Issue 25/ September-December 2011
By Glen Ruffle

Few would have thought in 1969, that an ardent worshipper of Egypt’s anti-imperial pan-Arabist leader, President Gamal Nasser, who led a coup and gained power in Libya, would only in August 2011 finally lose control. This week, after 42 years, his regime finally crumbled.

Muammar Gaddafi passionately chased after pan-Arabic unity, but few others shared his vision after Nasser died. Egypt’s next leader, Sadat, rejected Gaddafi, even subjecting him to a military defeat in 1977, and Sudan had a complex political situation at home to deal with without Gaddafi’s dreams.

He became excluded, and was even left out of the Arab assault on Israel in 1973. Gaddafi turned to his oil wealth, and started funding subversive groups and operations to gain the influence he craved. A supporter of genocide Idi Amin in Uganda, he also propped up the IRA terrorists in Britain.

His terrorism grew worse and worse, culminating in the Pan-Am jet bombing. But he could not buy himself back into Arab favour, and so attempted a new project of African Unity. This too failed, as did his project to unite Libya to Chad [1].

Libya struggled on, despite Gaddafi, and at the turn of the new millennium, he started to soften, and turn more to the Western powers he had for so long riled. He would come to regret abandoning many of the weapons of mass destruction as he warmed to Western powers, who conveniently forgot his past and signed up to oil-deals [2].

Secretary-General Meets Moammar Al-Gaddafi. 14 July 2009. UN Photo/Mark Garten

Gaddafi probably believed his own press, and was in denial that Libyans could ever revolt against him. Yet the Arab Spring inspired resistance across the Arabic world, and Libya was no exception. Demonstrations broke out on the 17th February, and they brought with them the end of his dictatorship.

French ambition

The response from the international community was mainly led by France. Sarkozy welcomed the opportunity to divert domestic attention from his economic woes and took the initiative to lead a popular uprising against Gaddafi.

Interestingly, soon after, on the 7th June, Baroness Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced the creation of a Task Force for the Southern Mediterranean [3]. Such a force has been designed to deal with the difficulties arising in North Africa, yet it also ties in nicely with Sarkozy’s project of a Mediterranean Union, launched back in 2008, and notably, the one leader who rejected this Union, was a certain Colonel Gaddafi [4].

France led the interests of the Mediterranean European states. France, Italy and Spain all had big oil investments in Gaddafi’s Libya, as did the UK [5]. Securing these investments were the prime concerns, reflecting the West’s lack-lustre action. Libya’s oil reserves are the largest in Africa, and the 9th largest in the world. Libya, on Europe’s doorstep, is one of the EU’s biggest suppliers - Italy, France and Germany all received half of their oil supplies from there, and Italy’s ENI, Spain’s REPSOL, and France’s TOTAL all had large contracts and investments to protect [6]. European states did not need an oil crisis as well as the Euro crisis.

Despite already being militarily stretched, the Coalition government in Britain opted to go with Sarkozy. Gaddafi’s clear rejection of the international community, the abuse of human rights, and a desire to further clear British interests connected with oil, led to British involvement [7]. The US followed, but domestic economic and political constraints held back further American commitments.

International response

The 19th March saw UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorised the more direct action with a larger coalition, principally drawn from the West of Europe and North America [8]. Most notably, the East of Europe did not take direct action, particularly Germany, Austria and Poland.

NATO acted in taking out Gaddafi’s capabilities to commit atrocities, but intervention in Libya was always half-hearted. No-one wanted to be pulled in to the “Mad-Dog’s” lair. However, Gaddafi came to regret his softening to the West and abandonment of weapons of mass destruction in 2003 [9], as his weaponry proved easy targets for NATO.

With the NATO-led coalition’s help, the rebel forces were able to strengthen, get supplies and advice, and strike at Gaddafi’s forces, which folded under the pressure. Only then, when it was clearer that Gaddafi was going to lose, did the Western rhetoric change from calling for peace and restraint to demanding Gaddafi step down completely and go without mass blood-shed. In other words, most of the action against Libya was half-hearted until it was clear the rebels would win.

And Europe?

The European response to all this was high on talks and low on delivery. This was understandable given the lack of actual resource the European Commission has. However, this won’t stop Brussels from exploiting the end of the war for its political advantages. NATO won the war, but the EU will win the peace.

The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, released many responses to events in Libya. On the 27th February, she focused on the importance of an international response [10], and stated that the EU “can not act in isolation” [11], for which we should read, the EU is powerless to do anything militarily.

However, Brussels authorised the deployment of “EUFOR Libya”, under the Common Defence and Security Policy, to be used in peace-building operations [12]. This came shortly after Britain’s Defence Minister, Liam Fox, called on Europe to get more involved and stop leaving the hard work to the UK and France [13].

Conclusions

The EU did little to remove Gaddafi, but expect Brussels to use the peace in building integration. The EU already replicates and duplicates NATO (Article 42 of the TEU of the Lisbon Treaty) and has developed a European Defence Agency to coordinate European military projects and arms build-up [14]. With funding problems everywhere, particularly in NATO, the EU is likely to push for more integration of armed forces as the logical way of saving money. The Euro crisis plays into Brussels hands - as the EU gains more sovereignty economically, it can now also venture into gaining more power in the realms of Security, Foreign and Defence policies.

France also was a winner in this conflict, showing international leadership and clearly stating to Berlin that, whilst Germany might control the EU economically, without France, the EU has little to contribute in terms of hard-power. This will strengthen Sarkozy’s hand in directing the future of Europe.

Glen Ruffle
Masters degree in Global Politics from the University of Southampton

What will be the future of Libya?

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

Sources/References
[1] Martin Meredith (2005) The State of Africa, The Free Press
[2] BBC News (2004) ‘Blair hails new Libyan relations’, 25th March 2004, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3566545.stm
[3] European Commission (2011) ‘HR Catherine Ashton sets up Task Force for the Southern Mediterranean’, 7th June 2011, at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/122454.pdf
[4] BBC News (2008) ‘Mediterranean union is launched’, 13th July 2008, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7504214.stm
[5] Roland Gribben (2011) ‘Libya: Britain and France jostle to ‘rebuild’ oilfields’, 22nd August 2011, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8716014/Libya-Britain-and-France-jostle-to-rebuild-oilfields.html
and
Russia Today (2011) ‘French want TOTAL control of Libyan oil’, 24th August 2011, at: http://rt.com/news/french-total-oil-libya-013/
[6] Russia Today (2011) ‘Crude Western interests in Libya’, 23rd August 2011, at: http://rt.com/news/libyan-oil-dogfight-europeans-975-915/
[7] France 24 (2011) ‘France and UK spearhead ‘no-fly zone’ in Libya’, 18th March 2011, at: http://www.france24.com/en/20110318-cameron-sarkozy-lead-no-fly-zone-effort-libya-benghazi
[8] UN Security Council Resolution 1973, 17th March 2011, accessed at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement
[9] Julian Coman and Colin Brown (2011) ‘Revealed: the real reason for Gadafi’s WMD surrender’, 21st December 2003, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/1450010/Revealed-the-real-reason-for-Gaddafis-WMD-surrender.html
[10] European Commission (2011) ‘Statement by Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on UNSC resolution and latest developments regarding the situation in Libya’, 27th February 2011, at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119511.pdf
[11] European Commission (2011) ‘Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to address UN Human Rights Council, discuss Libya with international partners’, 27th February 2011, at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119513.pdf
[12] EUFOR Libya (2011) at: http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eufor-libya.aspx?lang=en
[13] Ian Drury (2011) ‘Liam Fox launches broadside against ‘pathetic’ Nato allies who are ‘getting a free ride’ in Libya’, 14th July 2011, at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2014470/Liam-Fox-launches-broadside-pathetic-Nato-allies-getting-free-ride-Libya.html
[14] The Lisbon Treaty, at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF

