Mozambique is a country that is riddled with poverty. It is placed on the UN’s list of the 50 Least Developed Countries, and accommodates 0.61% of the world’s population living below the global poverty line of US$1 a day. It continues to have one of the lowest GDP per capita in the world, and shows dramatic limitations in crafting human development (with 900 US$ in 2009, Mozambique is ranked 218/228 countries worldwide in GDP per capita terms, and 172/182 on the 2009 Human Development Index). On the other hand is it a country that has been hailed by the World Bank for its vehement reduction in poverty levels: “poverty declined rapidly in Mozambique over the 96/97-02/03 period” one report stated (Fox et.al, 2005).

How is this possible? This article sets out to meaningfully critique the way poverty is measured in Mozambique, by analysing the measurements usefulness against the capabilities framework of Amartya Sen, which is the philosophical base of the country’s poverty definition used in the government’s PRSP. Considering the influence measurement techniques have gained on directing policies, and to judge progress made on reducing levels of absolute poverty, it concludes with a call to replace the current unidimensional poverty measure with a multidimensional measurement application, one that shall allow the better crafting of policy responses to fight poverty defined as “capabilities deprivation”.

Introduction: Discrepancy unravelled

In Mozambique’s current Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PARPA II 2006-2009 (Plano de Acção para a Redução da Probeza Absoluta), poverty is defined as the “the impossibility, owing to inability and/or lack of opportunity for individuals, families, and communities to have access to the minimum basic conditions, according to the society’s basic standards” (GdM, 2006: 8).

This definition follows implicitly the logic of Amartya Sen’s capabilities concept, one which perceives poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon: poverty understood as the absence of some basic capabilities; which is a minimum set of “real opportunities”, people need to live the life they value (Sen, 1987: 36).

Sen famously argued that seeking equality of income or consumption, the traditional proxies of development within welfare economics and utilitarianism, is a misleading informational base to judge development and poverty. Various “inter-individual” and “inter-societal” conversion factors, such as personal heterogeneities, social norms, customs and conventions, as well as environmental diversities, inter alia, can prevent the successful translation of commodities (or means, such as income and consumption), into functionings (or ends, such as being well-nourished). Functionings are defined as plural achievements (beings and doings) of value, e.g. being well-nourished, employed, clothed or literate. To ensure this, policy makers and their partners in development (public and private institutions) ought to focus on enhancing and equalising people’s real opportunities (or instrumental freedoms), by improving the provision of, among others, economic facilities, social opportunities, political rights, transparency guarantees and protective securities (Sen, 1999: 38-40). If this is ensured, a person can live out their full agency freedom. An agent is understood as “someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well” (Sen, 1999: 19).

Farming for Development: Agriculture in Mozambique For some time to come the poorer countries of the world will have to rely on agriculture to raise their living standards and supply the capital they need to create industries. Agricultural production must therefore be increased. This requires tractors, fertilizers, new and better seeds, vast irrigation schemes and land reforms. Woman working in a vegetable garden in the Maputo green belt. 01 January 1984 Maputo, Mozambique. UN Photo/Ray Witlin

Post hoc, with poverty being acknowledged in PARPA II as “a multidimensional phenomenon, there is no single indicator that can capture all its manifestations” (GdM, 2006: 8).

Against this assertion it comes as a surprise that the same PRSP operates with very “traditional” ways to measure poverty. What is used is the unidimensional headcount ratio, the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap, measuring consumption levels within the family unit. Of particular relevance for policy guidance is the headcount ratio, which reports the percentage of the population that falls below a poverty line, one that is usually related to income and is conventionally measured by total household consumption (Fox et. al, 2005: 1).

The National Directorate of Planning and Budget (DNPO) of the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD), the government’s key institution for poverty measurement, appraisal and monitoring, has chosen to base PARPA II on a consumption-based assessment of poverty, one in which

“the basic minimum conditions were identified on the basis of an absolute poverty line measured in monetary terms that permits the family unit to obtain a basket of goods corresponding to a basic standard of living (GdM, 2006: 10).”

With this measurement approach applied, the headcount ratio fell from 69% to 54%, based on the comparison of the two family consumption surveys IAF (Inequérito aos Agrgados Familiares) from 1996-97 and 2002-03, in both rural and urban areas of Mozambique (the data was collected by the National Statistics Institute (INE)). These household surveys contain information on expenditure for a random sample of 8700 households (DNPO, 2004: 2). This figure is used to guide policy action, and as a headline to judge joint governmental and international community efforts regarding their poverty reduction strategies and policies. It resulted in the World Bank stating that “poverty declined rapidly in Mozambique over the 96/97-02/03 period” (Fox et.al, 2005); and it allowed the IMF to conclude in their PRSP Annual Progress Report and Review of the GdM’s Economic and Social Plan for 2003 that: “After all, it can be said that the PARPA central objective of reducing poverty incidence to less than 60% of the population by 2005 had already been met” (IMF, 2004: 22)

PARPA II sets itself the target to further reduce the poverty headcount from 54% in 2003 to 45% by 2009 (GdM, 2006: 1), a target still uncertain of being achieved as of July 2010.

In the analysis to follow I aim to highlight the discrepancy between the definition of poverty used in PARPA, against the chosen way to measure poverty. It will be argued that the discrepancy results in the drafting of policies that are not useful in alleviating poverty defined as the deprivation of some basic capabilities.

Poverty as a lack of consumption: Measuring around the problem

PARPA’s consumption-based assessment of poverty operates with poverty lines that were defined in a way that attempts to reflect the wide variations in prices and consumption patterns throughout the country (Hanlon, Smart, 2008: 61).

Yet, what counts as consumption and what is actually measured is determined by definition. Contained in the measurement is the “the total value of consumption of food and nonfood items (including purchases, home-produced items, and gifts received), as well as imputed use values for owner-occupied housing and household durable goods” (DNPO, 2004: 4).

The validation of the different components of consumption (and income respectively) is done at market prices. What’s problematic here is that monetary values should, in fact, be imputed into the measurement for those items that are not valued through the market (Glewwe, Grosh, 2000). This can be done through approximation of expenditure data, and adjustments for the use of services from durables (Ruggeri Laderchi et.al, 2003: 8). Due to claims by the DNPO of econometric-quantitative limitations however, two important components of consumption, at least from a capabilities perspective, were omitted from the measurement in Mozambique: the “consumption of commodities supplied by the public sector free of charge (or the subsidized element in such commodities) and consumption of home produced services” (DNPO, 2004: 4, fn. 4).

In other words, the provision of public goods, defined as goods that are non-excludable and non-rival (as in opposition to private goods whose ownership can be transferred and contested (that is, a good consumed by an individual cannot be consumed by somebody else)), are not included in the consumption measure, as the IAF data do not permit quantification of these benefits. Examples would include streets, schools, public markets or water taps, the environment (including clear water, clear air, inter alia), defence and law enforcement, among others.

Thus, even though these goods will most likely enhance the well-being of an individual who is using those facilities, it is not accounted for in the measurement. Additionally, home produced services, such as cooking and cleaning, also add to a person’s welfare; yet, the IAF data permits neither quantification of those benefits. They are excluded from the consumption measure as well (DNPO, 2004: 4).

From a capability perspective, this is problematic in several ways: firstly, policy-makers will lack incentive to invest in and protect public goods, which is crucial for the enhancement of several “instrumental freedoms” (such as the creation of economic and social opportunities, i.e. through investments in public infrastructure, schools and health systems, inter alia (Sen, 1999: 38-40). That is, because their impact will not be felt in numerical terms. Secondly, the identification of the poor for “evidence-based” targeting may favour those lacking private income. This will favour a market and private sector driven development model, against one that rather follows support-led processes and opportunities expansions, the latter the more appropriate choice within the capabilities framework for low human development countries (Sen, 1999: 35-36; 46). Hence, the measure tends, on the grand scale, to set incentives for policy actions that are based on a competitive market ideology, when, in fact, a solidarity model would be the more appropriate strategy for Mozambique (Vollmer, 2010a).

Applying the “Basic Needs Approach” to set poverty lines: Confusing caloric intake with nutrition

To determine region-specific poverty rates for each of the 13 areas of the country, Mozambique’s first and second national poverty assessment (MPF et.al, 1998; DNPO, 2004) chose the cost of basic needs approach (CBN). The CBN differs to other models used within the consumption-based approach for the determination of poverty lines, such as the food energy intake, in the sense that it “does not suffer from the problem of inconsistent poverty comparisons”, as claimed by the DNPO (2004: fn. 6). Poverty lines within the CBN approach were constructed

“as the sum of a food and non-food poverty line. Once the poverty line has been constructed, households that spend less on a per capita basis than the poverty line are deemed poor (…). They are set in terms of a level of per capita consumption expenditure that is deemed consistent with meeting these basic needs (DNPO, 2004: 4-5).”

Hence, each poverty line was set

“as the sum of the nutritional poverty line established by nutritional standards of approximately 2,150 calories per person per day, plus a modest portion for non-food expenditures, determined on the basis of the portion of the budget spent on non-foods by families whose total consumption is approximately equal to the food-related poverty line. The poverty analysis in 2002-03 was done to facilitate a comparison of the results from that period with the results from 1996-97 (GdM, 2006: 10).”

For each of the 13 areas a “food basket” was defined, that aimed to reflect actual consumption of people close to the poverty line. The bundle for the 1996/97 survey covered 151 food commodities, the bundle for the 2002/03 survey only 20 to 30 items, which, nevertheless, accounted for 95 percent of the value of food consumption in 1996-97 (DNPO, 2004: 8). The food poverty line was then expressed in region specific monetary costs per person per day for meeting the minimum caloric requirements when consuming this food bundle (DNPO, 2004: 6).

The non-food poverty line was derived by examining the non-food consumption among those households whose total expenditure is equal or close (80% to 120%) to the food poverty line (DNPO, 2004: 14-15). Spending on non-food items such as clothing ranged between 18% of the total budget in rural Mozambique to 32% in some urban areas in 1996/97 (Hanlon, Smart, 2008: 61). For the 2002/03 survey the non-food spending was not specified in the DNPO.

Drought in Africa: Mozambique. UN Photo/Kate Truscott

By combining both poverty lines into one for each area, 69% of the population (11.7 million people) were classified “poor” based on the first IAF for 1996/97, and 54% (10 million) for the 2002/03 survey (Hanlon, Smart, 2008: 61).

The results of the DNPO are contested in the sense that the high fall of 15% in the headcount ratio is based on the use of a “flexible food bundle”, one that takes the substantial relative price changes that occurred between 1996/97 and 2002/03 in all spatial domains into account. As of these price changes, low-income households have incentives to change their consumption choices to take advantage of goods with relatively low prices and avoid goods with relatively high prices (DNPO, 2004: 9). The stark increase of maize prices for instance forced the poorest sections of Mozambique to switch to the cheaper cassava, which is problematic because cassava is less nutritious than maize (Hanlon, Smart, 2008: 62).

As this consumption-based measurement does not take nutrients other than calories into account (such as iron, proteins, vitamin A, B, C, among others), the change in the type of food remains non-accounted for as long as the caloric intake remains the same. Critics have identified this measurement weakness (Hanlon, Smart, 2008), which is indeed acknowledged in the DNPO report as an econometric problematic limitation (2004: fn. 9).

It can be named as the main reason why officially the poverty headcount in Mozambique can decline (defined by caloric intake), while chronic (child) malnutrition is apparently on the rise (Hanlon, Smart, 2008: 60, 62). Indices of chronic malnutrition in children under the age of five are still extremely high in Mozambique, at approx. 41%. Between 2001 and 2003, child malnutrition declined by 3.6 % in rural areas, with a small increase in urban areas (0.4%). Overall though, the number of chronically malnourished children rose from 36% in 1997 to 41% in 2003, turning Mozambique into a country with the highest rates of child malnutrition in Africa. It is estimated that approx. 1.3 million children are chronically undernourished (DARA, 2009: 2). UNICEF argues that chronic child malnutrition can act as a well suited reference indicator for the general well-being of a population (Dupraz et.al, 2007: 94).

Based on the comparison of caloric vs. energy intake, Hanlon and Smart criticise the DNPO measurement procedure, stating that “though the flexible food bundle reflects what the poor are buying, it is not of the same nutritional quality; it is not the same poverty line but a lower one” (2008: 62).

Instead, a “fixed food bundle” should have been used in order to establish consistency in (absolute) poverty comparisons. If this is done, the reduction of the headcount ratio between the surveys is only at app. 6 % (69% to 63%), which would mean a net increase of people living in poverty from 11.2 million to 11.7 million (the increase in total figures is due to a population rise between the two surveys from 16,099,246 in 1997 to 19,607,519 in 2002) (http 1)).

The DNPO defends the switch by stating that “fixed food bundles tend to overstate the cost of attaining that standard of living, as alternative bundles that yield the same utility are available at a lower cost” (2004: 9). And further,

“if the relative prices of food vary regionally, the comparability of welfare levels across regions is only an illusion, and the use of a single consumption bundle for all regions can generate inconsistent poverty comparisons (2004: 7).”

Following this reasoning the poverty line would have been set too high with a “fixed food bundle”, overstating the amount of people living in poverty. As outlined above though, this reasoning excludes the type of diet poor people are dependent on, and thus overstates the importance of caloric intake. Hanlon and Smart’s criticism has thus a valid core; however, as shall be seen, the operation with “flexible food bundles” satisfies Amartya Sen’s demand to operate with “differences in relational perspectives” (to be outlined in the next sub point), which relativises this argument.

In sum nevertheless, whether the measurement operates with “flexible” or “fixed” food bundles, the core weakness of any consumption-based measure, defined either by caloric intake or based on food energy, is it’s inability to account for the physical condition of individuals to convert available food into a well-nourished diet (or to use the capabilities terminology, to convert commodities as means (caloric intake) into functionings as ends (being well nourished)).

