazenly yet desperately attacking both state and civilian targets - including the military’s high command in Rawalpindi and the Federal Investigation Agency in Lahore - despite the animosity it creates against the attackers [19]. Those recent attacks have ensured the Pakistani public, political, and military are more determined than ever to thwart terrorism [20]. So political and military efforts still need resources, as and when requested by the Government of Pakistan, from the U.S. and E.U. because security locally facilitates the sustaining of a vibrant civil society.

Because the Government and people of Pakistan are finally accepting the challenges of creating civil society in the FATA as their own responsibility, it is vital that foreign governments — especially the U.S. administration — respect local sovereignty [21]. Even the slightest involvement of American and EU troops or security contractors from private organizations undercuts Pakistanis’ fierce sense of nationalism and so facilitates adoption of anti-Western sentiments which Islamic militants seek to spread [22]. It has been widely reported that, understanding this reality, Pakistan’s embattled president Asif Zardari wants more international emphasis on economic and political development [23].

Missteps

The U.S. and E.U. currently do not brand aid to the FATA, maintaining a low profile for protection of staff and beneficiaries such as the FATA Secretariat and the FATA Development Authority from terrorist retaliation [24]. Yet, many residents of the FATA surmise correctly that USAID, DFID, and GTZ are assisting them through the Government of Pakistan. Not labeling aid within the FATA is contrary to standard procedure with assistance and technology distributed in most Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries. Attempting to limit visibility, unfortunately, has contributed to baseless local suspicion of Western attempts to re-colonize Pakistan. Much local goodwill and political capital have been lost in the process. Talented foreigners supervising reconstruction and civil society projects have been physically harmed or have left Pakistan as a consequence of innuendo tarnishing their effectiveness [25].

Pakistani and foreign aid-workers are seeking to correct the misstep, realizing it is important that recipients know projects enhancing education, health, wealth, and welfare come from Americans and Europeans in friendship rather than as neocolonialism [26]. Pakistani government officials indicate that once the Taliban and al-Qaida threats have been better contained, aid must be linked more directly to the U.S. and other Western donors. However, full disclosure of how very much the U.S., England, Germany, and the U.N. are assisting Pakistan to rebuild FATA’s civil society is needed sooner than later. Rather than fanning suspicion, transparency will mitigate the rumor-fueled resistance to foreign assistance that has been building in Pakistan recently.

Hitherto, requests for educational development by local Muslim clerics have been disregarded for fear of assets falling into Taliban and al-Qaida hands. FATA officials and foreign consultants now recommend the Government of Pakistan select non-violent moderate madrasas to overtly receive Western aid for basic amenities, infrastructure, curricular instruction, and career training. They believe extending clearly-labeled aid to those religious schools would redress the past by highlighting American and European resources being utilized in partnership with the Pakistan government and Muslim institutions [27]. The Taliban and al-Qaida are explicit about their allegedly beneficial presence in the region as protectors of Islam against the Western presence. So administrators and aid-workers in the FATA suggest it is imperative that militants’ propaganda be countered with “public displays of foreign assistance making fundamentally positive contributions” that not only are not anti-Muslim but benefit mainstream Islam and Pakistan.

Most development planning and political direction for this critical region come from Islamabad, instead of Peshawar which is the administrative center for both the NWFP and the FATA [28]. Civil and political officials who represent the Government of Pakistan in those regions often express frustration at having only limited input in the decision-making process. Of course, the status quo is in place for security reasons. An American aid-worker was assassinated at Peshawar in November 2008 and a U.S. diplomat there was targeted three months earlier by Islamic terrorists. The Pearl-Continental Hotel housing many U.N. organizations was bombed in June 2009 and a Pakistani UNHCR official was murdered in July by those same Muslim militant groups [29]. The Pakistani press seems to have fueled anti-Western sentiment through speculative claims - picked up by Western media as well - which have exposed aid workers to harm from militants [30].

Yet the absence on-site of foreigners involved in reconstruction is bemoaned by the Pashtuns as a “terrible success” for the Taliban and al-Qaida since it reinforces a notion that local residents cannot count on either Pakistan’s government or Western ones to experience their problems and protect them from harm. U.S., E.U., and U.N. personnel need to demonstrate to skeptical Pakistanis that genuine partnerships include cooperation locally rather than demands from afar despite the security risks involved [31]. Likewise foreign agencies must show, by managing projects from within the FATA, that militants cannot run them out of town. To do so, those organizations will have to utilize official Pakistani security resources plus locally-provided secure residential and administrative areas — rather than attempting to create private international enclaves which generate misgivings among local residents [32]. Returning to the field, while following parameters acceptable to Pakistanis, will rectify a misstep that has played into the Islamists hands so far.

Opportunities

Foreign and Pakistani aid alone will not win the struggle for civil society, however. Elected officials and civil administrators in Pakistan realize governance structure and frontier crimes regulation need to be reformulated for stability to ensue. Revisions to the frontier criminal code have been approved by President Zardari [33]. Implementation of legal reform may prove problematic because of complex relations between the FATA’s administrative units and Pakistan’s Federal Government. But without legal and administrative codes that are uniform throughout the entire FATA, local norms in governance and justice will continue to prevail - causing friction, inequity, violence - including revenge killings, and civic breakdown among the 7 tribal agencies and 6 frontier regions there [34]. An important opportunity has presented itself for U.S., E.U., and U.N. personnel to serve as guides for FATA officials requesting collaboration in implementing updated regulations and modifying older codes.