Issue 24/May-August 2011
By Abdulkadir Suleiman

It is literally perfect to assume that the Norway shooting spree on Friday was not come by chance as Europe has been experiencing wave of loathing for the last ten years throughout the continent. The Norway incident was not more than a disclose of, what perhaps, most people won’t actually realize unless it is affected by score of people and that obscurity has ragged approximately hundred lives in a couple of hours.

The numbers of individuals who have excessively obsess a xenophobic as well as Islamphobia expressions were significantly increased in European metropolitan cities since 9/11 incident and in result the conservatisms have grabbed some attention since then. In deed the action by Anders Behring Breivik has translated the inner hearts of those individuals into really political manifestation.

The rise of right-wing politics in western countries is as clearer as they are wining too much seats in parliamentary sessions compared by 1990s. For racism and nationalistic elements who are entitled far more restriction on immigration policies have retained wide sympathizers from Ireland to Italy and from Italy to Norway.

In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and France hard right-wing and anti-immigrant parties regularly receive more than 10 percent of the vote. In Norway it is 22 percent, in Switzerland 29 percent, in Italy and Austria they have been in a government. More surprisingly in Switzerland, the anti- immigrant Swiss People’s party is the largest party and still they are. In UK the British National party has obtained a similar attention. From the fact of these realities Europe is changing back to its medieval era when the conservative parties had upper hand in all matters and was constantly leading the decision making process.

For instance, in UK the SLOGAN of the ultra-conservative party in 17th Century was seemed to be abhorrent and no one in this year would actually tolerate such slogan. “If you like a Niger at your neighbor vote for Labour”, this statement was the most fashionable for those days and in fact in the wake of Norway terror attacks; it is safe to assume that a revival of such expression is inevitable; perhaps it might not be announced similar statements by European right-wing parties publicly but was necessary adopted behind the doors.

However, the sentiments of bigotry are not isolated in Europe a lone. There is a strong Muslim hatred in America as well where USA is an immigrated land even though the proportions of Muslims are far less than other immigrants. A British reporter was asked a surprised question by an elderly Los Angeles woman recently. She asked; “do you have a child back in England?” “No”; he said. “You would better start” she replied; “The Muslims are breeding. Soon they will have the whole of Europe.”

In 2009, when the Obama Administration warned that the far right-wing parties might be at least serious, if not more, than Muslims extremist terrorism, the conclusion was bitterly denounced by conservatives. But what happened in Oslo was fundamentally what the Obama Administration had warned earlier. It was not a Muslim terrorism; it was rather a Christian type of Al-Qaida which cowardly massacred innocent masses indiscriminately in the name of “a government punishment”.

On Monday when the mastermind of that event appeared on a court, he argued that he wanted to save Europe from Muslims and acted just only to punish the Labor government in Norway for its relaxing policies on Immigrants. So in these remarks he indirectly announced a crusader war against Muslims and also revealed the level of Christian fundamentalists in Europe Because Breivik is neither layman nor mentally unfit (though his lawyer has declared him mentally disorder). He is an educated person and a son of a former Norwegian Diplomat.

In sum, the Norway twin incidents were ambiguously pre-planed and it could be anything, a conspiracy, a Christian extremist or even a domestic political struggle but what is more evident is that Anders Behring Breivik is a member of Norway’s second largest party, Fremstegspartiet; the progress party.

His party had a victory over a decade ago in leading the defeat in Norwegian referendum for joining the European Union. The most stated slogan of the progress party during that campaign was “would you want your daughter to marry a Sicilian?” empirically, how would anybody expect a mismatched interpretation of the horrific incident at the youth camp and the hidden agenda of far right-wing intentions in Europe when the level of xenophobia becomes normalized in such a way.

Abdulkadir Suleiman

International Relations in the University of Karachi, Pakistan Specializing in Middle East and CBMs (Confidence Building Measures)

Do you think there is a dangerous rise of the extreme right-wing parties in Europe?

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

Issue 24/May-August 2011
By Abdulkadir Suleiman

Although China’s strategic position in the region is still on its track of conventionality yet the zero-sum game politics of Korean-peninsula would likely be shifted into a new direction of a new adopted policy. China has opened up its markets rightly opposite on its ideological foundation and adopted what some analysts call as a State-run-Capitalism. On the other hand, North Korea even further closed tightly its doors and stands quite opposite on the direction of China. But America and it’s traditionally ally in the region South Korea, stand somewhere in between them watching and thinking properly of how and where to push the pendulum. If America and South Korea keep preserving their existing policy of isolating North Korea and refusing to resume the six-talks unless and until North Korea officially acknowledges the Yeonpyeong incidents; what effort China would have to adopt as to balance its Strategic interest in region as well as that of globally economic interest.

Would China pressure USA using its flourishing markets and keep devaluating America’s dollars as a means of instrument or would it be projecting herself in unrealistic position and watch how Seoul-Washington relation would transform form warm harmony to a more brotherly relationship. Hillary Clinton’s recent visit at Soul could be a reminder of how the two countries are cultivating their speedy growing friendships.

China is no doubt an emerging strong economic power and severely shakes westerns’ economic position. It has already cleared a very significant portion of its share in Africa, attracting many African spectators because of the policy China has adopted when it comes intervening a third country. It has accurately learned America’s mistakes of intervening and implemented a new version of investments with less intention of talking about internal institutional structures of the host country. There is neither human right abuse in the dictionary of China nor engaging rebels in another country, just straight forward and collect the raw materials then pour them into the markets with transforming them in a newly manufactured yet cheaply items. This is the exact attitude welcomed by most of corrupt and autocratic African leaders. The purposed visit to China by President Al Bashir of Sudan is remarkably a good instance of this interpretation. Presumably, china may displace USA from African continent sooner or later.

So, China has come to now to Europeans as to impress them more than the Africans but still many hot issues should be addressed deeply before the materialistic minded Europeans being influenced thoroughly, including the controversial climate change politics. David Shambaugh a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Program and the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) said in 2007 in an article published at the website of Brookings Institution that Chinese relations with Europe is passing from “honeymoon” to a “marriage” phase. That marriage phase has just come on the headlines.

Chinese Premier Tour to Europe on last June was a signal of how China is crossing from border to border on the context of boosting commercial, economic and political links with Europe. Of course, the tour could also be taken as Chinese bid to have more clients from Europe which likely would intimidate Americas’ ambitions not only in European politics but the global politics as well. Some well known commentators including Fareed Zakaria has cautiously analyzed that twenty first century belongs to China.