Main limitations of PARPA’s unidimensional measure: Disclosure vis-à-vis concealment

Any quantitative measurement presents “an integrated view of situations” (OPHI, n.d.: 1) and is operating with value judgements and arbitrariness’ to define some fundamental issues in a comprehensive manner. By nature, they reduce the complexities of poverty in order to produce econometric sound results. Thus, each measurement needs to be critically examined in two ways: it requires analysing the information it actually provides, to be triangulated with the search of information it (deliberately or non-deliberately) obscures.

For instance, if poverty is defined in absolute terms in relation to consumption, as happened with the IAF surveys, it is likely to some extent that poverty is

“relative in income terms, since in richer societies people generally need more money to acquire the same nutrition - as cheaper foods are not available, transport is needed to shop, and so on (Ruggeri Laderchi et. al, 2003: 5).”

This has been identified by Amartya Sen as a conversion factor in the translation of commodities into achieved levels of functionings, and refers to the “differences in relational perspectives” (1999: 71). In other words, by using “flexible food bundles”, DNPO’s and PARPA’s measurement is indeed sensitive to “inter-societal” variations with regards to commodity translations; yet it is insensitive to “inter-individual” variations, as of the non-accounting for of other nutrients needed (other than caloric intake) to achieve a healthy diet.

Having said this, the “inter-societal variation” is only partly accounted for, as other important information in relation to relative resources in the socio-economic/ political environment are not incorporated. For instance, according to the reliable online source NationMaster, historical data from between 1996 and 2006 (which constitutes at the same time latest data available) shows that out of Mozambique’s total 30,400 km roads network, only 5,685 km are paved, which severely limits the capacity to transport road goods. A total of only 110 million tonnes/km were transported in 1996, thereby ranking Mozambique 49/52 in worldwide country comparison. This breaks down to 6.74 million tonnes/km per 1 million population, which is severely below the weighted average of 336.1 million tonnes/km per 1 million population of 72 countries ranked (http 2).

Additionally, Mozambique’s total railway network amounted to 3,123 km in 2006 (ranking it 53/220 worldwide), allowing goods to be transported in the realm of 768 million tonnes/km (ranking it 81/111 worldwide). This was equal to a capacity utilisation of only 38.803 million tonnes/km per 1 million population, which, furthermore, was severely below the weighted average of 3,901.0 million tonnes/km per 1 million of 111 countries ranked. Per capita, this places Mozambique 87/111 in worldwide comparison (http 2).

Thus, goods which cannot reach most of rural Mozambique, where 70% and hence the majority of the country’s poor live, are goods not available for consumption. Also problematic is the lack of suitable infrastructure in rural areas, which adds to the costs of farming. As outlined in a report by Mole, who conducted a Micro study on Smallholder Agricultural Intensification in Mozambique, transportation costs “increase transaction costs to market for both inputs and produce. High transaction costs result mainly due to poor links between production areas and consumption markets” (2006: 11).

Another important aspect to consider when consumption is used as an indicator for poverty is to assess technological achievements. These are suitable signifiers for judging governmental and private sector efforts in the R+D of (and actual distribution or real access to) new agriculture technologies, such as fertilisers and seeds, indispensable for the increase in food production. Here, UNDP’s 2001 “Technology Achievement Index” (TAI) is useful, which measured

“how well a country is creating and diffusing technology and building a human skill base, reflecting capacity to participate in the technological innovations of the network age. The TAI focuses on four dimensions of technological capacity: creation of technology, diffusion of recent innovations, diffusion of old innovations, human skills (http 3).”

Out of 72 countries ranked in the TAI (for which relevant data was available and of acceptable quality), Mozambique achieved a score of 0.066, and was placed last. The authors of the study state that scores below 0.20 indicate a marginalisation of the country, indicating that “technology diffusion and skill building have a long way to go in these countries. Large parts of the population have not benefited from the diffusion of old technology” (Desai et. al, 2002: 112).

This assessment has been somewhat verified by the aforementioned study conducted by Mole, whose survey of 398 households across Mozambique revealed that approx. 74% “had no cash outlay on seed in the year preceding the survey. The majority of the households in rural areas exchange seed from past harvest among themselves” (2006: 12). The survey revealed further that only 4% of smallholder farmers obtain seed via the market, that land preparation services by tractor or animal traction are in most parts of the study non-existent, and that only a few farmers have the ability to use fertilisers and pesticides (2006: 11-12).

Thus, one of the main problems of increasing agricultural production in Mozambique is the lack of inputs in the form of seeds and fertilizers, and poor market access. As a result, “the likelihood for increased incomes to improve access to food and reduce poverty is low” (Mole, 2006: 52).

These “inter-societal” conversion factors, or “real unfreedoms” in the terminology of Sen, are important types of information if poverty is understood as “capabilities deprivation”. That is, because they are barriers in people’s “agency freedom” which need to be removed, strictly speaking. Yet, PARPA’s measurement does not help in revealing these areas of necessary policy action; on the contrary, it conceals them with its narrow and unidimensional focus on caloric intake as a proxy for consumption. Hence, what is undoubtedly needed is a meaningful multidimensional measurement that better captures PARPA’s multidimensional poverty definition.

Conclusion: Matching measurement with definition - A call for revision

This paper has highlighted the problem that the applied measurement of poverty in Mozambique conceals, rather than discloses necessary areas of policy action. Researchers and analysts should aim to find and successfully apply a multidimensional measurement that actually helps to analyse real opportunity provisions for impoverished Mozambicans, in order to better guide policy makers and development actors with regard to Sen’s capability approach, which is engaged with the attempt to explicitly achieve individual well-being, context-specific defined, by switching the focus from means (such as consumption in form of caloric intake) to ends (such as being well-nourished, which remains one functioning among others nonetheless).

Measuring poverty is certainly meaningful; but only if it helps guiding policies to achieve self-set standards. The official unidimensional poverty measurement is of no help in alleviating the kind of poverty in Mozambique as correctly defined in PARPA II. And indeed, a close scrutiny of PARPA II reveals a policy orientation that is highly neo-liberal, monetarist and supply leaning, as it seeks macroeconomic stability through fiscal discipline, the creation of a free market and favourable market conditions for Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and the private sector (GdM, 2006: 118-119; Vollmer, 2010b: 350). Certainly, causation between poverty measurement and policy response can not be claimed; but neither can be a strong correlation denied.

Because of this rationale, a measure is needed that sets incentives to create the pro-poor possibilities people need to live out their full potential as active agents capable of improving living realities for themselves. Possible actions include, among others, prudent public expenditure policies that focuses on the development of “public infrastructure in the field of transport, communication and energy”, and a proactive tax and incentive policy, in order to mobilize investments for formal job and commercial agribusiness creation (Cornia, 2006: 20-21); far-reaching direct cash transfers to stimulate market demand, and a sharp expansion of labour-intensive public work projects, such as road and irrigation system building (Hanlon, Smart, 2008: 155-157); the “reintroduction of some type of marketing boards” to ensure fair prices of produced goods and guaranteed markets (Tvedten et.al, 2009: 4); and continuous investments in education and health systems, housing and sanitation.

It should be advocated that in the crafting of PARPA III, and even in the current debates on the governments programme for the five year period 2010-2014, submitted by the President Armando Guebuza and Prime Minister Aires Ali led government to Mozambique’s parliament Assembleia da República for approval on March 30th 2010 (http 4), and approved on April 5th 2010 (http 5), that this is a consideration which must be taken seriously into account. A promising new measurement applied in several cases, particularly across Latin America, is Sabina Alkire’s and James Foster’s Counting Approach (2008), one of a few new kinds of complex measures of multidimensional poverty which has been proven of being “user-friendly” (as in technically solid and replicable) whilst satisfying a number of desirable statistical and econometric properties. Yet, this is only food for thought. Finding the appropriate measure requires a very thorough debate.

Frank Vollmer
PhD Candidate
UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace
University Jaume I, Spain

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The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

The past decade has seen a push towards separation and unilateralism on both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Following a decade of engagement under the Oslo process, the shift occurred after the outbreak of the second Intifada. It was a shift initially led by the Israelis under the premiership of Ariel Sharon (2001-06), during which construction of the Separation Wall began and an evacuation of Jewish settlements in Gaza took place.

The Palestinians’ drive for separation is more recent: August 2010 will mark the first anniversary of that official position, based on Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s programme for government. If fulfilled the plan, “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, will see a unilateral declaration of independence by the Palestinians by the end of next year. This marks a significant change from previous model to achieve Palestinian self-government through the Oslo process, which included Israeli involvement.

The shift from engagement to separation in the Israel/Palestine conflict is interesting for several factors. First, it goes against many of the assumptions concerning conflict resolution. Second, separation as a policy faces several challenges given the connections that exist between Israel and the Palestinians - despite efforts to achieve it through ‘facts on the ground’. Third, it poses questions about the feasibility of achieving separation, which are ultimately bound up in the relative positions and influence of the respective actors.

Separation as policy: running against the trend

That both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships have opted for a path of separation has been the main dynamic of the past decade. Yet it also comes in a period where globalisation constitutes the dominant trend. Globalisation has many facets, the most commonly associated of which is economic integration. But it also has significant political, social and cultural dimensions as well.

At a general level the response to globalisation has been greater engagement by different actors around the world. This has occurred at all levels, from the elite level including political leaders at various summits (e.g. G8, G20) and economic negotiators in the WTO talks to civil society; the most notable of which were those individuals, social movements and organisations at the World Social Forum. Perhaps the most institutionalised approach has been the European Union and its development of supranational governance. But even at the level of the individual globalisation has permeated our senses: despite restrictions on freedom of movement (most notably immigration barriers), society and culture appears to know no boundaries. The use of information technology and digital social networks enable communication and the sharing of cultural artefacts (e.g. film, music) across continents and facilitate mobilisation on behalf of others - one way in which the Israel-Palestine conflict has both attracted widespread attention and agitation.

Aida Camp, West Bank .In the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)'s Aida Camp for Palestinian refugees, a young resident bikes past a bullet-pocked wall of UNRWA's School for Girls. June 2003. UN Photo/Stephenie Hollyman

The Israel-Palestine conflict is one such recipient of this greater global connectedness. From the early 1990s until the early part of the 2000s the two sides were committed to the Oslo process, whereby the two sides would move step-by-step towards the creation of a Palestinian state and remove Israeli forces from the occupied territories (the two-state solution). This was to be achieved by undertaking parallel confidence-building measures. Towards the end of the process some of the most difficult aspects of the conflict would be resolved, including the borders between the two states, the rights of refugees, decisions on settlements in the areas and the status of Jerusalem.

However, that process has been effectively dead for much of the past decade. The failure of the US-mediated Camp David talks between then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 2000 contributed to a loss of faith by both sides. Provocative acts, including Ariel Sharon’s (Israel’s soon to be Prime Minister) visit to the Dome of the Rock, weakened trust further and eventually resulted in the start of the second Intifada. For the following few years acts of violence were carried out by both sides, including Palestinian suicide bombings in Israeli cities and the killing of civilians by Israeli troops in the West Bank and Gaza.

It was during this period that the Sharon government embarked on a unilateral process of separation. The most visible manifestation of this was the creation of the concrete parts of the Separation or Security Wall within the territory of the West Bank and the removal of Jewish settlements from the Gaza strip in 2005. But Sharon was not content with separating Israel from the Palestinians; rather he sought separation within Israel as well. This was most apparent in Sharon’s break away from the Likud party and the formation of a new political force, Kadima, which incorporated both Sharon’s supporters and those who felt disenfranchised by the political establishment. Although Kadima lost the 2009 election, the successor coalition government led by Likud remains similarly separatist in outlook.

The Palestinians’ response own turn towards separation and unilateralism was slow in coming. In part this involved an internal separation and schism occurring within Palestinian politics and society between Hamas and Fatah during the mid-2000s.

The second Intifada had effectively exhausted the Palestinians and achieved no substantial change for their situation. Matters were further compounded by the election of the Islamist party, Hamas, in February 2006 and rising tensions between it and the more secular Fatah party for control of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). This eventually resulted in civil war and the effective political and administrative disconnection of Gaza under control of Hamas and the West Bank by Fatah in mid-2007.

The separation of political control was exacerbated by the aversion of many in the international community, including the US and EU, to engage directly with Hamas. As a result, the EU adopted mechanisms to channel aid which bypassed Hamas while also promoting Fatah as its main partner for dialogue. It was at this moment, in June 2007 that the PNA president, Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas, appointed the technocrat Salam Fayyad as prime minister.

Despite the shift towards separation, both within and between Israel and the Palestinians, much of the rhetoric coming out of the international community has been concerned with getting the two sides back around the table. Although the main actors in the Quartet (the US, EU, Russia and the UN) did express their support for Fayyad’s 2009 plan at their meeting last March, they have also pressed for both Israel and the Palestinians to undertake proximity talks (1). These talks would be arguably seen as a step towards getting the Oslo process back on track, since they envisage a return to full bilateral discussion between the two sides regarding the final status of all outstanding differences.

The myth of separation in the Israel-Palestine conflict: becoming a reality?

Notwithstanding the wish of the international community, to what extent is the situation between Israel and Palestine becoming one of growing separation? While it is certainly apparent that there are growing divisions between the two sides, at both a physical as and metaphysical level (including both metal and rhetorical), it is also evident that there remains certain points of contact and connection beneath the facade. Whether these provide much of a basis for dialogue though is another matter.

Physically it is very much the case that in both the occupied territories as well as in Israel itself, Israel and Palestinians appear worlds apart. In the occupied territories although the removal of Jewish settlements from Gaza has not been matched in the West Bank, the latter is increasingly adopting a series of measures that ensure Israelis and Palestinians remain separate. The Separation Wall is one example of this, but it can also be seen in the creation of a parallel road network in the territory where settlers use one and Palestinians the other. Even where a Jewish settlement is located in the heart of a Palestinian community, as in Hebron, separation is paramount. Nowhere is this more explicit than the convoluted means of access to the mosque and synagogue that house opposite sides of the Tombs of the Patriarchs.