Simultaneous with other efforts, enhancing cross-border collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan would boost bilateral trust [35]. Certain tribes, like the Shinwaris of the FATA, coexist well on both sides of that border. Their assistance should be sought in re-establishing civil society and regional security. Other FATA Pashtun tribes such as the Waziris have ethnic links to the Kandaharis in Afghanistan, providing opportunities for positive engagement with each other, with their national governments, and with foreign aid organizations. Likewise, certain professions such as engineering, medicine, and education permit individuals and groups to transcend tribal and national differences. Afghanistan lacks qualified professionals in those fields and could draw upon foreign expertise in the FATA and Pakistani talent at NWFP institutions like the University of Peshawar whose faculty express eagerness at the prospect.

Indeed, cross-border initiatives provide a unique opportunity to enhance the tribal, technological, educational, and employment situations among all Pashtuns according to FATA representatives. Therefore, according to fieldworkers there, the U.S., E.U., and U.N. need to engage the central and regional administrations of both Pakistan and Afghanistan to build the necessary intellectual, civil, economic, and law-enforcement ties. Western-supported pilot programs would eventually lead to increased trust, dialogue, and teamwork across the FATA’s western border. Most important, both FATA officials and relief providers believe that collaboration by tribesfolk, educators, technologists, and administrators would initially mitigate and eventually replace the current, destructive, cross-border exchanges by fundamentalist ideologues, militant fighters, and drug smugglers that have begun to extend from the FATA to Pakistan’s main cities [36]. So a project has begun to halt illicit trade and provide infrastructure and regulations for cross-border economic activities — one which now is threatened by U.S. funding reallocations.

One line of thought in current U.S. policy, spearheaded by Richard Holbrooke the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, focuses on completely handing over the planning, administration, and staffing of civil society reconstruction projects to the Government of Pakistan and to private Pakistani organizations [37]. U.S. officials suggest that so doing will reduce negative reactions by Pakistanis while safeguarding Western civilians by removing them from the FATA. However, Pakistani and foreign aid-workers in addition to local officials of the FATA are greatly perturbed by this possibility. They know full well that on-site Western guidance is necessary in addition to financial assistance - and lack thereof will “seriously compromise” civil society redevelopment efforts [38]. Moreover, apprehension displayed recently by Pakistan’s generals and press toward foreign involvement arises from fears that American politicians and the U.S. military with its private security contractors could undermine that nation’s military and civilian institutions, and not from non-nationals cooperating with Pakistanis in the re-engineering of FATA’s civil society [39]. So less direct military and paramilitary involvement in Pakistani affairs and more concerted civilian activity provide other important opportunities toward successful civil society reconstruction.

In the context of maintaining on-ground involvement within the FATA, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) generate less controversy there. Precisely because they are not linked officially to Western regimes, NGOs are less connected to the notion of neocolonialism that many Pakistanis fear. Civil society reconstruction in the FATA would benefit, therefore, from USAID’s Offices of New Initiatives (ONI) and Transition Initiatives (OTI) among other American agencies, England’s DFID, Germany’s GTZ, and the various bureaus of the U.N. integrating their efforts more closely with NGOs especially with Pakistani-overseen and Pakistani-controlled ones [40]. In other words, projects should not be handed over to those organizations; rather, partnerships need to exist between Western aid agencies and NGOs and Pakistani NGOs. A greater sense of ownership in re-engineering their own society will allay suspicion, increase local commitment, and facilitate broader and more effective penetration into the diverse populations groups of the FATA that need assistance. FATA officials suggest this would be more efficient than abruptly transferring activities to the Government of Pakistan.

Prospects

“From its safe haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the so-called FATA, al- Qaida continues to recruit and train fighters … and to plot attacks,” emphasized John Brennan, Assistant to the U.S. President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, in August 2009 [41]. The battle for the hearts and minds of FATA’s residents is between civil society and violent militancy, with the elected Pakistani government and its citizens on one side and the unelected Taliban and al-Qaida on the other side. It is a struggle that governments and peace-seeking citizens are slowly winning through reconstruction of civil society. Pakistan’s Interior Minister Rehman Malik noted that “now the people have turned against them (Islamic militants)” [42].

U.S., E.U., and U.N. assistance for incorporating individuals and groups back into FATA’s society has been the key to success. Civil society reconstruction may very well ensure the “security for our families, progress for our communities, and peace between nations” which, as U.S. President Barack Obama observed, most people seek [43]. Sustaining positive outcomes, however, require cautious policy, tactful engagement, and constant consultation (and not just between senior officials but with persons actually working in the FATA) so as not to squander a unique opportunity to get things right [44].

Essentially, in order for success to continue, words spoken by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi to the American press in September must continue to remain true: “The people of FATA are with us” [45]. Meeting that most important goal, which underlies all other successes, requires foreign governments and organizations to be on the ground there for civilian projects. Military and paramilitary actions should be left largely to the Pakistan military, which will seek foreign guidance and assistance when needed as it engages in combat against the Muslim terrorists who have fled from the towns and villages of South Waziristan into the hills and to nearby regions - warning they will return “for our offensive” [46]. Benchmarks of progress proposed by the U.S. administration, therefore, must focus on civilian factors more than on military ones for lasting stability to be generated. A vibrant safe community there will be the best deterrent to militant fundamentalism.

Ultimately the successes, missteps, and opportunities encountered in Pakistan’s FATA will provide invaluable lessons of how to create modern civil societies with external support [47].

Jamsheed K. Choksy
BA Columbia University, PhD Harvard University, is professor of Central Eurasian, Indian, Iranian, Islamic, and International studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. The views expressed are his own.

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[38] http://i.usatoday.net/news/pdf/Dissent%20on%20Holbrooke%20FATA%20actions.pdf.

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[47] http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4489.

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