Financial center in Guangzhou, China. Source: Global Affairs

Nevertheless, the Chinese next neighbor North Korea; seems to have no knowledge of where China is moving. It is moreover seems to disappear on the planet for its increasing isolationism. Therefore, it is safe to assume that Democratic Republic of North Korea would face an unprecedented challenge for the coming decades due to the lack of standing friends right next to its shoulders. How would you think to survive when your lonely increases and your only remaining friend seem to have moving the direction you would never think about it? Sates are giving no priority to build only the muscles of the state these days.

There are some other important issues which policy makers are prioritizing like assuring diplomatic engagements and economic wellbeing. Citizens’ security is much targeted than state security. Only a few with no exceptional of North Korea is maximizing the concept of State security and that concept is assumed in this twenty first century as an old minded advocacy. The scenario in Democratic Republic of North Korea is even far beyond the state security because the transition of power is from the father to son as monarchies do; and this is why North Korea is supposed to have slipping down far in the Eastern ocean of political adjustments. The fact that America’s arrogant attitude toward North Korea is indisputable; yet it should show some limited restraint and apply for full participation on outstanding issues across the globe which effect North Korea’s National interest directly or indirectly. Interestingly, China was also isolated country since 1970s however; it has dramatically proved that no one can deny her ability when China assured self-assessment on all fields of the life. Today, not a single major international political structure is emphasized without Chinese consciousness and it is fully participating with a great share of interest.

North Korea is supposed to see the way Chinese have survived from the long rocky way to the current wealthy room. Hopefully China is the only guider who can persuade Koreans on some specific issues like shifting from a political position to another. As North Koreans have a habitat for the Chinese advice, expectedly its image would be a different and the region would be far from antagonism.

To sum up, China can heartily support North Koreans not only political side but economically as well just like America’s never ending support to Israelis. Surely, America’s standing policy to the region would be erupted and perhaps it would think alternatively which ultimately bring the concerned parties on the Korean peninsula to the round table that may lead for conclusion of a permanent peace deal. On other side, there was a growing report in recent times indicating that China may join some American domestic critics who are strongly pushing on policy makers to reform their policy to Korean peninsula and adopt bilateral talks to North Korea. This reform could be opportunity for China to use its influence on these lobbies and it can convince them what China wants for the region.

Abdulkadir Suleiman
International Relations in the University of Karachi, Pakistan
Specializing in Middle East and CBMs (Confidence Building Measures)

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

By Niruban Balachandran
Issue 24/ May-August 2011

From conflict prevention to third-party mediation, intercultural organizations have long had a unique history of resolving ethnic disputes between communities. The importance of grassroots intercultural organizations to international peacebuilding, which has often been overlooked, is now attracting the attention of governments, NGOs, diplomats and multilateral organizations worldwide.

Below are profiles of five intercultural organizations that have different geographical locations, different goals and different visions for the future, but are united in a belief that cross-cultural dialogue and mutual respect are crucial to peacebuilding. They are Seeds of Peace, The Valley of Peace Initiative, The Pontamina Choir of Bosnia-Herzegovina, The Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict and Peace Direct.

Seeds of Peace

In the early 1990s at a state dinner with politicians from Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority, an American journalist named John Wallach toasted them, then challenged them to pledge to bring 15 youth from each of their respective countries to a new intercultural youth camp he was founding in Maine. The result was Seeds of Peace, an intercultural youth NGO headquarter in New York City, now with offices in Amman, Cairo, Gaza, Jerusalem, Kabul, Lahore, Mumbai, Otisfield, Ramallah, Tel Aviv and Washington, D.C.

Seeds of Peace website. Source: Seeds of Peace

The first session of the Seeds of Peace International Camp in Otisfield, Maine, brought together teenage youth (called “Seeds”) from the three aforementioned countries to empower them with conflict-resolution skills and other collaborative experiences. In addition to the original three countries, today there are now graduated Seeds from conflict areas such as Jordan, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Cyprus (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus/Republic of Cyprus), and the Balkans.

Building upon the peacebuilding, negotiation, reconciliation and conflict resolution skills that they learned at camp, many Seeds have continued on to successful careers in diplomacy, peacekeeping, foreign policy and similar lines of work. Seeds of Peace also runs the Center for Coexistence in Jerusalem, which serves as a neutral, safe meeting space for Arabs and Jews. In response to the September 11 attacks, the NGO convened the International Youth Summit and met with visiting heads of state, academics, business leaders and media personalities to inform their Charter on Uprooting Hatred and Terror. Seeds of Peace also provides dialogue meetings, conferences, workshops, educational and professional opportunities year-round.

The Valley of Peace Initiative

The Valley of Peace Initiative is an excellent example of the power of peacebuilding through super ordinate goals - namely, joint economic development and integration between conflicting groups. The initiative is an effort by the governments of Japan, Turkey, Germany and others to create jobs and promote economic cooperation and integration between Israel, Jordan and Palestine. For example, in March 2007, Tokyo hosted a two-day conference which allowed the cross-pollination of economic development ideas between the governments of Japan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

The number of Valley of Peace success stories is legion. Some of the economic cooperation projects jointly managed by Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians include Olives of Peace (a joint Israeli-Palestinian business venture to sell olive oil), as well as a project jointly operated between Israeli officials in Gilboa and Palestinian officials in Jenin to promote tourism in and between the two areas.

There are also a number of business projects currently operated jointly by Israel and Jordan as well, including a Toyota and Renault car factory managed by citizens of both countries, an airport in Eilat shared by the two nations, and a railway connection that would facilitate the transport of goods between the two countries. Several more are in the project planning and implementation phases.

The Pontamina Choir of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Founded in the wake of the ethnic cleansing and bloodshed of the Yugoslav wars, the Pontanima Choir of Bosnia-Herzegovina is proof that music can unite people across ethnic and religious lines, even in post-conflict areas. In the wake of the 1995 Dayton Accords, the choir first began with a number of Catholic vocalists. Today, it has grown to include Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Jews and people of other faiths. From its base at St. Anthony’s Church in Sarajevo, the award-winning choir sings a blend of music that showcases Bosnia-Herzegovina’s colorful religious traditions. Through its concert programs and online presence, Pontamina (meaning “bridge of souls”) has reached thousands of listeners worldwide.

The choir’s founder, Ivo Markovic, originally conceived the Pontamina Choir as an extension of his previous efforts at cross-cultural education and reconciliation– for example, he used to organize children’s visits to churches and mosques in order to introduce them to the other faiths and cultures of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Markovic, the integration of vocalists from different religious communities in such a conflict-ridden region was by no means an easy task. Several choir members, many of which personally suffered during the war, strongly resisted singing songs from a different religious tradition. Some choir members were accused by their friends and family of betraying their own cultures. Some Orthodox Christian and Muslim vocalists were also suspicious that their Catholic counterparts were trying to convert them.