In Israel there is a significant Palestinian minority, around 20% of the population. While they do have some political representation in the Knesset (Parliament) they remain largely separated from the majority Jewish population on several counts. First, they are concentrated in the north of the country and east Jerusalem. Second, they feel discriminated against, owing to the Jewish nature of the Israeli state. For example, not only can Palestinians not take advantage of the Jewish ‘right of return’ law, but the 2003 Citizenship and Entry Law has also restricted the right to residency of foreign spouses (i.e. Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza) of Palestinian citizens in Israel.

Mentally, there is also a growing disconnection between Israelis and Palestinians. For many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, their main contact with Israelis extends no further than the soldiers and military or border police at checkpoints, which arguably limits Palestinians’ capacity to emphasise with Israelis beyond their experience at the wrong end of a gun.

Among Israelis and especially those who live in the ‘bubble’, there is an unawareness or willingness to understand the experience of the Palestinian experience, both among them as a minority and in the occupied territories. One example of this separation is evident in the use of language and the emphasis on ‘Arab’ rather than ‘Palestinian’. The denial of ‘Palestinian‘ indicates an unwillingness to acknowledge these people’s self-definition as such and consequently their right to self-determination on lands that they consider ‘Palestinian’. By contrast the label ‘Arab’ makes it easier for a clear-cut distinction to be drawn between Israelis and Arabs and a return to a pre-1967 mindset when Israel saw itself threatened from the outside, including Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. ‘Arab’ is a term to signify the other, as not part of Israel and therefore without any commensurate rights. The term also enables Israeli leaders and societies to imply that there are other homes for ‘Arabs’, outside of Israel and the lands taken in 1967. Acknowledging them as ‘Palestinian’ would mean accepting their differences from other Arabs and their nation states.

Despite these cases of separation though, the reality is that Israelis and Palestinians are more connected than their leaders will acknowledge - although the tendency is towards a more negative relationship than a positive one. The case of the Palestinian minority in Israel has already been noted above. In addition, there is the nature of the economic relationship between Israel and the occupied territories - although to the benefit of the former over the latter. Leila Farsakh has noted how this was done, including prevention of competition from Palestinian goods and factors of production, a one-sided customs union that allowed Israelis free access to Palestinian markets and denied them to Palestinian products (especially agricultural), restricted investment and capital flows and high taxation of Palestinians and a one-way flow of Palestinian workers into Israel (2).

Second, despite Israeli efforts to exert control, market forces remain prevalent. This is apparent both in the daily migration of thousands of Palestinian labourers passing through weak and unsecured points in the barrier between the West Bank and Israel in search of low-wage work. Meanwhile, within the West Bank and given the absence of other jobs, it is possible to find hundreds of Palestinians working in the settlements and their construction.

Third, separatist policies bring their own paradoxical pressures towards greater connection and engagement. The Israeli occupation and settlement of the West Bank has meant the creation of hundreds of checkpoints across the territory which ensure daily interaction (albeit it of a tense and polarising kind), mainly between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians. In Gaza the removal of settlements changed the dynamic of the relationship, from one that was a direct occupation into a siege. While the consequences and costs have undoubtedly been greater for the population in Gaza than for Israel, it has ensured a form of connection between the two sides, whether through Israeli restrictions on the supply of aid into the territory or the use of force, as occurred during its invasion of the territory in December 2008/January 2009.

Is separation feasible?

The previous sections have considered the extent to which Israeli and Palestinian leaderships have adopted separation as their main course of action and the extent to which this is a reality. Certainly there is a general acceptance that the Oslo process is dead, despite efforts by the international community to resuscitate it. At the same time the trend towards separation seems to be at odds with the nature of a more integrated world. In addition, there is the fact that while Israelis and Palestinians remain connected, it is questionable whether it can provide the basis for any positive engagement: the connection between the two sides is structurally imbalanced, benefiting one side over the other and underpinned by an occupier-occupied dynamic.

In such circumstances does Fayyad’s plan constitute the best course available for the Palestinians? If achieved the plan envisages a declaration of independence by that part of the PNA controlled by Fatah before the end of 2011. This would require the effective institutionalisation of governing organs and governance, sufficient social security coverage and programmes, a vibrant market-based economy and the development of necessary infrastructure (3). All of this will undoubtedly be a tall order to achieve, if limited to the main objectives laid out in the plan.

For Shlomo Avineri, a political science professor at Hebrew University, a Palestinian declaration of independence would certainly change the parameters of the conflict. In particular he says that while it would not end the conflict but change the dynamics from one that is between an occupier and occupied people into one that is between two countries which disagree on a number of issues. Avineri suggests this would make the conflict an inter-state one like that which exists between Israel and Syria. (4)

However, Avineri’s analogy may not be entirely accurate. Doubtless there would be a number of states that would respond positively to a Palestinian declaration of independence. But the likelihood that this would temper or even change the Israeli approach is scant. First, it is by no means certain that those states, such as the US and key European countries, will necessarily go along with independence, despite the Quartet’s support for the Fayyad plan. Second, it remains unclear what effect a (presumably) Fatah-announced declaration of Palestinian independence would have on the Hamas-controlled Gaza strip. Third, Israel’s response is by no means clear: the fact that it has been criticised by its peers in the UN on numerous occasions concerning its occupation of Palestinian territory has had little effect in changing its behaviour.

Indeed, Columbia University’s Joseph Massad sees the Fayyad plan as little more than a repeat of the Camp David proposals offered to Yasser Arafat in 2000. The main differences are that first, it is Americans’ Palestinian proxies that are making the deal rather than themselves and the Israelis and second, the land available for Palestinian sovereignty is less than was available in 2000 (i.e. 58% as opposed to 65% of the West bank). (5)

The responses to Massad’s charges are two. First, we cannot be certain what the outcome would be of a Palestinian declaration of independence would be. History is not always the best guide to politics in the region. The failure of Camp David heralded the end of the Oslo process and the resumption of confrontation and violence through the second Intifada. By contrast the current context is one of growing separation and isolation on both sides, coupled with Palestinian exhaustion and failure to achieve anything of substance as a result of the Intifada.

Second, Massad’s criticism arguably has an underlying assumption of determinism. Yet if Camp David was acceptable to the Israelis in 2000, it is not necessarily the case that the same offer would be accepted ten years after the event. Indeed, in April the Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, said that a declaration of independence could prompt his country to revoke parts of the Oslo process or even move to annex parts of the West Bank. (6)

Lieberman’s words were telling for reasons that were unsaid, namely the relative difference in power between Israel and the Palestinians. More specifically, this imbalance is what makes separation and unilateralism a more feasible policy approach by the Israelis than the Palestinians, the former benefiting from its greater autonomy and scope of action. These are at least two factors that are both present in the immediate past and historically.

First, Israel’s relative stronger position has enabled it to adopt a much more flexible policy course. This is apparent in its historical unwillingness to set down what the status of final political and administrative arrangements with its Arab neighbours (whether they be other countries or the Palestinians) would be. This is has been a dominant theme in Israeli diplomacy since before 1948 where its leaders have been prepared to compromise on the means without ever jettisoning the ends. For example the Jewish leadership expressed a willingness to support the 1947 partition plan while privately seeing it as a temporary measure. Similarly the Oslo process effectively became an end itself. This was apparent in leaving the main points of contention to the end which was never reached. Meanwhile, the process provided a way of subcontracting their security concerns to the Palestinians without ever giving way on settlement construction, refugees’ rights or the status of Jerusalem.

Second, Israeli autonomy of action is also reflected in both its ability to maintain the occupation (and siege of Gaza) without having to shoulder its cost. Instead, much of this is taken up by the international community in the form of international aid, donor assistance and humanitarian relief (e.g. UNRWA schools) to the Palestinians on one hand and continuing access to international markets and privileged financial and military assistance from key allies like Washington.

In sum then, for the goal of Palestinian independence to be achieved ultimately - and ironically - requires Israeli assistance. To do this it will be necessary to reframe the power dynamics that underpin this conflict, namely the inbuilt advantage that Israel has over the Palestinians. This could be achieved from within and without. Internally, it would require Israel’s leaders abandoning its ambiguous stance in favour of a clear statement of intent and what it envisages as the basis for a final agreement. Externally, pressure from outside could help to redress the imbalance through less preferential treatment by the international community in terms of economic markets and assistance to easy and low-cost finance for example. Another would be for the international community to oblige Israel to take on the financial burden of its occupation policies. How pressure might be exerted on Israel in the current setting will be difficult though. It was Israel that initially adopted unilateralism and separation, followed by the Palestinians several years later. But whereas the Palestinians operate from a weaker position and therefore have less room for manoeuvre, the Israelis do so from a position from strength: and are consequently less likely to adopt willing self-restraint.

Guy Burton
Research associate at the London School of Economics (LSE) Ideas Centre.

References

(1) QUARTET, Joint Statement by the Quartet. 19 March, 2010. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138583.htm [accessed 4 July 2010]

(2) FARSAKH, L. “The Political Economy of Israeli Occupation: What’s Colonial About It?” The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies, 8(Spring): 41-58, 2008.

(3) PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State. Program of the Thirteenth Government. August 2009
http://www.mideastweb.org/palestine_state_program.htm [accessed 4 July 2010]

(4) AVINERI, S. “Watch for Palestinian declaration of independence,” The Cap Times. 13 June, 2010. http://host.madison.com/ct/news/opinion/column/article_3647a1de-758d-11df-ad93-001cc4c03286.html [accessed 4 July 2010]

(5) MASSAD, J. “An immaculate conception?” The Electronic Intifada. 14 April, 2010. http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article11207.shtml [accessed 4 July 2010]

(6) FRIEDMAN, M. “Israel Warns Palestine Not To Declare State,” The Huffington Post. 6 April, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/06/israel-warns-palestine-no_n_526565.html [accessed 4 July 2010]

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

The Transformed International Security Environment

“With the Soviet Union receding in memory, it is a wonder that NATO still exists,” wrote former National Security Council Director Mark Medish on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 60th anniversary celebrations last year. “After the fall of the Soviet bloc many voices called for disbanding NATO. That was not an outrageous idea.”

Founded in 1949 to counter expansionism by the Soviet Union, NATO is the world’s most powerful military alliance. Under the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5, the security of all current 28 European and North American NATO member states (known as “Allies”) is regarded as “indivisible”: an attack on one is an attack on all. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, pithily stated the Alliance’s purpose was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”

This goal has been achieved with enormous success, among other victories such as its military interventions in the Balkans. However, since then, NATO’s purpose has been called into question by leaders and policymakers as in Medish’s concerns above: What is the Alliance’s function in the 21st century?

That question has now been answered, with vigor, in a new report released this May by a panel of experts chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Commissioned by current NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark, the comprehensive 58-page proposal, titled “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement”, is a bold manifesto which makes a variety of policy recommendations for the future of NATO’s strategy. The report addresses strategic issues such as terrorism, cyber defense, Afghanistan, Russia and nuclear nonproliferation. The report is the preview of a final proposal, which is slated to be green-lighted this November at NATO’s New Strategic Concept Summit in Lisbon, Portugal.

The NATO 2020 report acknowledges that the international security environment has changed drastically since NATO’s original inception in 1949, pointing out that the greatest threats to the alliance’s member states will probably come from non-state actors: “With the Cold War long since ended, NATO must find its place within a less centralized and more complicated international order. Its new role will be influenced by the emergence of specific threats from a diverse spectrum of possibilities.”

Joint Press Conference Left to right: NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Madeleine Albright making their way to the press conference. Source: NATO

Global trends such as nuclear proliferation, the rise of international terrorism, piracy off the coast of Africa, ethnopolitical conflict and security challenges that will inevitably arise from the world’s increased reliance on a threatened ecosystem, diminishing natural resources, the Internet and potentially vulnerable information systems are all candidates according to the proposal.

More specifically, the report mentions that the Middle East harbors the triple threat of ongoing extremist violence, Arab-Israeli tensions and the policies of the government of Iran (specifically its nuclear ambitions). In the Asia-Pacific region, the report points out rising India-Pakistan tensions and the policies of the government of the People’s Republic of North Korea.

Of note, the Group concludes that “the most probable threats to Allies in the coming decade are unconventional. Three in particular stand out: 1) an attack by ballistic missile (whether or not nuclear-armed); 2) strikes by international terrorist groups; and 3) cyber assaults of varying degrees of severity.”

In light of the aforementioned global and regional trends, the report concludes that NATO’s new tasks and grand strategy will flow logically from the emergence of these aforementioned unconventional threats. As a consequence, the report declares that NATO must be willing to fight outside the treaty area in order to defend its members in a new world of unconventional threats and non-state actors: “Often, an effective defense against these unconventional security threats must begin well beyond the territory of the Alliance.”

NATO Enlargement: Regional or Global?

In a recent radio interview on NPR, Albright stated that the Group of Experts eventually concluded that collective defense was core to NATO’s purpose. “We made very clear that Article 5 was the core of the Alliance; that protecting the members of the Alliance was the number one job and that NATO needed to be prepared to do that.” Traditionally, NATO member states are democracies that have shown commitment to freedom, human rights and good governance. By extension, the Alliance is the key multilateral institution that unites North America and Europe. Still, the desire for further enlargement is a dream that many NATO leaders share.

As a result, NATO, which recently picked up Croatia and Albania as member states in 2006, will most likely eventually grant membership to additional former Soviet satellite states such as the Ukraine, Macedonia and Georgia in the future. Acquiring these states practically on Russia’s doorstep will inevitably amplify tensions between Moscow and the Alliance.

Lastly, although the current proposal makes very little reference to enlargement beyond the North Atlantic area, many NATO leaders envision a true global Alliance in the future, bristling with states like India, Singapore, Japan and Israel united in the spirit of collective defense.

A New Relationship with Moscow

Updated for the post-Cold War status quo, the new report calls for “pragmatic collaboration” with Russia on shared interests and common areas of concern such as nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, counterterrorism, maritime security (esp. anti-piracy defense) and drug trafficking. It points to the formation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and that venue’s track record of attempts to engage with Russia, including previous diplomatic efforts, joint projects and even consultations with Russian civilian and military leaders during the creation of the NATO 2020 report itself.

Although it acknowledges the diverse range of perceptions with which NATO personnel view Moscow, the proposal repeatedly stresses that “the Alliance neither poses a military threat to Russia, nor considers Russia a military threat to the Alliance.” Still, NATO’s activities (esp. enlargement) are often perceived by Moscow as a continuation of Cold War efforts to surround and isolate it. In fact, Albright expressed some frustration after recently delivering a speech on the NATO 2020 report at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, saying, “I don’t know how many times we have to repeat that, but [NATO] is not a threat to Russia. It is not against Russia.” It remains to be seen to what extent the NATO-Russia relationship ebbs and flows over the next decade.

The Four Most Likely Threats to NATO Allies This Decade

Of special importance is the proposal’s highlighting of what the Group of Experts conclude are the four most likely threat to NATO member states in the coming decade: nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile attacks, terrorism and cyber attacks on NATO’s critical information and communication systems.

Joint Press Conference Left to right: Madeleine Albright and NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Source: NATO

• Nuclear Proliferation

Recognizing Russia’s concerns about NATO nuclear weapon capabilities, the new proposal recommends that NATO should “invite an ongoing dialogue with Russia on nuclear perceptions, concepts, doctrines, and transparency,” in the hopes that these and other engagement efforts will “help set the stage for the further reduction and possible eventual elimination of the entire class of sub-strategic nuclear weapons.”

The report also alludes to nuclear arms control initiatives (especially with regards to Iran and North Korea), and securing stockpiles of nuclear materials to prevent the worst-case scenario of nuclear terrorism. In this vein, NATO’s vision of a nuclear-free world is consistent with President Obama’s, which the latter has expressed many times over the courses of both his candidacy and presidency.

• Ballistic Missile Attacks

On ballistic missile defense, the NATO 2020 proposal acknowledges the Obama Administration’s “gradual roll-out” approach to missile defense, which was changed last year to allay Russian concerns about arms control and to win Medvedev’s support on President Obama’s signature nuclear arms reduction proposal. It also recommends that the Alliance expand its Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense System further to provide its core command and control functions.

• Terrorism

The report also recommends that NATO’s Defense Against Terrorism Program — established in 2004 to protect against weapons of terrorism such as IEDs, suicide bombs and anti-aircraft rockets — should expand from its current focus to include, among other subjects, collaborative research on investigative techniques, deterrence, and social networking.

• Cyber Attacks on Information and Communication Systems

A major cyber attack on the public and private infrastructure of Estonia (a NATO member state) in 2007 by Russian hackers prompted NATO to allocate greater attention and resources to its cyber defenses. The mass digital invasion shut down the nation’s largest bank, Hansabank, and disrupted commerce and communications across Estonia. Similarly, when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Georgians were denied online access to news, cash and air tickets for days.

Since then, NATO has created three entities that specialize and work together in dealing with cyber attacks: A Cyber Defense Management Authority (an administrative center), a Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (a training center), and a Computer Incident Response Capability Center (a command center).

This May, NATO held its 13th war games exercise, the Cyber Defense Workshop, to discuss current issues in cyber security and practice responding to digital attacks from foreign hackers. The NATO 2020 report recommends that the Center of Excellence deliver more training in cyber defense to NATO personnel, expand early warning capabilities of electronic threats, and build up its defenses to protect the Alliance’s information and communication systems.

The Afghanistan Question

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, NATO Allies agreed to invoke Article 5 for the first time since the signing of the treaty: an attack on one member state shall be considered as an attack on all. Since August 2003, NATO’s number of military personnel in Afghanistan (”The International Security Assistance Force,” or ISAF) has grown significantly.

Probably its most contentious issue, NATO’s presence in Afghanistan has achieved mixed results in terms of stabilizing and rebuilding the country thus far. The report acknowledges both the accomplishments and failures of the ISAF, and also enumerates a list of “lessons learned.” The list goes on to make recommendations in policy arenas such as operating under a unified chain of command, clearly communicating NATO’s intentions to the local population, the protection and shielding of civilians in the field, the treatment of prisoners and finally, counterinsurgency techniques that can better enable NATO to earn the trust and loyalty of the Afghan people.

NATO’S Enduring Ideals and Purpose

NATO’s 28 member states have a combined GDP of US$31 trillion, over 2 million men and women under arms, and 130,000 military personnel on missions in three different continents. The combined military spending of all NATO Alliance constitutes over 70% of the world’s defense spending. The new Strategic Concept, if approved this November, will empower this powerful organization to adapt to a new world of unconventional security threats and also provide an answer to the policymakers who have questioned NATO’s raison d’être.

NATO is not only a military organization, but also a political one. Since 1949, it has traditionally stated its central purpose as being to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization” of its members by promoting “stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.” Despite numerous setbacks, disagreements among Allies, geopolitical obstacles and errors, the Alliance embodies the enduring ideals of a stable and secure world where liberty, the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights - and therefore, peace — are held paramount.

In a world of layered complexity and fast-paced geopolitics, it remains to be seen whether the new Strategic Concept’s recommitment to Article 5 (”Assured Security”) and its proposed operations beyond the treaty area (”Dynamic Engagement”) will help the Alliance address the new security challenges in the coming decade ahead. Stay tuned.

Niruban Balachandran
Executive Director of TeamBuilders International Ltd

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

If economic development under the Lula administration can be likened to a football match, it may be seen as a case of two distinct halves - and which may be heading for extra time. That it does so will be regardless of whoever follows him in the presidency, whether it remains in the hands of his Workers Party (PT) or the opposition.

Lula’s successor will undoubtedly use the same strategy, the primary focus of which has been inflation control and which enabled him to introduce two key state-led programs in each half of his presidency: redistribution through the ‘family grant’ (bolsa familia) system in his first term and a package of infrastructure investment through the Accelerated Growth Program (PAC) during his second.

The government’s economic and social actions are credited with not only raising Brazil’s global status alongside that of other developing BRIC economies and G20, but also in helping insulate Brazil’s economy and society from the worst effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Lula will leave office at the end of 2010 with Brazil in a strong position, but much of that achievement may also be attributable to his commitment to maintain the economic policy of his predecessor.

In the beginning…

While the 2000s has undoubtedly been Lula’s, the 1990s belonged to the sociologist and former finance minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In 1993-94 he introduced the anti-inflationary Real Plan which brought in a new currency, the real, which was pegged to the dollar. Cardoso aimed to put end to the ‘Lost Decade’ of the 1980s, when high input costs and low productivity resulted in economic decline and pressure for structural adjustment across the region.

The fall in inflation was almost immediate and delivered electoral success to Cardoso’s alliance between the centre-left Brazilian Social Democrat Party (PSDB) and centre-right Liberal Front Party (PFL, now Democrats) in the presidential election in 1994. In the years that followed, low inflation ensured a more stable business environment which along with various neoliberal measures such as privatizations and financial and trade liberalization led to a surge of foreign investment. Imports rose from US$27.8bn in 1992 to US$75.7bn in 1998 while the economy expanded by 4.2% of GDP in 1995, followed by 2.2% in 1996 and 3.4% in 1997.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso , former President of Brazil, Chairman of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, addresses a press conference at headquarters. UN Photo/Mark Garten

However, Brazil’s economic growth during the 1990s was modest, even superficial. In order to pay for imports the country required greater levels of foreign resources. The downside was that this contributed both to growing public debt and the risk of capital flight. The latter was realized in the wake of the 1997-98 Russian and East Asian financial crises when investor confidence in developing countries such as Brazil was weakened. Following his successful re-election in 1998 Cardoso was obliged to loosen his economic policy, by devaluing the real and loosening the inflation target.

This was the economic model that Lula inherited after winning the 2002 election. But rather than change it, he embraced it. That he did so was due to both short- and long-term factors. First, the PT underwent a policy re-evaluation during the 1990s. At Lula’s first presidential contest in 1989 he failed to win over both the public and the media. He and the PT were seen as dangerous socialists who were swimming against the tide of history, especially following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe. During the following contest in 1994 Lula and the PT opposed the Real Plan, assuming that it would fail like previous anti-inflation programs. The party’s mistaken position election results highlighted the need to adopt a more pragmatic approach and support for more monetarist policies.

Second, Lula and his close associates in the PT leadership had become detached from the wider party. The 1989 and 1994 contests the party’s presence had been largely collective affairs that involved a wide range of party activists and social movements, including human rights activists, intellectuals and new independent trade unions. These groups had formed the basis of the party since its foundation in 1980. However, following his second presidential election defeat Lula demanded more control over strategy in the future. This coincided with two developments occurring during the 1990s: one, the party’s membership began to change, to include more professionals and middle class supporters who were less ideological in their views; and two, the PT’s more pragmatic stance appeared successful, contributing towards electoral success, including control of several important cities and state governorships. By 2001 Lula’s direction seemed sufficiently successful to encourage the membership to trust the leadership to make any cross-party alliances that it wished, including with the free-market Liberal Party.

Third, Lula and his election team saw no alternative to the model in 2002. Although Lula supported the prevailing economic model, it was not apparent that the markets believed this. As the election date approached the markets remained highly volatile. This encouraged political and business leaders to demand that Lula and the other election candidates commit themselves to pre-existing contracts made by the Cardoso administration, including the servicing of the public debt and the enforcement of a new IMF agreement. At the same time Lula and his election team published their ‘Letter to the Brazilian People’ which spelled out their commitment to Cardoso’s economic policies. This manifesto was significant in several ways, from the narrow nature of its drafting through to Lula’s refusal to qualify it following his election (1).

Insufficient economic growth

That Lula held to a policy of low inflation, high interest rates and liberalization caused considerable consternation among some of the PT’s constituencies. This included those left-wing intellectuals and members of the organized labor and the peasant movements who did not share his pragmatic stance and middle class concerns.

However, even if Lula had been predisposed to their views, there were two additional factors following the election that prevented him from doing so. Politically, he did not command a legislative majority in Congress. The PT won 91 out of 513 deputies in the 2002 election, which made it the largest party but did not give it a majority. He was therefore obliged to seek cross-party support with the catch-all and centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) both in the legislature and in cabinet. This only served to dilute the strength of the left in the PT.

Economically, Brazil was in a weak position in early 2003. Externally, the country faced lower levels of foreign credit following the financial crises of the late 1990s and the short recession in North America and Europe a few years later. Internally, the public deficit was large and continuing to rise. Although the markets had recovered following Lula’s support for his predecessor’s policies, the situation remained fluid. An IMF agreement dating back to 1992 also limited the state’s capacity to invest in infrastructure; breaking it could have undone the already weak levels of business confidence in the new government.

Given the political and economic situation, the new government’s economic policy was limited during its first year. A Development Plan was drawn up which identified several sectors for future work, including on semi-conductors, software, pharmaceuticals and capital goods (the latter which remained largely undefined). The administration also began to diversity its international economic relations by seeking ties beyond the US through closer links with the EU and non-OECD countries. This include the formation of the G3 with India and South Africa, followed by alliances with China and other developing countries against the North over agricultural subsidies during the abortive WTO negotiations in Cancún in 2003. At the same time the government was also burnishing its pro-market credentials. This included the passage of legislation relating to public private partnerships (PPPs) and the creation of a neo-corporatist Economic and Social Development Council (CDES) to provide advice to the president, half of whose members came from the business world.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil. UN Photo/Mark Garten

The economy remained virtually static in this period, growing by only 0.54% of GDP. Recovery began the following year, rising above 5% of GDP in 2004 before settling back to 3.2% in 2005 and 4% in 2006. The main driver in this period was a rise in exports, of which agricultural commodities and a cheaper real played a significant role. For Lula and his supporters, economic growth was essential since it was believed that it would contribute to more jobs, higher incomes and lower levels of poverty.

The government’s optimism was misplaced, however. The Brazilian economy remained structurally weak and its growth both unsustainable. The impact of the late 1990s and early 2000s illustrated this, through what Csaba Deák called ‘hindered accumulation’ (2). Reviewing the first year of the PT administration he noted that the economic policy of both Cardoso and Lula was similar to that of followed that of previous governments, going back to the colonial period. Since the nineteenth century production surpluses had been largely expatriated through import consumption, foreign debt repayments and profit remittances. What little remained went back into the productive process as reinvestment, but never at a sufficient level to achieve substantial economic or social transformation across society as whole. As a result, most Brazilians were ‘losers’ of this process, remaining poor. By contrast a limited group who benefited from this surplus acquisition and spending constituted the ‘winners’. That the situation remained was evident in those sectors that did best in the early Lula years: large landowners and farmers working in the export sector whose economies of scale were more effective than those of small-scale and domestically-oriented tenant farmers.

In addition, that the economic growth in this ‘golden half decade’ was insufficient was apparent in two further ways. First, the growth rate was low, both historically and comparatively. The 1960s and 1970s, when the economy grew by 6% and 8.6% of GDP respectively, were the periods when transformation was achieved through the development of an industrial and manufacturing base. By contrast, a growth rate of 3.2% between 2001 and 2009 does not appear significant, especially against that of other comparable middle-income countries. Second, the reliance on agricultural exports meant that the larger proportion of poor people in the cities remained unaffected by the boom: while poverty declined across the country during the 1990s in urban areas it increased, from 13.5% in 1995 to 15% by 2004 (3).

Social democracy in action: the bolsa familia and PAC

Despite Brazil’s relatively poor economic performance, Lula continues to be extremely popular and the country stronger than before. How to account for this? The roots may be found in another aspect of its economic structure, along with the two key programs undertaken by the government in its first and second terms respectively: the bolsa familia and the PAC.