However, through gradual trust and support, these walls of resistance gradually tumbled down. The Pontanima Choir has demonstrated that friendship and the fine arts are an effective way to combat racism, hatred and xenophobia. Its diverse makeup sets one of the best examples of interfaith cooperation in the Balkans, and perhaps even in the world.

The Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict

Named in honor of one of the 20th century’s most accomplished psychologists, the primary goal of this academic institution is to discover the roles that psychology and the social sciences can play in predicting and preventing ethnopolitical warfare. Founded at the University of Pennsylvania and now based in Bryn Mawr College, the center brings historians, political scientists, psychologists, economists, legal scholars, sociologists, anthropologists and other social scientists together to research the causes of ethnopolitical conflicts, as well as how to resolve them.

Empirical rigor and social-scientific research are the hallmarks of the Asch Center’s activities, as well as its emphasis on educating NGO officers and other specialists on the science of resolving ethnopolitical conflicts. For example, the Solomon Asch Center Summer Institutes are designed to bridge the gap between research and practice by bringing together social scientists and practitioners to study the origins and consequences of ethnopolitical conflict. The Center also organizes courses and internships for students interested in ethnic conflict, as well as post doctorial fellowships and an annual film festival built around these issues.

Looking at intercultural warfare through the lenses of psychological science is arguably a noble endeavor, given the severe shortage of psychologists and social scientists involved in foreign policy, diplomacy, geopolitics and humanitarian issues.

For example, a report from a 1998 conference in Northern Ireland co-organized by the founders of the Center, declared, “One of the most interesting questions for psychology is to understand why certain individuals are able to forgive past wrongs, and break the cycles of revenge that typically escalate ethnic warfare. Another is to ask how individuals come to identify so strongly with an ethnic group that they will engage in bloody conflict with members of other groups who were once acquaintances, or even friends. Though there has been insufficient research on this in the past, it is clear that psychology is uniquely positioned to make progress in such inquiries.” In the sense that saving lives, ending violence and achieving peace fundamentally boils down to individual people’s thoughts, behaviors and emotions, the Asch Center has been indispensable.

Peace Direct

Peace Direct is a London-based NGO which currently supports grassroots peacebuilders in 16 areas of conflict around the world. Peace Direct focuses on funding and backing grassroots peacebuilders who are local to each conflict and have a clear vision of what needs to be achieved. Just a few of Peace Direct’s achievements include:

Directly funding Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), a peacebuilding group that successfully defused intergroup tensions during Kenya’s 2008 post-election violence. CCP also proposed a solution for ending the conflict that was eventually brokered by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.

Establishing an online directory of small, local peacebuilding organizations and individuals, called the Insight on Conflict database.
Bringing Muslim peace activists from Kenya and Palestine face-to-face with young British Muslims to jointly explore areas of mutual cooperation within British society.

Supporting local peacebuilder Henri Lady in Congo, whose organization has helped rescue 444 child soldiers, and has helped 14,000 refugees to return to their villages safely.

Peace Direct has been unique in its smart, results-focused approach to selectively funding individual peacebuilders and small organizations whose efforts are measurable and proven.

Pathways to Reconciliation

Though they mean well, government-driven, top-down, authoritarian peacekeeping or treaty-compliance initiatives geared toward promoting intercultural reconciliation oftentimes arouse suspicion, are poorly managed or fail to produce positive social outcomes. The above five examples from all around the world prove that grassroots organizations and ordinary local citizens can often be instrumental in preventing and reducing intercultural violence. In today’s increasingly decentralized world, diplomatic negotiations or multilateral resolutions are not the only methods by which peace and stability can be established.

Ignoring the work of proven NGOs and local peacebuilders can mean enormous missed opportunities for cross-cultural understanding, saving lives, mutual respect and bridging ethnopolitical gaps. By turning the spotlight on organizations whose effectiveness may have been unnoticed, governments, NGOs, diplomats and multilateral organizations can increasingly look to these organizations as willing, passionate partners in the mutual quest for reconciliation and harmony between societies.

Niruban Balachandran
Executive Director of TeamBuilders International Ltd.

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

Issue 24/May-August 2011
By Guy Burton

On 19 May Barack Obama tried to reset American foreign policy towards the Middle East. This was in the wake of the uprisings that have swept the region, resulting in the overthrow of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents and the ongoing confrontations between people on the street and their regimes in Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and Syria (1).

The Libyan and Syrian cases have been especially prominent in the West in recent months. This is mainly because of the different approaches taken by the West towards the two countries. In Libya the West appears to be actively engaged in trying to topple Muammar Gaddafi’s leadership through NATO’s implementation of a no-fly zone and airstrikes against the regime. The British, French and American forces have been at the forefront of this movement; the Italians have also recently joined. Meanwhile, despite continuing protests and the heavy handed response of the authorities in Syria, which has resulted in hundreds of deaths and more injured, the West has avoided taking action.

That the West has adopted such contrasting approaches is particularly striking given that both countries have historically been seen to challenge the global order by supporting ‘international terrorism’ and facing very weak internal opposition. First, Libya and Syria have historically been regarded with deep suspicion by the West. Both countries have been accused of supporting ‘terrorist’ organisations and actions. Libya was suspected of providing assistance to the Lockerbie bombers, who blew up a Pan Am jet over the Scottish town in 1988, killing around 280 people. After a decade of legal wrangling between the US, Britain and Libya, the Libyan suspects were eventually extradited to face charges in a Scottish court established in The Netherlands, eventually resulting in one conviction. Meanwhile, Syria is suspected of providing resources to Islamist groups who have actively targeted Israel, through Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine.

Security Council Meets on Situation in Syria. UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras

Second, before the current ‘Arab spring’, both Libya and Syria had extremely weak oppositions. After Gaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969, his regime actively pursued its critics, including carrying out assassinations overseas (2). In Syria the greatest threat to the regime occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the former president and Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Asad, liquidated the Muslim Brotherhood (3). Following his death in 2000, there was a brief ‘Damascus Spring’ and the prospect of reforms. These never materialised. More recently, a Damascus Declaration was signed by over 250 individuals associated with civil society groups and NGOs in 2005. However, its support never stretched beyond the elite and its demands fizzled out during the latter 2000s (4).

In addition, the West’s reaction is odd given its improving relationship with Libya over the past decade and its persistently frozen state with Damascus. Since the Second Gulf War in 2003, Libya’s leadership has expressed its willingness to renounce the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. This was the opening that enabled the US to re-establish diplomatic relations and the development of closer relations between Gaddafi and the European Union (EU).

By 2009 the thaw was sufficient that Britain released the convicted Lockerbie bomber to Libya on compassionate grounds, provoking a storm of protest in the media. By contrast, over the past decade relations between the West and Syria remained largely unchanged, especially after the collapse of the Damascus Spring. Western officials continued to pin their hopes on Bashar al-Asad’s reformist tendencies, despite the absence of any evidence in this regard.

Yet the West’s contrary responses to the Libyan and Syrian protest movements may be accounted for in three main ways. First, the West has invested more money in the Libyan economy than in Syria’s. Libya’s economy is dominated by oil, most of which is exported. Although Libya’s energy sector was nationalised in the 1970s, Libya’s return to the international community in 2003 meant that sanctions were lifted. The result was a surge in Libyan oil to the West from 2004. Between 2005 and 2008 shipments to US refiners increased from 56,000 to 102,000 barrels per day while Italy, France, Germany and Spain make up the largest share of Libyan oil. Similarly, Western companies are competing to get into the Libyan energy sector; in 2007 BP signed a contract to conduct natural and liquid gas exploration (5). Consequently, for the West political instability in Libya cannot be tolerated since it threatens energy supplies. Syria’s economy, by contrast, remains largely closed. Although the leadership broadly rejects central planning, market reforms have taken place at a slow rate and the economy performs sluggishly. Both domestic and international investment remains low: Syrian businesses receive only 7% of bank loans at present, which only serves to reduce investment further. The slow and limited nature of Syria’s economic changes reflects broader political concerns as well, namely to prevent the creation of a new and independent social class that owes no allegiance to the regime (6). In sum then, the West has less incentive to intervene in Syria than it does in Libya, where political instability could disrupt American and European growing reliance on energy supplies. At the same time, there may well be a calculation that a non-Gaddafi government may serve as a more reliably partner, not only in terms of providing energy supplies, but also in leasing contracts to foreign companies.

Second, despite similarities in the means of Libyan and Syrian foreign policies, they are largely oriented towards different ends. Under Gaddafi Libya’s goals have been broadly consistent and directed towards challenging the prevailing international order, even as he has managed twists and turns. Tim Niblock has argued that Gaddafi’s rhetoric since 1969 has been directed towards promoting the concerns of Arabs, Muslims and Africans. This has brought his country into confrontation with his neighbours, especially given Libya’s demand to be a leader on these issues (7). Such suspicions are bound to remain, even as Gaddafi has sought to develop relations with the West. Meanwhile, unlike Libya, Syria’s aims have been more focused on recovering national territory lost to Israel in the 1967 war and promoting Palestinian rights. Rather than overthrowing the prevailing regional order, the Syrian leadership under the Asads has been contained to building up Syrian military capacity to match that of Israel and harassing Israel at every turn. These objectives accounted for Syria’s military alliance with the Soviet Union and then with the US after the end of the Cold War and the involvement into the First Gulf War in 1990-91 on the one hand and its support for anti-Israeli proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah on the other hand (8).

Third, the two regimes face contrasting types of opposition. Notwithstanding the historic weakness of the anti-government forces in Libya and Syria, events since the start of the year have contributed to substantially different types of opposition. In Libya the popular protests which began in mid-February soon gained elite support; parts of the regime not only began to distance themselves from the Gaddafi leadership, but broke with it. A number of key diplomats rejected the leadership’s actions while the opposition soon gained a military capability as elements of the armed forces sided with the demonstrators. The opposition was also helped in two other ways. On one hand, Libya’s geography in which the populated areas are located at opposite ends of the country and are separated by several hundred miles of desert meant that the regime and the opposition soon took control of distinct territorial areas. On the other hand, the opposition was also sustained by NATO’s military intervention.

Following the UN Security Council’s condemnation of Gaddafi’s repression and a vote for a no-fly zone, NATO quickly filled the space by carrying out airstrikes against the regime’s military installations - thereby tacitly supporting the opposition. Such features - elite support, territorial control and external military assistance - are not to be found in the Syrian opposition. In part this is due to the difficulty of gaining verified and independent assessments on the ground; unlike Libya, the Syrian government has made it difficult for outside media to enter the country. At the same time though, there has been relatively little public criticism of the Asad government by elements within the regime, raising the likelihood that it still is largely unified.

The absence of any significant internal splits has meant that the protests have largely remained at the mass level and absent of any support from within Syria’s armed forces. This has meant there is less scope for Western action to exploit perceived differences in Syria than in Libya.

Both Washington and the Europeans appear to have made an assessment that they can afford to lose Gaddafi but not necessarily Asad. This is especially illustrated by the refugee question. Simply put, the difference is between Libya, whose internal convulsions have contributed to a refugee crisis on Europe’s doorstep and Syria, where the impact has not been directly felt by the West. Arguably, the West - and especially EU leaders involved in the NATO airstrikes - believe that matter cannot get any worse under an alternative Libyan leadership. The same may not necessarily be said in the case of Syria, despite the government’s actions against its own people.

In Libya’s case European concern about illegal migration across the Mediterranean and the lack of an agreement between the EU and Libya over how to deal with the problem predated the current crisis (9). Gadaffi’s response to the protests only served to exacerbate the situation, leading to a wave of refugees crossing to Malta and Italy - and in the latter case including illegal migration into France. Meanwhile, although the government’s actions have affected people in Syria, they have not led to significant numbers of people seeking refuge or asylum in Europe. Furthermore, Syria serves as an asset to some European minds, since it presently hosts around 600,000 Iraqi refugees (who fled the country during and after the Second Gulf War) and a notable number of Lebanese refugees after Israel’s war in 2006 (10).

The various economic, strategic and political factors - and especially the consequences in terms of refugees arriving in Europe - all point to the dominance of realpolitik over idealism in the West’s calculations. Contrary to the rhetoric of Western leaders in support of democracy and people power, the cases of Libya and Syria illustrate the extent to which these goals have been trumped by more practical and self-interested concerns. A primary concern with securing their energy supplies and preventing an influx of refugees and asylum seekers appears to be the primary concern of European leaders, backed by their US ally. Moreover, if this can be achieved through the defeat of a persistent thorn in the guise of Gaddafi and its replacement by a more pliant regime that owes its establishment to NATO assistance, then so much the better from their perspective. For the Syrian protestors, their misfortune (or fortune?) lies with residing in a country that is not only economically unimportant to the West but whose government has ‘helped’ contain the consequences of its interference in Iraq and so far appears to remain fairly united.

Given these circumstances and the prominence of realism over idealism in the Arab region, the surprise is not that the West should act in such a contrary fashion in relation to the two countries, but rather why anyone ever assumed it would be otherwise. That this is so was only reinforced by Obama’s acceptance of the fact through his inability to articulate an alternate American position in relation to the region on 19 May other than one that continues to maintain the present line. In particular this remains one where Washington and its NATO allies will continue to bomb the Libyan regime’s military installations until Gaddafi leaves and the use of a carrot-and-stick approach to Syria, by urging Asad to adopt reforms and imposing sanctions against individual members of the regime.

While this may hold in the short-term, it is not clear that either approach will prove sustainable should the Libyan and Syrian regimes dig in. To date NATO’s airstrikes have failed to strike a decisive blow against Gaddafi’s regime and the last couple of months has seen the emergence of ‘mission creep’, whereby NATO is extending its support to the opposition through training. At the same time, the lack of any tangible support to the Syrian opposition may make it easier for Asad’s government to snuff out the protests in time. The result may therefore end up in the West’s nightmare scenario: on the one hand, by becoming embedded in a civil war in Libya where its extrication will lead to the collapse of the opposition and a more confrontational Gaddafi; and in Syria a regime that may even less willing to reform following the defeat of its critics.