First, although the Brazilian economy is structurally weak and has failed to grow fast enough, it does have a comparative advantage over several of its neighbors in the region. This includes a much larger internal market (around 200 million in population) and a relatively more diversified and protected economy. This is apparent in particular sectors, including the aerospace industry and in the less onerous demands that its membership of the regional trading bloc, Mercosur, has had when compared to that which NAFTA has had on Mexico.

Second, Brazil has benefited from a redistribution mechanism introduced during Lula’s first year of office. “The bolsa familia” consists of four different programs that provided social security to previously excluded and marginalized people, combining several different social assistance and conditional cash transfers. They include some that predated the Lula government with others that were introduced for the first time, from payments made to mothers to send their children to primary school (the school grant or bolsa escola) and to discourage child labor along with financial assistance for basic foods and maternal nutrition.

The government moved quickly to increase the number of recipients of the program. Between 2003 and 2006 the number of beneficiaries increased from around 5 million to 11.1 million, of which 1.8 million mostly based in the poorer Northeast joined in the months preceding Lula’s re-election. The importance of the bolsa familia was especially important, given that for the proportion of employment earnings to household income had declined across Brazil from 90% to 48% between 1995 and 2004. As a result, the poor became an extremely important social and electoral constituency whose influence helped determine Lula’s re-election in 2006.

Lula’s re-election in 2006 was significant for the separation in the electoral base of the PT in the presidential and congressional elections that year. The effect of the bolsa familia was noted through the shift in Lula’s support from the professional and middle class voters in the PT’s historic heartlands in the South and Southeast to poorer and more rural voters in the North and Northeast. This latter region not only included a great number of bolsa recipients, but was notable for the fact that between 60% and 85% of all valid votes went to Lula (4). The scope of the bolsa familia has not been fully tapped politically though: despite the substantial increase in beneficiaries prior to Lula’s re-election, it only reached 40% of the eligible population.

Third, Brazil’s economic prospects have been helped by a stronger role for the state in response to the limits presented by economic liberalism. At the start of Lula’s second term in 2007, the government launched the Accelerated Growth Program (PAC). Its purpose was to overcome the constraint of low economic growth by expanding the country’s transport, energy, sanitation and housing infrastructure. The four year program was calculated to cost around R$504bn and would use both public and private funds, the former being provided mostly through state banks such as the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES). The government believed that it would add an additional one percentage point of economic growth each year, which would help push the country in a more dynamic fashion. According to Finance Ministry figures, the PAC soon appeared to have the desired effect: GDP growth increased from 4% in 2006 to 6.1% and 5.1% in 2007 and 2008 respectively.

The slowdown in 2008 may be traced to the financial crisis that swept the globe in the months after September. In contrast to several of its neighbors and other countries in the North, Brazil appeared to weather the storm reasonably well. The result was a highly self-congratulatory tone by the government which while stopping short of claiming advanced foresight of the crisis, emphasized the role that the PAC had as a form of insulation and sustaining productive activity during a period of growing retrenchment.

Beyond the PAC, the government’s other responses to the crisis included a loosening of the money supply and the injection of state credit into the country’s banks, sectors and firms. The effect of these measures helped turn the economy around, bottoming out by the middle of 2009 after economic growth fell from 6.8% of GDP to 1.3% between the final quarters of 2008. Currently the government estimates economic growth for 2010 will be around 5% of GDP. This is slightly down on anticipated growth rates at the time of its launch but may be attributable to the lower level of private contributions following the crisis (5).

Brazil after Lula: continuity whoever wins

In October 2010 Brazilians will go to the polls. For the first time since direct presidential elections returned in 1989, Lula will not be a candidate. Instead his hand-picked successor, Dilma Rousseff, a former energy minister and currently the president’s chief of staff, will be the PT candidate. Her main rival will be the same man that Lula beat in 2002, the PSDB’s José Serra. A former health minister in the Cardoso government, Serra subsequently carved out an independent base of support as a former mayor (2005-06) and governor (2007-10) of São Paulo city and state respectively. In mid-May, several months before the campaign will officially begin, public opinion appeared evenly split between the two.

Aiming to get the upper hand in this contest, Lula and Rousseff launched PAC2 in March, which is set to run from 2011 to 2014. Estimated at around R$959 billion over the period (nearly double what the first PAC cost), the government will finance it though revenue from the recently-discovered oilfields in the South Atlantic. It is planned that half of the funds will be spent in the energy sector, followed by a quarter for low cost housing and 11% towards transport (6). The publicity surrounding the event was designed to link Rousseff to Lula, who retains high popularity in the final year of his presidency, as the candidate of continuity and of the PAC and social redistribution. Given the dependence on oil revenues to fund the program, question marks may be raised about both its accessibility and the political will to achieve it, especially in the wake of the current environmental disaster following the deep sea oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

For his part, Serra also seems to offer Brazilian voters more of the same. When he announced his candidacy in April he noted that poorly maintained roads and overcrowded airports had served to slow Brazil’s economic growth. His economic manifesto is primarily concerned with achieving more effective implementation of infrastructure projects than present, along with lower taxes to stimulate growth - which he believes could be at least 50% higher than it currently is. At the same time he has proposed creating a PAC for health and public security while also endorsing his support for the bolsa familia - a position that the PSDB also held during the 2006 election. That Serra appears to offer much the same as that presently offered by Lula and the PT highlights the extent to which the political and economic situation in Brazil has stabilized since the 1990s

Just as the potential successors to Cardoso lined up to declare their commitment to the economic model set out by the Real Plan in 2002, the main contenders in 2010 are keen to show their support for the two main hallmarks of the last eight years: the bolsa familia and the PAC. The Real Plan provided for low inflation, even as it exposed the country to fiscal deficits and occasional instability during times of crisis. Those low levels of inflation and limited opening up of the Brazilian economy, along with a modest economic boom, have in turn provided the basis for public investment, both in social redistribution programs and infrastructure development.

The coming campaign will doubtless consist of both main candidates denouncing and criticizing the other. The value of the prize at stake will mean that the tone will no doubt be shrill as each tries to portray the image of the other in the presidency in suitable apocalyptic terms. Yet the reality remains that there has been and remains considerable overlap between the two, areas where the difference is more style than substance. Consequently, both Rousseff and Serra will have more in common than they care to admit. But this should not disguise the fact that the main parameters of Brazil’s economic policy look set to continue whoever takes office next January.

Guy Burton
Research associate on the Latin America International Affairs Program at the London School of Economics (LSE) Ideas Centre. He holds a PhD in Government from the LSE with particular focus on the Cardoso and Lula governments.

References

(1) MOLLO, M de LR & SAAD-FILHO, A “Neoliberal Economics Policies in Brazil (1994-2005): Cardoso, Lula and the Need for a Democratic Alternative,” New Political Economy, 11(1): 99-123, 2006.

(2) DEÁK, C, “Brazil: The Partido dos Trabalhadores in government,” Soundings, 28: 143-155, 2004.

(3) HALL, A, “Brazil’s Bolsa Família: A Double-Edged Sword?” Development and Change, 39(5): 799-822, 2008.

(4) HUNTER, W & POWER, T, “Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Policy, and the Brazilian Elections of 2006,” Latin American Politics & Society, (49)1: 1-30, 2007.

(5) GOVERNO DO BRASIL, Balanço 3 Anos Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC): Fevereiro de 2010.
http://www.brasil.gov.br/pac/relatorios/por-balanco/balanco-3-anos/balanco-3-anos/parte-1-abertura [accessed 18 May 2010]

(6) LATIN AMERICAN NEWS, “On to the virtuous circle,” March, 2010.

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

Thailand has been severely hit by a deeply-rooted and now overly exposed social clash. The Red-Shirt demands, the camps’ raising factionalism, and the hidden agendas across the divide could be tracked down into the divisive figure of Thaksin Shinawatra.

His rise in 2001 to the premiership polarised Thailand’s society in a way unseen since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. By launching an ambitious range of pro-poor policies, Thaksin gained the unconditional support of north Thailand’s rural and working classes. This popularity posed an outright threat to the elites’ grip on the country affairs, what triggered a succession of questionable manoeuvres engineered to kick Thaksin out.

While in office, Thaksin also used his position to boost his numerous businesses, expanding an already vast fortune in a corrupt race that was eventually picked up by the army to oust him.

The following paper aspires to shed some light on the rights and wrongs of a man who has turned Thailand upside down.

Bangkok’s recent unrest illustrates a people’s legitimate (but way too ruthless) uprising against its elites’ neglect to the deprived. This empowers the Red-Shirts- a resolute grouping of Northern peasants and excluded city dwellers spearheaded by an assembly of leaders closely linked with former Prime Minister (PM) Thaksin Shinawatra.

This people’s resentment was fiercely untapped when Thailand top court seized half of Thaksin’s wealth. He was found guilty of having doubled his fortune during his time in office. His supporters received the judgment as plain state looting.

The ruling came against the backdrop of the Red-Shirts’ call for snap-elections. The current government lacks the mandate of the polls, having climbed to power by clearing its way of Thaksin and his proxies. The United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), the Red-Shirts official designation, demanded elections to take place almost immediately. Gradually, the Red-Shirts gathered strength, hijacking Bangkok’s financial and shopping hub for two-months.

The physical outcome is well-known. Thailand worst political violence in almost two decades left almost 90 people killed, thousands injured and the savage destruction of sections of the capital. Dreadful it may seem, the resulting social wounds look even scarier. As T. Fuller and S. Mydans from the New York Times pointed out, “it is a collapse of the political consensus (1).”

Former SG with H.E. Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra (Former Prime Minister, THAILAND) at the Government House.Photo: UN

The divide between the Thai middle and upper classes (embodied by the Army, businessmen and civil servants), and pretty much the rest of the country is not necessarily wider than it was two months ago (what cannot be said in regard of the monarchy, though). The divide is, however, captured in a state of acrimony and bitterness. The current scenario may turn into a country-wide confrontation if elections are not held before the end of the year, the outcome honoured, and the ensuing leaders abstain from using their position for personal gain (too much to ask, may question the reader). Furthermore, Thaksin must walk away from his current role of exiled agitator and let Thailand heal.

The Thaksin’s years

The political ambitions of one of the country wealthiest businessman challenged the unfair social and political balance of Thailand. When Thaksin won the 2001 elections, he employed a populist agenda that, besides gaining the hearts and minds of neglected rural dwellers, threatened the military’s and monarchy’s behind-the-scenes commanding role.

Against most odds, Thaksin did well on his first term, winning a landslide victory on the 2005 polls. His popularity was underpinned on his cabinet favourable terms towards the poor, rather than the transparency of his premiership- few may challenge that Thaksin used his incumbency to favour his wide-reaching business interests. The last straw was served when his family sold his $1,8 billion stake in Shin Corporation (a Thai conglomerate heavily involved on the country telecom industry) to the Singaporean Temasek. Actually, the Thai regulations regarding overseas investments in the telecom sector had been relaxed just prior to the sale. It gives a sense of how thin was the line between the former PM private deals and the business of ruling the country.

Thaksin conflict of interests also clashed with the army’s and the monarchy’s investments. It is known that King Bhumibol Adulyade’s family runs business all across Thailand’s economic board. Less secretive are the army business interests. The military ample assets on the communications industry are complemented with holdings in airlines, construction, manufacturing, and agriculture. Thaksin‘s enterprises where involved in much of the above, laying a tangible menace to the army’s sources of finance.

The combination of profiteering and the threat Thaksin represented to the old guard was behind a well-orchestrated campaign to discredit him. As a result, the growing allegations of corruption forced a just re-elected Thaksin to call for snap-elections. The move aimed at easing the unbearable political pressure by proving that, in spite of the allegations of power abuse, an overwhelming majority of the population still trusted him with the government reins.

The new polls were boycotted by the major opposition parties and again, massively won by the Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT). In a carefully framed move, the Constitutional Court (endorsed by the King) declared Thaksin second landslide in a row invalid. According with the ruling, the opposition refusal to participate in the voting prevented the full formation of the lower house, as various constituencies’ seats could not be taken. Thaksin bloody counter-insurgency strategy on the mostly Muslim South and his bet against Bangkok’s elites prompted many in both of these constituencies to exercise the abstain option at the ballot box. That kept a number of seats unfilled, what fed the Constitutional Court judgement. In short, the monarchy-backed political class, along with the military and the judiciary ambushed Thaksin in an attempt to terminate his political race.

To unlock the lower house impasse, the TRT announced the holding of new polls (the third in less than 2 years). They never took placed, as Thaksin was ousted in a military coup.

The relentless road to chaos

Schemed to bring the political picture back to the old guard’s control, the military intrusion did eventually backfire. During the 15 months-old caretaker government, Thaksin was found guilty of breaking a conflict of interest law, corruption and abuse of power, and therefore, convicted in absentia.

With the former PM in a self-imposed exile, new elections were carried out. Although the TRT was outlawed, its successor, the Thaksin-proxy People’s Power Party (PPP), emerged as the most voted party. Back to square one. The coup had achieved little to nothing excepting throwing Thaksin away from Thailand, not his political clout, though.

The post-coup government was perceived by Bangkok’s elites as much of the same. With the complicity of the judiciary, the establishment was about to do whatever it takes to wash away any Thaksin influence from the country’s policy-making process. Such a mission was to be accomplished by an eventually mighty People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), better known as Yellow-Shirts (colour linked to the monarchy).

The Yellow-Shirts is Thaksin-despising group made up of affluent Bangkokians and Southerners. As put by G.M. Greenwood, an associate with Allan & Associates, a Hong Kong-based political and security risk consultancy “[the Yellow-Shirts are] created, funded and protected by the military, the aristocracy, the bureaucracy,… the urban professional and commercial classes… [The PAD] reflects an unwillingness to share status and wealth with the masses. (2)”

By staging a series of hysterical protests, the PAD exerted enough pressure to push the Constitutional Court to rule against Samak Sundaravej, Thaksin’s proxy post-coup PM. The Court could have not picked up a more laughable charge; Mr Sundaravej was found guilty of pocketing some extra income from his TV cooking shows.