Guy Burton
Researcher at the Centre for Development Studies at Birzeit University and a research associate with the Ideas Centre for diplomacy and strategy at the London School of Economics.

VOTE: Do you think the Western countries will intervene in Syria?

References

(1) BBC, “Obama Middle East speech in full with analysis,” 19 May, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13461682 [accessed 20 May 2011]

(2) BLANCHARD, C. AND J. ZANOTTI, “Libya: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 18 February, 2011, 19-20.

(3) ZISSER, E, Asad’s Legacy: Syria in Transition. London: Hurst & Co., 2001.

(4) SHARP, J, “Syria: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 20 April, 2011, 19-20.

(5) BLANCHARD AND ZANOTTI, 26-27.

(6) MARSHALL, S, “Syria and the Financial Crisis: Prospects for Reform?” Middle East Policy, 16(2): 106-115, 2009.

(7) NIBLOCK, T, “The Foreign Policy of Libya,” The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, R. Hinnesbusch and e. Aoushiravan, eds. London: Lynne Rienner, 2002, 213-233.

(8) HINNESBUSCH, R, “The Foreign Policy of Syria,” The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, R. Hinnesbusch and A. Ehteshami, eds. London: Lynne Rienner, 2002, 141-165.

(9) EUROPEAN UNION, “European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Libya. Strategy Paper & National Indicative Programme 2011-13,” 2010.

(10) EUROPEAN UNION, “European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Syrian Arab Republic. Strategy Paper 2007-13 & National Indicative Programme 2007-10,” 2006.

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

Click on the image to see the full report

Issue 24/May-August 2011
By Erica L. Green

A transition of power has finally taken place in Côte d’Ivoire, but many are uncertain if there will be peace. For the last four months, there has been a tense standoff between outgoing President Gbagbo, and President-elect Ouattara. However, several weeks ago, Gbagbo’s rein was brought to an abrupt end by his arrest, giving Ouattara full sovereignty over the country.

Gbagbo’s reaction to the election loss took many by surprise. Previously, to some he was viewed as a role model that brought peace and economic stability to the country. Up until now, Côte d’Ivoire was considered one of the most stable and prosperous countries in Africa. Reflecting on Gbagbo’s time in office, some wonder if his down fall was the self perception of a man too successful to step down. On the other hand, others argue he should have stepped down a long time ago.

History

Located on Africa’s west coast, Côte d’Ivoire has been one of the biggest producers of cocoa in the world. This former French colony gained independence in 1960, but it is constantly reminded of the occupation by a sustained French presence in the region. Post colonization leadership under President Felix Houphouet-Boigny maintained relative stability until his death in 1993.

Many may view Côte d’Ivoire’s recent history as déjà vu. It was only 10 years ago, after a series of coups and rioting, when Gbagbo and Ouattara first met at the negotiation table to discuss peace between their rivaling parties. An earlier election, one year prior, declared Gbagbo and his Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) party as the winner, but Ouattara was not allowed on the ballot. Their parties clashed leading negotiators to call for new elections, which put Ouattara in a significant lead by popular vote. However, increased killings in the north led Ouattara to flee to France in exile. Gbagbo’s party assumes leadership, although in the midst of turmoil and assassination plots, during this time. In 2004, the UN deploys peacekeeping troops to stabilize the ongoing unrest. Viewed as an interference of government affairs, the peacekeeping troops met militia resistance.

Ivorian Refugees in Liberia. UN Photo/UNHCR/Glenna Gordon

Although a power-sharing deal was instated between President Gbagbo and the prime minister, the leader of another opposition group, the assassination attempt by rocket attack on Prime Minister Soro’s plane and a sustained peacekeeping presence, new UN Security Council sanctions were placed against the region. These sanctions affect the vase diamond trade and fishing industry. In 2008, President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro do not feel the country is stable enough to hold elections, so the process is delayed until the fall of 2010.

This past fall, Gbagbo’s refusal to step down has brought intense fighting. The UN reported the deaths of at least 462 people in the violence. On the other hand, Ouattara’s representatives put the death toll much higher at 832. UN reporters also say that 500, 000 people have fled the country in the midst of the violence and heavy artillery fire. Neighboring Liberia received 90,000 of these refugees. Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and other aid agencies also had to seek safety and flee to surrounding regions.

After the election, Ouattara sought refuge in a hotel. Tense standoff brought heavy artillery and his troops eventual began to seize control of the country. And corner Gbagbo and his wife in a hotel. The tense standoff came to an end when he was cornered in a hotel with his wife. He was arrested by the UN.

Recovery

As part of the recovery, the African Union has lifted sanctions and France has vowed to lend the struggling country 400 million euro to assist in the stabilization process. Reuters notes a previous default on a loan back in January that led to a freeze in Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa exports. However the first installment of 200 million euro, slated for distribution in several days, is designed to pay back salaries and assist in other humanitarian needs. Endemic health problems persist, such as yellow fever and malaria.

According to the World Health Organization, the average life expectancy is to age 50 for men and 55 for women, although healthy life figures suggest aging 38 and 41 respectively. However, risks and health disparities will increase with continued skirmishes between factions and interference with the aid workers.

Humanitarian aid groups are starting to return and could benefit from public support. MSF has returned to Côte d’Ivoire and is trying to aid the thousands affected physically and mentally by the civil war violence. Ouattara may have been declared president, but militia groups sympathetic to Gbagbo remain. These groups continue to intimidate and attack innocent civilians. To read more about rescued efforts to the Côte d’Ivoire region or to learn how you too can support the efforts, visit:
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/donate/overview.cfm

Erica L. Green
MA, MPH, CADC
Director of Health & Humanitarian Aid
UNA-USA Chicago
Ph.D. Candidate
International Psychology
The Chicago School of Professional Psychology

VOTE: Do you think an stable future is possible for Cote d’Ivoire?

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

Issue 23/January-March 2011
By Erica L. Green

The problem with writing about a country that is so rapidly changing is that by the time this is article is published, everything will be old news. However, one question will probably remain the same. What will Haiti’s future hold? One tragedy after another in past year alone has left many perplexed over the fate of the country of Haiti and its people. The year 2010 brought a deadly earthquake, a cholera epidemic, and election riots. These incidents alone had a death toll of an estimated 280,000 of Haiti’s inhabitants. When is enough enough? What will it take for the country to stabilize itself? Can a country so ravaged by poverty and health disparities before the earthquake rebound after so many setbacks?

I had the privilege of journeying back to Haiti one year after the devastating earthquake. What a difference 12 months can make. Structurally, there were some signs of improvement, but much has stayed the same. The biggest change, however, is probably in the sentiment of the people. These days many of the Haitians receiving aid are a tad suspicious, and rightly so. Many international faces have come and gone. Many promises of support have been, but lie dormant in the hands of the donors until the government can stabilize and develop a system to manage these resources, which is arguable the cause of such wide-spread destruction and loss of life.

Politics

The national presidential election held on November 28th of 2010 was plagued with controversy. There were too many candidates, there was no established medium to display their views, and their job qualifications ranged the gamut. This does include reported ballot box stuffing and the inability to get to the polling place. There was no clear winner so tension has been on the rise ever sense [1]. On my way to a cafe one day, January 14th, two days before the scheduled presidential run-off, it was over heard on the radio that the election results were release. Riots had already begun forming in the south claiming one life. Germaine Pierre Louis, founder of the first beauty school in Haiti 50 years ago notes, “I know my people and this is normal.”

The people complain there are many candidates running for election but they are all corrupt. Reports state that rioting several months earlier had led to rubbish barricaded streets and the deaths of 4 people [2]. I was advised that if I went to the café and see a mob of people run by, the best thing is to go out there and run with them because I do not know what they are running from. March 20th is scheduled to be the final run-off.

Cholera

Researchers say Haiti has not experienced a cholera case in over 40 years. However, in October the first symptoms of cholera emerged in Saint Marc, which is about 2 hours north of Port-au-Prince. For a period of time there was rumor and heated accusations against the occupying United Nations Peacekeepers. They are suspected of bringing the cholera to the region Nepal, but many people question the legitimacy of such claims [3]. St. Marc health officials tell me it is difficult to know if the UN troops brought the cholera unless they take stool samples from each one. Instead, time should be spent finding those at risk and educating them.

Peacekeeping - MINUSTAH. UN Photo/Logan Abassi

Surprisingly enough, the family members who cared for the cholera patients were the biggest culprits in spreading the disease, health officials say. These individuals unknowingly discarded fluids and washed soiled linens in the town’s main water source, the Artibonite River. It has been a challenge identifying these infected individuals including the local latrine cleaners because of the level of stigma that accompanies a cholera diagnosis and those slated for fecal sanitation-related occupations.

The standard treatment protocol for cholera has been intravenous treatments and plenty of oral fluids. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) has investigated the possibility of using a cholera vaccine [4]. The vaccine has not been part of the regimen does far because of its limited availability. Only select countries have access to the vaccine. For example, in North America, only Canada offers the cholera vaccine over the counter. The two dose treatments that require for refrigeration sells for 100 Canadian dollars (73.40 €). This is not advantageous for Haiti because the vaccine’s protection only lasts 6 months, so health officials believe education is a better prevention method.

Hurricane

The October hurricane added a deadly mix to the existing earthquake recovery and cholera epidemic. Although hurricane Thomas only reached category 2 intensity [5], the increase in rainfall and wind wreaked havoc on communities already unstable. Post-earthquake, the displaced moved into tent cities built on unoccupied flood plain land such as dry river beds.

The increase in water flow disseminated the cholera to available drinking water, food sources, and families living in the river beds. Occupants were advised to leave [6], but the already displaced residents feared someone would come and take their dirt floor, tarp and pole home, if it survived the 201 km/h (125 mph) winds.

Action

In the midst of all the challenges in 2010, the people stand resilient. There have been challenges rebuilding due to the lack of coordination, the lack of land ownership documentation, and the lack of garbage removal. Funding was raised by many organizations to create stable housing, but contractors are leery to begin permanent structures with the minimal organization. However, the Haitian community is finding ways to manage these crises to bring back businesses and a stable life.

One thing the health care community has learned from the earthquake is that sustainable change can only come from the Haitian people and not from the relief workers. I asked Serge Pierre Louis, a Neurologist born in Haiti, who also serves as President of the Chicago-based DuSable Heritage Association, what can the international community do now to assist? He states, “The international community is very important for the future of Haiti. It can continue to provide the much-needed and much-appreciated emergency assistance to the victims of hurricanes, earthquake and cholera. More importantly, it can work with Haitians in Haiti and abroad to develop long-term solutions to their problems and to assure that they take charge of their own destiny.”

So there has been some improvement post earthquake, but there is more than seismic repair needed to rebuild the country.

Erica L. Green

MA, MPH, CADC
Director of Health & Humanitarian Aid
UNA-USA Chicago
Ph.D. Candidate
International Psychology
The Chicago School of Professional Psychology

VOTE: What do you think will be the future of Haiti?

References
1. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2010/11/201011295115818229.html2.
2. http://www.trabajadores.cu/news/2010/12/9/disturbios-dejan-cuatro-muertos-en-haiti-1
3. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11949181
4. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/dec2010cholera.html
5. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-31/world/tropical.weather_1_tropical-storm-leeward-islands-watches-and-warnings?_s=PM:WORLD
6. http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/11/05/v-fullstory/1909935/hurricane-tomas-nears-coast-of.html#

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

Issue 23/January-March 2011
By Guy Burton

The issue of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank forms a central part of any negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The settlements started to be built in the occupied Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza after the end of the 1967 war. While settlements grew under Labor governments during the 1970s, it was after the election of the pro-settler and right-wing Likud party in 1977 that the number of settlers and settlements increased rapidly.

Over the past decade the number of settlements in the West Bank has reached 121 with another 100 classified as outposts. While the settlements were officially sanctioned, outposts emerged without any authorization by the state. However, both types receive the same assistance from the Israeli state in terms of security and road construction around them. In total, around 460,000 Jewish Israeli settlers currently live in the West Bank. Around 191,000 of them live in or around Jerusalem with 271,000 in the rest of the West Bank. The settler population is also growing faster than the rest of the Israeli population, at 4-6% compared to 1.5% each year over the past two decades (1).

The settlements have become largely a West Bank matter. Under the government of Ariel Sharon, Israel carried out a unilateral Disengagement Plan in Gaza, which removed 9000 Jewish settlers from the 21 settlements existing in the territory in August 2005. The decision was not universally welcomed by all Israelis and especially the settlers and their supporters, many of whom protested violently during the withdrawal.

Israel and its settlements

There are several reasons for Israeli support for the settlements. First, there is the ideological Zionist claim that the territory is part of the Jewish homeland. Second, the extremely proportional political system in Israel means that the Knesset (Parliament) is fragmented between a few large parties such as Labor, Likud and Kadima and a number of smaller parties. Some of these smaller parties are particularly nationalist and ultraorthodox like Shas. The larger parties find themselves seeking such parties’ support, in order to form a governing coalition. As a result, parties like Shas have an influence that is out of proportion to their size, thereby preventing any moves to change Israel’s settlement policy (2). Third, a number of Israeli policymakers have a demographic fear that Israel may disappear in the future.

Catherine Ashton, on the right, visiting a primary school for girls in Beit Hanoun, with John Ging, Director of operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in the centre. Source: EC

They point to Israel’s relatively lower growth rate compared to the Palestinian population. Even as Palestinian fertility has fallen over the past decade it remains higher than Israel’s, at 2.7% to 1.5% respectively in 2009 (3). Fourth, the settlements provide ‘facts’ on the ground ahead of any final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The Green Line, which separated Israel from Arab territory between 1948 and 1967, is the basis on which UN resolutions and the Oslo process since 1994 are framed. However, it does not mean that a final border between an Israeli and Palestinian state will be set along it. There is a chance that the eventual border will be based on which side has a majority in the population of particular areas.