The PPP ruling party placed Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-law, as new PM. This time, counting with the tacit compliance of the army and the quiet blessing of the King, the Yellow-Shirts cut Bangkok off from the rest of the world by seizing its major airports. The judiciary gave in to the movement’s demands and dissolved the PPP. A number of the just-abolished party lawmakers defected to the opposition Democratic Party, and here we go- Abhisit Vejjajiva, current Thai PM, came into scene. His illegitimate, unvoted ascension to the premiership sparked the outrage of millions, which culminated in last months’ urban battle.

The populist formula: Thaksin appeal

Thaksin years turned out to be not only the most contentious in Thailand’s wobbling democracy, but quite accomplishing as well. The polemic PM did not honour his successors’ line of standing aloof to millions of poverty-stricken Thais. In perspective, one may question what his real agenda was, but as a matter of fact, he swept the North of Thailand with a wave of programmes conceived to ease the live of millions.

Among others, his cabinet paved roads, set up a scheme of loans for small farms, expanded the electricity and water supply, introduced universal healthcare, and relaxed credit requirements. A poverty alleviation campaign that earned Thaksin livelong supporters. Many of these Thais are keen to welcome Thaksin back. The thinking may well go like follows: all Thai politicians profit from their positions to enrich themselves. Thaksin was not an exemption but at least, seems to care about us.

To be fair, it should not go unnoticed that, as the The Economist reminds, “much of [Thaksin] generosity has continued under today’s prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva. (3)” This gives us pure food for thought. If the current government has taken over Thaksin’s pro-poor policies- where does the Red-Shirts impatience for elections come from?; are they then simply concerned with the questionable way in which Mr Abhisit stepped in?

The answer rests on Thaksin’s initial leadership and funding of the Red-Shirts. Disguised on the otherwise genuine accusation of Mr Abhisit illicit shortcut to power, the exiled former PM looks as if is solely preoccupied to get back on the Thai politics scene -and recover his partly-sized fortune on the way.

But Thaksin’s machinations may prove flawed. As a correspondent from the Asia Sentinel pointed out, the Red-Shirts “appear to be evolving away from the billionaire former leader into something more ominous.(4)” Originally devised as a proxy movement to press the government and the military on his behalf, Thaksin no longer holds the reins of the Red-Shirts. In words of The Economist, “some protesters do not care if Thaksin is rehabilitated. (5)”

It is no longer about Thaksin

The Red-Shirts movement has outgrown its original master. Conceived as a Thaksin’s noisy mouthpiece, today we know that he underestimated the forces he worked so hard to unleashed.

If the struggle for the Thaksin version of justice is to cost lives and suffering, better to turn it into an endeavour towards truly democracy. The thousands of men and women who risked their lives in Bangkok (and other provincial seats as well) grew tired of championing the cause of a leader whose massive wealth swelled over his term in office.

Thaksin has unintentionally given a vital push to millions of Thais that were quietly seeking the confidence to raise their voices against the inequitable status quo. So evident is the shift on the country social dynamics, that even Mr Kasit, Mr Abhisit’s foreign minister, went further to state that “ordinary people, farmers, labourers, and workers participate in the political process as opposed to Thailand 15 years or 20 years ago, where political actors were confined to the bureaucrats, to some of the business people, to some of the professional politicians, to some of the military officers. (6)”

His last throes

As mentioned before, as the Red-Shirts took the streets, their key demand was the holding of elections to put an end to Thailand’s illegitimate government. They actually got it, when Mr Abhisit’s and the UDD leaders reached an agreement to call elections on November. The crisis appeared to be on its closing leg when suddenly, the Red-Shirts added an impossible demand: that the deputy PM surrenders to the police.

The protests’ leaders spoiled the hard-fought deal, condemning thousands of demonstrators to the reaction of a (following the failure in the negotiating table) strengthened army. “The reversal of the agreement was a sign of growing factionalisation of the protest movement, (7)” pointed out T. Fuller and S. Mydans from the New York Times.

Most likely, Thaksin’s interference lies at the heart of this factionalisation. As he was becoming increasingly irrelevant, he may have dictated to his royalist to harden their standing. Thaksin knew that, if he was to see his conviction revoked, a bargaining chip had to be gained. By claiming to hold Thailand’s deputy PM accountable of criminal charges, Thaksin was seeking to gain a new negotiating card to be used in his hypothetical comeback. His desired scenario: to trade the invalidation of his two years of prison sentence for the withdrawal of the deputy PM accusation. Today, he would have to add terrorist charges to the deal.

The man who broke up Thailand

For almost four years, the ousted (but still billionaire) PM has been in the run on his golden, self-imposed exile. Using the web and live-broadcasted speeches, he has shown a stunning resilience in fighting his foes from abroad. An all out race against Thailand’s establishment that has ended up putting the country on the brink of civil war.

By flagging a self-tailored banner of democracy and freedom, Thaksin empowered the wildest dreams of millions not used to articulate (even less to enjoy) their constitutionally-granted civil and political rights. Thaksin may be an advocate of the underprivileged, but he is also a reckless politician and an anxious businessman.

For weeks, he had the government where he always wanted: in an uneasy state of confusion on how to deal with the crisis’ apparently perennial deadlock. That drove the executive to toughen its approach and consequently eroded Thais’ freedoms by taking measures as the Emergency Decree, by which the “freedoms of assembly and press are curtailed and suspects can be locked up for 30 days without charge. (8)”

As a result, the¬ split between the haves and have-nots is not only wider but deeper-seated and regrettably, bloodier than ever before.

What next?

For the sake of Thailand’s tarnished democracy and now lacking stability, elections will have to take place. “New elections will not solve Thailand’s complex problems but they would go a long way to cool temperatures, (9)” believes H. Koyakutty, a freelance Southeast Asia correspondent based in Bangkok.

Nevertheless, hard times lay down the road if a Thaksin-minded political force wins the voting and replicates the whole process once again; launch a massive pro-poor programme that lures the support of millions. Nothing wrong till here. The trouble comes if the very same government incurs in Thaksin-like illegitimate practices of power abusing and pocket filling. If in spite of this, people keep backing such a government- how would the establishment be supposed to act?

This question targets a school of thought increasing attractive for some members of the establishment. It argues that the political fate of the country cannot be trusted to Thailand’s uneducated and easy-to-manipulate masses. Not a very democratic reflexion but one that exposes the backbone of the country’s plight.

For Thailand to be fixed, a new relationship among the establishment, the government, the urban middle and upper classes and the rural population must be conceived. “A new social contract, (10)” as nicely put by Otto F. von Feigenblatt, a fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.

The elites must recognise that the centuries-old status quo is not sustainable any more. Channels are to be created for the population to be better off, increase its chances of economic fulfilment, and assure than the political process remains competitive. The judiciary should step back from its current politicised shape. People’s rights (e.g quality before the law) and freedoms (e.g. of press) are to be threaded as religion-like. It cannot be bargained- nothing less will guarantee the stability that all Thais yearn for.

When he entered into politics, it was not in Thaksin’s plans to confront the two Thailands to the extent of having to rethink the country’s ‘social contract.’ His mission was rather self-centre, though in order to accomplish it, he did not mind to do some good and empower the weak in the way.

Javier Delgado Rivera
Freelance Journalist on Asia politics

Bibliography:

MYDANS, SETH and FULLER, THOMAS, “Thailand’s King Sees His Influence Fading,” The New York Times, May 15th 2010
. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/world/asia/16king.html?ref=world

GREENWOOD, G.M., “Thailand’s Multiple Revolts,” Asia Sentinel, May 4th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2441&Itemid=185

The Economist (staff writer), “Thaksin’s harvest: Where red shirts hang their hats,” May 13th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=16112030

Asia Sentinel (correspondent), “Thailand’s Chaos: No Way Out,” April 12th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2396&Itemid=164

The Economist (staff writer), “Thaksin’s harvest: Where red shirts hang their hats,” May 13th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=16112030

Asian Correspondent (column ‘Bangkok Pundit’), “Thai foreign minister calls for reform of the monarchy,” April 16th 2010
. Available at:
http://uk.asiancorrespondent.com/bangkok-pundit-blog/thai-foreign-minister-calls-for-reform-of-the-monarchy

MYDANS, SETH and FULLER, THOMAS, “The reversal of the agreement,” The New York Times, May 13th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/world/asia/14thai.html?hp

BELL, Thomas, “Thai government issues emergency decree after violence in Bangkok,” The Daily Telegraph, September 2nd 2008
. Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/2665859/Thai-government-issues-emergency-decree-after-violence-in-Bangkok.html

KOYAKUTTY, Haseenah, “The End for Thailand’s Abhisit?,” Asia Sentinel, April 12th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2393&Itemid=164

F. von Feigenblatt, Otto, “Thailand’s struggle over legitimacy,” UPI Asia, April 9th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2010/04/09/thailands_struggle_over_legitimacy/2024/

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

When you think about the ocean, you shouldn’t have images of bloated fish bobbing around on the surface, surrounded by greasy swirls of oil, tar balls washing up on shore lines or sea birds trapped in oil slicks, waiting to die.

Since late April 2010, when the Deepwater Horizon oil rig caught fire and exploded, the Mexican Gulf has changed, and not for the better. The corporation responsible for this, BP had estimated only 5,000 barrels of oil were pumping into the gulf a day. It was revealed, however, that the figures are significantly higher. Around 12,000-19,000 barrels a day are pumping out, according to a panel of government scientists known as the Flow Rate Technical Group. [1] If these figures are correct, then over 444,000 barrels (18.65 million gallons/70.59 million litres) have been released into the ocean, whereas the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster had only pumped out over 257,000 barrels of oil. Within the waters near the oil flow, the levels of Oxygen have already fallen by 30 percent, meaning it becomes a so-called “dead zone” as marine species simply can’t live there anymore.

The “top kill” effort BP implemented, which involved shooting high-pressure mud into the well, displayed the same under achieving results as their first response - a lot of optimism that ultimately ended in failure. On top of everything, BP have been spraying chemicals into the ocean to try and disperse the oil, and like every other method they’ve tried, this also hasn’t worked out according to their plan. The chemicals being used could be more harmful in the long run to the ocean and marine life (and our own bodies if fish ingested the chemicals and were caught and sold to restaurants) than the oil. This is why the Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A) has ordered BP to stop, and find safer alternatives. [2] Whether BP will comply or not, is another matter.

Carol Browner, a White House environmental advisor has admitted that the BP oil spill is “the worst environmental disaster” the United States has ever suffered, [2] and as of the 1st of June, more than 100 miles of Louisiana coastline has been affected by this disaster. The oil first appeared in marshes near the Mississippi River’s mouth, and then it spread to the islands, lakes and bayous just west of the river. Louisiana scientists, who ventured out into Barataria Bay, went specifically to seek out signs of oil, yet what they encountered left them shaken. Robert J. Barham who is head of Louisiana’s Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, recounted how he had seen dozens of oily pelicans trying in vain to rid their wings of oil. “They think this is water sticking to their wings, but it’s not, and they can’t get it off,” Barham said. “It’s heart-wrenching, when you grow up in Louisiana and you are in love with this part of the world. . . . It just is a blow in the pit of your stomach.” [3] Oil that is produced in nature is a well equipped killer. It smothers blades of marsh grass, cutting them off from air and sunlight; it suffocates smaller organisms which form coral reefs, it sticks to bird’s feathers, preventing them from flying and, in trying to remove the oil; the birds swallow it and ultimately die. Turtles, dolphins and crabs have also been reportedly washing up on shorelines coated in oil.

Apart from the environmental impact, the economic consequences could wind up being devastating not only for the Gulf of Mexico, but for the entire world. According to David Karl, a marine scientist from the University of Hawaii, “No matter where you put oil in the ocean, there is a connection.” Karl has said. “All the waters circulate everywhere.” [4] In other words, cleaning up this mess could end up taking decades!

While majority of the U.S.A is subjected to increased and often outrageous seafood prices, fishing in the gulf has been halted, and around 27,000 fishermen and seafood plants are living in limbo, uncertain whether they’ll be able to go back to work. People are in constant fear that they will have their homes foreclosed on, as their income has dwindled and all but stopped. [5] Tourism has also suffered along the Gulf, especially as this environmental disaster has hit during their busy season, and with tourists cancelling their vacation plans, hospitality sectors have been forced into dropping their prices to dirt-cheap rates in the hopes of attract any travellers. Unfortunately for them, the drop in tourism is expected to last for as long as the oil continues to pour out into the gulf. [6]

Another aspect to worry about is hurricanes and what even one could do to the current environmental disaster. The National Hurricane Centre (NHC) has prepared a document, with two main points: The assumption that a hurricane will come from the west of the oil spill, means the oil could be driven into the coast lines, and that a hurricane on the east would do the opposite, and drive it away from the coast. “However, the details of the evolution of the storm, the track, the wind speed, the size, the forward motion and the intensity are all unknowns at this point and may alter this general statement.”[7] In other words, no one can really be certain what would happen if one came along.

Surprisingly, the worst case scenario of the oil spill hasn’t even been mention … and with the sheer volume of oil pumping out, it would be more accurate to call this a volcano of oil, not just an oil spill. So if this volcano of oil carries on at it’s current rate, the crude will get dragged into the Loop Current, and not only spread to the Florida Keys, destroying yet another coastline and popular tourist destination, but it could enter the into the Gulf Stream. The Gulf Stream is well know as the ocean’s superhighway, as it carries warm water up the eastern seaboard, meaning Florida’s east coast, the coral reefs in the Keys, northern Cuba, the Carolinas and even Virginia would be at risk. [8] If this happened, Florida’s mango groves would become virtually obsolete once covered with oil, destroying the nurseries of coral reef fish and other marine wildlife. Some tourists have already cancelled any plans for the sunny Florida shorelines, in anticipation of this.

If this flow of oil continues, all ocean life could be affected. Seafood prices around the world could rise virtually overnight, as they have in most of the U.S states. Our ocean, once thriving with life, would slowly be depleted as the oil circulated the globe, with desperate fisherman forced to watch their livelihoods destroyed and washing up on shorelines around the world. [9]

All in all this “minor” disaster as BP first put it, could ultimately result in marine destruction on a global scale. Which I suppose resolves the question of what’s more important: The environment or the economy? As Mother Nature is pointing out to us, “the economy cannot exist without protecting the environment first.” [10]

Roseanna Elizabeth Cox
Ramsaymedia

References:
1] Director Marcia McNutt: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64Q4F720100527
2] Carol Browner: http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/bp-oil-spill-white-house-worst-american-history/story?id=10735137 3] Robert J. Barham : http://www.bigislandweekly.com/articles/2010/05/26/read/news/news02.txt
4] Marine scientist David Karl: http://www.bigislandweekly.com/articles/2010/05/26/read/news/news02.txt
5] Kirsten Korosec: http://industry.bnet.com/energy/10004661/the-gulf-oil-spill-worst-case-scenario/
6] Bernadette Poppopy: http://get-lawyers.com/personal/oil-spill-economic-impact-seafood-prices-rise-jobs-lost-tourism-down-3.html
7] Anthony Watts: http://wattsupwiththat.com/2010/05/30/what-happens-if-a-hurricane-hits-the-gulf-oil-slick/
8] Kirsten Korosec: http://industry.bnet.com/energy/10004661/the-gulf-oil-spill-worst-case-scenario/
9] Rick Jervis and Alan Levin: http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-05-27-oil-spill-news_N.htm?csp=obinsite
10] Mike Adams: http://www.naturalnews.com/028863_British_Petroleum_Gulf_of_Mexico.html

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

On 11th May 2010, the 53rd Prime Minister in Britain’s history, David Cameron, took power. Yet it was not in the way that nearly every other took power before him. Under the First Past the Post electoral system, Britain is usually given one strong party that wins and allows clear and strong leadership.

However, this time, despite an electoral system that helps produce winners, there was no single, victorious party. The Conservatives, 13 years in opposition, almost achieved the magic 326 seats to make a majority, but fell 20 short. This meant they could try and govern as a minority, constantly risking losing every vote, or try to forge an alliance to govern as a majority.

The outcome has seen a most unusual alliance emerge. The right-wing Conservatives, anti-European, market-orientated and socially traditional, have teamed up with the Liberal Democrats, the most pro-European party, which talks of social regulation and a liberal society.

The campaign

How did this happen? In reality, this election was a defeat for the Conservatives. In September 2009 [1], they led in the opinion polls commandingly, and yet, when it came to the actual vote, they failed to win a majority. After 15 years of Conservative rule, in 1997, the country was so desperate to get rid of them that Tony Blair won with a landslide victory. How come the Conservatives did not do the same, considering Gordon Brown, the outgoing Prime Minister, and previously, Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister) for the Labour party, had consistently spent more than the country earned, increased the size of the state as a quick solution to unemployment, paid for it all by borrowing and taxing the wealth creators more, whilst also allowing massive inflation into the economy, conducted through the housing market, by the lax control of monetary policy, that helped record numbers of people get into debt and, when the problems began in the financial system (as they were bound to) helped cause the greatest recession since the 1930s, is a miracle of bad management.

Gentlemen from Eton

The Conservatives - wrongly - planned a campaign on the belief that ordinary people were tired with normal, argument-based, politics. As a result of this, when Labour were down, when Gordon Brown’s claim ‘the end of boom and bust’ [2] was clearly seen to be hollow, the Conservatives did not jump on it and exploit it like they should have done.

Gordon Brown, Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, briefs the members of the media outside the Security Council Chamber. UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras

Consistently, when Labour was weak, the Conservatives failed to hammer the point home that Labour was failing and had failed. The Conservatives forgot their own lesson: under Thatcher, Sir Bernard Ingham, a former journalist, developed the abilities of spin and media control that Tony Blair and Labour then took to new levels. Another former journalist, Alastair Campbell, brought in by Blair, took manipulation to a new level, which many people found disgusting in its cynicism [3]. Despite many bad days, Labour was able to escape serious consequences, earning Blair the nickname ‘Teflon Tony’ [4], for whatever problems were thrown at him, they bounced off.

The Debates

Having failed to capitalise on Labour’s problems, and allowed Labour to claim that the UK was beginning to recover because of Brown’s leadership [5], the election campaigns began, and for the first time ever, live TV debates would take place between the leaders of the big three parties.

This was a crucial moment to allow the leaders to defeat the arguments of their opponents, in live debate, in front of the nation. These were not free, unscripted arguments, but they did reveal some crucial strategic mistakes.

When Gordon Brown questioned David Cameron on policy, the Conservative leader chose not to answer, trying to look like he was a leader who did not need to argue. This was a mistake - instead of being a leader, he looked like a man without an answer, afraid of telling people the harsh truth.

The Conservatives tried to avoid arguments, believing them to be negative to the voters, but in avoiding debate they failed to offer strong leadership. Tony Blair would have fought the argument, and then told people passionately, “this is where I am going. Come with me”. That is leadership. That is what Cameron failed to deliver.

The Conservatives also focused on some good ideas that they had completely failed to communicate to the wider public. The idea of ‘the big society’, where people are given more power, completely failed to enter into the popular imagination [6], and so when Cameron talked about it, no one really understood what he was saying.

Fundamentally, most people are not that interested in politics. They have little time to understand complex arguments about taxes or economics; instead they want someone who will simply communicate to them, as Blair did, a strong, encouraging message. Blair won an election by simply repeating “education, education, education” [7]. Yet few understood what the parties were offering in 2010.

The TV debates did do one thing: they launched the small, third party, the Liberal Democrats and their leader, into the public mind. Nick Clegg, by sounding different from the main two leaders, showed that the public is easily swayed by style over substance [8]. Whilst many did not vote for him on election day, his performances in the debates brought out enough of his own supporters to ensure the Conservatives were denied a victory.

Result

So when the people cast their votes, we saw a large swing from Labour to the Conservatives, but in the Liberal Democrats strongholds, the Tories failed to win. This was thus the election the Conservatives threw away. Better planning, strategy and leadership would have seen a commanding victory; though it is difficult to imagine who else could have done a better job than Cameron; and Labour’s internal discipline was remarkable, given Brown’s unpopularity.

The result and subsequent negotiations saw Labour fail to secure an agreement with their more natural friends, the Liberals, because of Brown’s stubborn refusal to leave. As such, and as the people did give the Conservatives the most votes, the Liberals have made an alliance with the Tories, which saw Cameron and Clegg team up, despite Cameron’s previous immense distaste for Clegg’s inexperience.

The one guiding principle for Cameron and Clegg seems to have been, ironically, best stated by Tony Blair in 1995. Speaking at the Trade Union Congress, he said “But what has come home to me more than anything else is the utter futility of opposition. I did not join the Labour party to protest. [9]“ The fundamental arrangements of British politics mean that anyone in power, however weak, is able to o things the opposition can only dream of.

The Agreement [10]

Interestingly, the Conservatives have tied the Liberal Democrats into a real agreement, not a loose alliance. Given the pain that the British economy needs to go through in order to reduce its debt, one has to ask if the Liberals, or anyone, should have wanted to actually win the election. But either the lure of power has sucked them into agreeing and compromising, or something else.

And that something else is the real belief and idealism of the coalition. The Conservatives, at least their leader, seems to genuinely want to build a government for the nation, above party interest. And the Liberals seem to believe them.

The focus of the agreement established between the Conservatives and Liberals is to reduce the economic deficit, by reductions in the amount government wastes and spends, rather than by increasing the taxes on the British people. However, the amount spent on healthcare will continue to rise every year.

Taxation will focus more on middle-income earners and the rich, and the prestigious financial services industry will see a possible split between the investment sections of banks and the general retail banking sections, to make it harder for banks to use savers money in reckless investments. The bonuses paid to bankers will also be restricted, though this may easily be countered by increasing the basic salaries they are paid.

The electoral system in the UK may also change, with a second chamber (the House of Lords) reflecting more the composition of the elected first chamber, or by becoming fully elected itself. Local government will become more independent and responsible for the services it provides, to increase democracy and enable local people to deal with local issues.

Foreign policy

Britain’s foreign policy is an area where the parties differed most. And under the surface of the agreement, there is still a tension. Whilst nuclear weapons will remain at the core of UK defence, they will be fully appraised, and this may mean that no good decision will be made about a replacement for the ageing Trident system.

But it is with the relationship to Europe that the parties differed in most. And it is most notable that the new Foreign Secretary, William Hague (who previously campaigned strongly against Tony Blair’s wish to adopt the Euro single currency), went to America first, and said very clearly that the US was “without doubt the most important ally of the UK”. This was a calculated move on many fronts: it was a realignment with Britain’s older allies that would appeal to Conservative voters, whilst also being a clear signal to Europe and Brussels that this government would put Britain first, not Brussels. UK foreign relations will be governed from Westminster, not Brussels, and Washington will be the main partner [11].

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (right) meets with David William Donald Cameron, leader of the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

The agreement repeatedly referred to Europe as a collection of nation-states, rather than recognizing the growing central power in Brussels, reflecting again the Conservative vision of a Europe of nation-states, not a superstate. To back this up, the Agreement promises to examine the full range of powers Europe has gained and promises that any new legal powers that would move to Brussels, such as activation of the ‘passerelle’ clauses in the Lisbon Treaty, would trigger a referendum of the people of Britain. The Working Time Directive will also be probably removed from British law - the first time a member state has actively gone to Brussels and taken policy powers back from Europe.

With a promise that Britain will not join the Euro for the next 5 years minimum, and not take part in moves to create a European public prosecutor, many would conclude that this is a strongly Eurosceptic coalition. However, when contrasted with the original commitments in the Conservative manifesto, there is significant backing away from the original promises. A commitment to pass the ‘UK sovereignty act’, an act of parliament to make it entirely sure that power ultimately rested in London, might now not be passed, and many other promises to bring back more powers from Brussels now seem to have disappeared. And the man who fought the Lisbon Treaty through parliament, the shadow Europe Minister, Mark Francois MP, was not chosen to become the real Europe Minister; a pro-European instead getting the job [12]. The impact of the pro-European Liberal Democrats has been strong.

Foreign Policy tension

At the core of this divide is an old tension in British foreign policy. Most people in the UK want to reduce the number of immigrants arriving, and the Conservative manifesto promise was to indeed reduce the numbers [13]. Yet what most people do not understand is that the UK has no power to stop most migrants, who come from the EU [14]. This is rarely mentioned by the major political parties, for many people would find it unacceptable that the UK can not control its own borders with regard to European immigration.

It is regarded by many as absurd that the UK is tied to the EU, a collection of many nations, speaking many different languages, with a history of only bringing trouble to Britain, when Britain’s natural allies, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India and the Commonwealth, all either born from Britain or with strong historical and linguistic ties to the country and genetic ties to the people, are pushed to the side. This tension is at the core of British foreign policy; why do the politicians ignore the popular desire to change the relationship with the EU [15], a declining block losing power and influence in the world [16]?

The Future

The defeated Labour party has been left leaderless, after Gordon Brown announced his retirement, and it looks as though one of two brothers will replace him, David or Ed. However, both lack the charisma and charm of Blair, and it is difficult to see them attracting the average person back to Labour.

The situation is therefore open. Labour will become a force again, able to win where the current coalition government makes mistakes. And it is the ability of this coalition to hold together, control the media, control the internal party disciplines of the Liberals and Conservatives, and reduce the budget deficit without causing too much pain in the country, that will decide the next election. If they don’t work together, this coalition could destroy the Liberals and the Conservatives for years to come, but if they do succeed, this coalition could see the Liberals move forwards as a force to displace Labour, and the reshaping of British politics forever.

Glen Ruffle MSc, BA (Hons)
Worked with the Conservative Party during the Treaty of Lisbon debates in 2008.

Bibliography/Sources

[1] Jonathan Isaby (2009) Ipsos-Mori put Tory poll lead down to 6%, Conservative Home, at: http://conservativehome.blogs.com/thetorydiary/2009/10/tories-17-ahead-in-ipsosmori-survey.html

[2] BBC News (2008) ‘Brown on end of boom and bust’, at BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7691853.stm

[3] BBC News (2002) ‘Spin memo row duo quit’, at BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1823120.stm

[4] Peter Riddell (2005) ‘The collapse of Teflon Tony’, 10/11/2005, The Times, at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/peter_riddell/article588490.ece

[5] Angela Monaghan (2010) ‘Gordon Brown says Britain is emerging from recession thanks to government action’, 27/09/2009, The Daily Telegraph, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/recession/6237217/Gordon-Brown-says-Britain-is-emerging-from-recession-thanks-to-government-action.html

[6] Toby Helm (2010) ‘David Cameron’s critics erupt after ‘heir to Blair’ fails to deliver majority’, 9/05/2010, The Guardian, at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/may/09/david-cameron-critics-erupt

[7] Sean Coughlan (2007) ‘Education, education, education’, 14/05/2007, BBC News, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/6564933.stm

[8] Christopher Hope (2010) ‘Nick Clegg’s TV debate performance ‘changed election dynamic’, says Ashdown’, 16/04/2010, The Daily Telegraph, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/election-2010/7596570/Nick-Cleggs-TV-debate-performance-changed-election-dynamic-says-Ashdown.html

[9] Tony Blair (September 1995) speaking at the Trade Union Congress, quoted on page 25 of Larry Elliott and Dan Atkinson (2007) Fantasy Island, Constable books.

[10] BBC News (2001) ‘Hague to step down’, at : http://news.bbc.co.uk/news/vote2001/hi/english/newsid_1377000/1377309.stm

[11] Alex Spllius (2010) ‘William Hague hails ‘unbreakable alliance’ between Britain and USA’, 14/05/2010, The Daily Telegraph, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7726332/William-Hague-hails-unbreakable-alliance-between-Britain-and-USA.html

[12] Tim Shipman (2010) ‘Cabinet job snub as Cameron passes over Tory eurosceptic for post of Europe minister’, 14/05/2010, The Daily Mail, at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/election/article-1278240/NEW-CABINET-David-Cameron-appoints-David-Lidington-Europe-Minister-Mark-Francois.html

[13] The Conservative Party Manifesto (2010) ‘Where we stand: Immigration’, at: http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/Immigration.aspx

[14] Jeremy Kempton, Russel Haque, Christian Dustmann, Francesca Fabbri, Ian Preston, Jonathan Wadsworth, Michael Shields and Stephen Wheatley Price (2002) ‘Migrants in the UK: their characteristics and labour market outcomes and impacts’, report published by the Home Office; RDC occassional paper number 82, at: http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/occ82migrantuk.pdf

[15] YouGov poll (2009) ‘New YouGov poll launches TPA/Global Vision EU campaign: Overwhelming public demand for radical change’, 11th January 2009, accessed at: http://www.global-vision.net/GVTPAY2106.htm

[16] Ian Milne (2008) The UK’s future export growth markets, research published by Global Vision, accessible at: http://www.global-vision.net/perspectives10.asp

and;
Ruth Lea (2008) ‘Europe’s worsening demographics’, research paper published by Global Vision, 8th April 2008, accessed at: http://www.global-vision.net/files/downloads/download447.pdf

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

“Oh mother, I see the hangman’s noose in front of me. They are going to execute me. Please save me.” Delara Darabi, 22, screamed in the phone of her parents last May from the jail of Rasht, northern Iran. A few minutes later, the line went dead, and the young woman was executed on a charge of murder. Years before, at 17, Darabi had told the police that her boyfriend had persuaded her to make a false confession by telling her that he would be executed, as she would not, being a minor. The investigation confirmed that the murder had been committed by a right-handed person, while Delera was left-handed. But in Iran, the life of a female is worth half that of a male. While her boyfriend was serving a 10-year sentence, Darabi was hanged.

On April 19, 2009, Iranian officials announced that Delara’s sentence had been granted a two-month delay. But on May 1st, they suddenly killed her without warning her parents and lawyer in advance in violation of the Iranian national code, in order to avoid domestic and foreign protests. A silent and illegal murder.

Under international law, the execution of persons for crimes committed while minors is strictly forbidden. “Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age” says the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the United Nations in 1989. Yet, five countries still continue to violate this injunction: Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iran, Yemen and Nigeria. One State in particular, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is in the infamous position of executing more juveniles than any other country in the world - 33 since 2004.

In a recent report presented to the British Parliament, a human rights association, Stop Child Executions (SCE), summarized the issue: “Since 47% of Iran’s population is below the age of 18, this is an important and justified area of concern for all those who care about Iran and Iranians.” Indeed, the judicial system of the Islamic regime lists many offences requiring the death penalty: murder, blasphemy, forbidden religion (often the Ba’hai minority), criticism of the government, possession of forbidden media or books, high treason, drinking alcohol after a third conviction, drug related offences, adultery, sexual relationships between non-married people after four convictions, sodomy, homosexuality, sexual relations between a Muslim and a non-Muslim… With the civil law setting the age of criminal responsibility at 14 years old for boys and 9 for girls, the door is wide open for the massive condemnation of juveniles.

Human Rights Council. UN Photo/Jean-Marc FERRE

What they are protesting is part of the systematic brutality of the mullahs: in 2008, eight teenagers were executed by hanging or stoning. Children like Nazbibi, prosecuted for drugs trafficking when she was 16, like Na’im, charged of possession of drugs at 15, like Reza, condemned to death for having mistakenly killed a friend during children’s play at 13, or Soghra, executed while being mentally disabled at the age of 13. Currently, up to a total of 160 minors are in the death row in Iran.

At the 10th session of the Human Rights Council in March 2009, IHEU Main representative Roy Brown said: “Iran has been responsible for 26 out of a total of 32 child executions since 2005. Eight were executed in Iran in 2008 and 133 remain under sentence of death”. He called upon the Council to act to end “what many see as the ultimate barbarity: States killing their own children”. This appeal was repeated at the 11th session of the Council in September 2009 by IHEU representative David Cormut, who pointed out that “Iran signed the Convention on the Right of the child, but … persists in ignoring its obligations under international law: for example, Tehran hanged a 17-year-old boy on the very day the regime presented its record on the rights of children at the UN.”

In 2004, Mahmud Asgari and Ayaz Marhoni, both 15, were convicted to 228 lashes and ultimately hanged because of their homosexuality. In 2007, a young man was executed after having “confessed” to a minor crime under torture. Furthermore, while waiting in jails full of adults, young prisoners are sexually abused and tortured, especially women who are threatened and often gang raped by inmates and guards.

Human rights defenders have repeatedly pointed out the implications of the fact that the notion of “child” - a person without full intellectual and moral clarity until 18 - does not exist in Iran. Reports have shown that most crimes involving juveniles were committed without premeditation and in self-defense. In these cases, often group fights, the person actually responsible is not easily identifiable. When taken to the police stations however, minors are often frightened, and easily manipulated under questioning. They usually make damaging confessions and receive the harshest sentences. In trials, judges unused to dealing with cases involving minors often convict them based on “elm e-qazi”: the judge’s own knowledge - without the advice or presence of any expert on children.

Fighting child executions remains a very serious challenge. Authorities harass the families of detainees and their attorneys. In October 2007, one lawyer had his belongings ransacked; his passport confiscated and was jailed for five years on charges of “endangering national security”. Says David Cornut: “The Iranian regime is unpredictable. It respects neither international law nor its own, national law. Thus, this death industry cannot be stopped by judiciary battles only. The pressure must come from the international community, at the highest levels.”

And in some cases world pressure has proven to be effective. Sentenced to death in 2004, Leyla Mafi, who had been forced to marry a 55 year-old man and put into prostitution at the age of 17, was released because of the mobilization of human rights defenders throughout the world. The same happened to Nazanin Fatehi, in the death row for having killed a man who tried to rape her: she was ultimately saved by a global movement led by Nazanin Afshin-Jam, an Iran-born activist from Canada.

As if to thumb its nose at the very concept of human rights, this year the Islamic Republic of Iran had the effrontery to apply for membership of the Human Rights Council. But following world-wide protests, Iran was unable to gain sufficient support and withdrew its candidacy.

Xavier Cornut
IHEU representative at the UN, Geneva

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

“There is no way in which one can buck the market” said Margaret Thatcher to the British House of Commons in 1988 [1]. What was true then is still true now. Market economics simply cannot be avoided: if you spend more than you earn, you will run out of money. You will need to make savings. You will need to have cuts. And failure to do these things will cause economic crisis.

Greek tragedy

Greece has got itself into a big problem. Many have jobs that, constitutionally, mean they can never be lost: jobs for life. Tax evasion is practised by everyone - it is normal and expected. Jobs in the public sector are prized above jobs that create wealth in the private sector, because you cannot lose the public sector ones. Successive governments have expanded the public sector as a way of rewarding those who voted for them, as this provided quick solutions to unemployment. Public sectors are the natural home of Unions, which then, despite the fact that no one was creating any money or doing much work, demanded much higher wages. Some people were able to retire at 45, and subsequently receive pensions and expenses for the next 30 or more years of their lives [2]. For normal people, the average age of retirement is 61, and the government only hopes to raise it to 63 by 2015 [3]! The whole situation is a mess, the logical consequence of socialist policies pursued for a long time [4].

The cold facts and figures

This is not a new situation: Greece has been in trouble for a while. IMF figures show that Gross Domestic Product, the measure of the value of everything a country produces, peaked in 2008 at a value of 352,000 million Dollars, and has since been falling. The Current Account Balance, the amount of exports and imports the country is buying and selling, shows a consistent trend also: in 2004, Greece bought $13 billion more than it sold; in 2005, $18 billion; in 2006, $29 billion; in 2007, $44 billion; in 2008, the highest year of deficit, $51 billion; in 2009, $37 billion, and this year an estimated $31 billion [5]. Greece, put simply, has been very good at buying things it cannot afford, using borrowed money.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (second from right) walks to the opening ceremony for the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) inside the Athens Concert Hall, the Megaron, in Athens, Greece. He is flanked by Karolos Papoulias (to the left of Mr. Ban), President of Greece, and George A. Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece. UN Photo/Mark Garten

Future of Europe

The most significant statement from an international perspective was that of German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who stated that the Greek crisis was threatening the future of the European Union itself, announcing to the Bundestag: “Nothing less than the future of Europe is at stake”[6]. Such a statement obviously had political motivations to get other European states to contribute more, but it was also a scare story lacking substance.

‘A dream’ of Europe is very safe

The European Union, as it currently exists, could indeed fall apart - indeed, some have been predicting that for a long time [7]). Yet there will remain a core of countries, so committed to the federal vision of a united European state that will never let the dream die. The elites of the Euro-core will forever continue their dream - just see the statements from Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso for evidence: “We will defend the Euro whatever it takes” [8]. France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and perhaps Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Austria, along with some of the newer Eastern European members, will still want to continue with the precious dream of the new Roman Empire [9].

President Sarkozy of France had already shown discontent with the direction of the European Union as it currently is. The UK membership of the European Union seriously hindered French ambitions: the UK wanted a free market area for trade and enlargement [10]; the French a political structure to entrench European power. The passing of the Single European Act in 1985 helped turn it into a free market area, and the enlargement into Eastern Europe, and the continual enlargement plans into Ukraine and Turkey, places that blatantly push the definition of Europe to its limits, seriously weaken the original vision of the French.

Because of this, Sarkozy proposed the idea of the Mediterranean Union in 2007 (11), which would have undermined the EU and rebuilt French dominance at the heart of this new block, a key aim of the politicians in Paris. It never took off as an idea, but under pressure from the economic strains of countries abusing the stability and growth pact rules of the EU (deficit no higher than 3% of GDP, national debt lower than 60% of GDP [12]), this is the ideal chance for Sarkozy and Merkel to jettison states that are blocking the development of their dream.

Smaller, deeper

Losing Britain (and Denmark) would be a key gain; or at least, giving them an associate membership status. Europe needs the UK’s armed forces, but with the people of the UK consistently hating the idea of the European Union [13], and with most people voting for a party in the recent election that explicitly promised to bring power back from Europe to Britain [14], its membership and involvement is only an obstacle for the planned superstate.

Losing Greece and other Mediterranean states with deep economic problems will raise the Euro’s status as a really strong global currency. Eastern Europe has also grown quickly because of the borrowing of money; Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania all have long negative current account deficits [15]. The fact is that Germany is the motor of Europe; Germany has sensibly pursued good economic policies; and Germany is the bedrock of the Euro. But Germany cannot carry all of Europe. A smaller, but deeper Europe serves the purposes of Brussels, Paris and Berlin.

More non-democracy

The other interesting thing to note is the way that Merkel was willing to sacrifice her own countrymen for the sake of the dream of Europe [16]. German citizens, the ones who voted for her and the ones who share her culture, language and gene pool, were ignored and forced instead to pay for the Greeks. The era of politicians being responsible to the people who elected them in Europe has truly died.

In part, this is now a structural problem. The creation of the Euro necessitates that the people of Europe can no longer have national economies and taxation systems. Dominic Strauss Kahn, head of the IMF, noted this, stating that Europe needed fiscal union if the Euro was to remain stable [17].That means the member states of the EU will no longer even be able to control their own taxes. National politicians would be truly redundant.

Conclusion

The Greek crisis shows us that in the modern world, left-wing politics cannot work together for a long time with globalised markets. This will not sit well with European public opinion. But the idea of Europe is not threatened by the crisis in Greece; rather it is an opportunity for those who really want integration to cut off the problems to their dream.

Glen Ruffle
Masters degree from the University of Southampton

Bibliography and Sources

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[3] BBC News (2010) Greece plans to ban early retirement, 09/02/2010, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8506142.stm

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[5] International Monetary Fund (2010) World Economic Output Database April 2010, at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=87&pr.y=6&sy=2004&ey=2011&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=cou=

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[7] Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2007) Rising Euro nears danger level as politicians round on ECB, 06/04/2007, The Daily Telegraph, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/2806896/Rising-euro-nears-danger-level-as-politicians-round-on-ECB.html

and;

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2009) Trichet is bounced into defence of the Euro, 30/06/2009, The Daily Telegraph, at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/davos/4394914/Trichet-is-bounced-into-defence-of-the-euro.html

[8] David Batty (2010) Debt crisis: EU leaders announce €70bn plan to protect Euro, The Guardian, 08/05/2010, at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/08/debt-crisis-merkel-sarkozy-euro-protection-plan[7] David Batty (2010)

[9] Boris Johnson (2006) The Dream of Rome, Harper Collins Publishers.

[10] Adele Brown and Michael Attenborough (2007) EU Enlargement: The Western Balkans, House of Commons Library Research Paper 07/27, 14th March 2007, at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-027.pdf

[11] Katrin Bennhold (2010) Sarkozy’s proposal for Mediterranean bloc makes waves, 10/05/2007, The New York Times, at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/world/europe/10iht-france.4.5656114.html

[12] European Commission (2010) European Commission Recommendations for Greece, 03/02/2010, at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/sgp/2010_02_03_sgp_en.htm

[13] Eurobarometer Poll (2009) Page 95: Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership of the European Union is…? A good thing, at:
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71_std_part1.pdf

[14] Conservative Party Manifesto (2010) Where we stand: Europe, at:
http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/Europe.aspx

[15] International Monetary Fund (2010) World Economic Output Database April 2010, at:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=86&pr.y=9&sy=2008&ey=2015&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=918%2C964%2C968%2C944&s=a=

[16] BBC News (2010) Merkel urged to put struggling Germans first, BBC News website, 07/05/2010, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8667836.stm

[17] IMF Press Release (2010) IMF managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn calls for strengthening European integration and cooperation, 29/03/2010, at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10120.htm

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jeremywarner/100005473/merkel-goes-to-war-in-battle-she-cannot-win/

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