Although the consensus since Oslo has been in favour of two states, there is growing realization among some in the Israeli Right that the settlements are undermining the two-state solution. The presence of so many settlements and Jewish settlers surrounded by Palestinians and Palestinian territory means that the map of the West Bank now looks like a chessboard with pockets of settlements dotted throughout the territory and in between Palestinian conurbations. Consequently, the idea that the Palestinians could be compensated for land lost to the settlements with territory taken from elsewhere is hard to envisage.

It is extremely unlikely that an Israeli government is likely to give up some of its own territory to the Palestinians on the other side of the Green Line to make up for the land taken by the settlements in the West Bank.

Without the Israeli leadership being prepared to sacrifice its own territory, there therefore appears to be three main options for the Israeli government: one, withdrawal of the settlers from the West Bank and into Israel proper; two, incorporation of the settlements into a future Palestinian state with settlers becoming Palestinians or Israeli residents living in Palestine; or three, the incorporation of the settlements and the territory around it into Israel.

Of the three options the first would involve high financial and human costs, in terms of state compensation to the settlers and the use of armed forces to prevent violent protest during the settlers’ eviction. Moreover, the Israeli government would have to remove a much greater number of settlements and settlers from the West Bank than they did in Gaza in 2005. To do this the government would not only face far more opposition to withdrawal than it did in Gaza but also have to deal with the greater problems of resettling the settlers. The experience of the Gaza settlers since their eviction is not a positive one. Despite the Israeli government promising to compensate the settlers for their removal from Gaza, a year after the Disengagement Plan 81% were living in temporary accommodation and a half were unemployed. By 2010 70% were still living in temporary accommodation and many had still to receive any compensation (4).

The second option would be untenable to many Israelis and settlers. As a result the third option has begun to receive growing attention from many around the Israeli leadership. It would mean the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of one state. But it would not be the binational state that many on the left of the Israeli political spectrum favour (5). Instead, it is likely that West Bank Palestinians would face similar discrimination that Palestinians already living in Israel face as Arab-Israelis, including with regard to citizenship rights, owing property and serving in the armed forces.

The impact of the settlements on the Palestinians

For the Palestinians, the settlements go to the heart of their claim to self-determination and sovereignty. The settlements are seen as an encroachment and fragmentation of Palestinian territory. Palestinians are denied control or access to the land surrounding the settlements. As part of the Oslo process during the 1990s the West Bank was separated up into three forms of administrative and security control. The purpose was to put in place a phased period of Israeli military withdrawal from the territory.

Palestinians were given control over Area A, which amounted to 2.7% of land in the West Bank and where most of the Palestinian urban centers were located. In Area B, which accounted for 25.1%, the Palestinians had administrative control while the Israelis maintained control over security. All the settlements and outposts are located in the 72.2% of the West Bank known as Area C, where Israel has both administrative and security control (6).

Given Israel’s complete control of Area C, Palestinians face a great number of obstacles and challenges. The result is discriminatory treatment in favour of Israelis and the settlers in these areas and against the Palestinians. Supported by Israel and the security forces around them, settlers enjoy all the rights as citizens of Israel. By contrast the Palestinians who live in the surrounding region are denied equal treatment, being subject to Israeli military authority. Other forms of discrimination are felt by Palestinians in Jerusalem where Israel has condoned settler activity within Arab neighbourhoods.

Contrary to Israel’s official claim that it is not in breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention (which denies the forcible transfer of people in occupied territory), settlers have not only used various third party intermediaries to hide their purchase of Arab-owned property in the Old City, Silwan and Al Tur (where they now live in fortified compounds), they have also resorted to the courts to evict Palestinian families from their homes. This is especially the case in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood over the past year, where many international agencies and consulates are based (7).

The impact of all this state action and pressure by pro-settler organizations is to weaken Palestinian control of territory within the Green Line. In Jerusalem settler encroachment threatens the Palestinian leadership’s commitment to making East Jerusalem the capital of an independent Palestine. In the West Bank the settlements and their support structure, including a parallel road system that only settlers can use, risk a balkanization of the Palestinian population into a number of relatively disconnected regions: Jenin, Nablus, Salfit, Ramallah, Hebron, Jericho and Bethlehem.

On or off? The settlement freeze and negotiations

Given the threat posed by the settlers and settlements, the Palestinian leadership has made a freeze on settlement construction and their expansion a precondition of any negotiations with the Israelis. In November 2009 Israel announced a ten-month moratorium on settlement construction, which it was hoped would bring the Palestinians into a dialogue sponsored by Washington. However, the freeze was less comprehensive than it first appeared. Only new projects were covered by the ban while those that had already been started or were located in those parts of the West Bank which Israel had annexed to its Jerusalem municipality were allowed to carry on (8).

In March 2010 there was tension between the US and Israel over an Israeli announcement to build more housing units in a settlement near to Jerusalem. The publicity coincided with a visit by the US Vice President Joe Biden to Israel and led to acrimony when Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu visited Washington at the end of the same month (9). Under Barack Obama’s presidency, relations between the US and Israel appeared to have reached a low.

At the same time Washington was pushing the Palestinians to resume talks with the Israelis. Diplomacy over the summer months meant that in early September the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships met for the first time since face-to-face meetings were broken off in 2008 and then frozen following Israel’s invasion of Gaza in December 2008-January 2009.

However, the talks did not last long. At the end of September the moratorium ran out. Netanyahu offered to renew it, but with the condition that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state (10). This was untenable for the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, since its acceptance would not only undermine the right of return for Palestinian refugees which fled after 1948 and their descendents, but also weaken the position of Arab-Israelis living there.

At the same time Washington’s relationship with Israel began to change. In contrast to Obama’s perceived snub of Netanyahu over the settlement issue earlier in the year, in November the US was ready to offer Israel a military package of 20 aircraft worth $3bn if they would extend the moratorium for a further three months. In addition the Americans was prepared to offer various defence and security guarantees and a commitment of US support against any condemnation of Israel at the UN (11).

Although Israel’s cabinet was split, the US subsequently withdrew the deal in December. There were several reasons for this. First, it was seen as too extravagant an offer given the fact that the freeze would only continue to be applied to a few number of cases and not to Jerusalem. Second, it was uncertain what would happen once the additional 90 days were up. Third, there was a feeling among American policymakers that Washington would have been rewarding Israel for its intransigence. Fourth, the Americans realized that the focus on the settlement moratorium was detracting attention away from the main objective, which was to get the Israelis and the Palestinians to talk. (12)

Around the same time the Palestinian envoy to the UN, Riyad Mansour, proposed to submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council that would condemn Israel’s settlement activity in the West Bank and demand their halt. Mansour said that he believed the US could be brought around to support the resolution since it reflects existing US policy. By mid-January 2011 the resolution had been put before the UN Security Council, prompting Washington to reject the forum as the right place for discussion of the issue. To date there are ongoing talks behind the scenes between the Council members to establish whether the US will veto the resolution or not (13).

Where to next?

The settlement freeze has been subject to a rollercoaster ride over the past year and it may not yet be over. Despite Israel’s present position, it may decide to renew the moratorium in the near future. The Palestinian leadership will continue to oppose settlements and its participation in any talks without an assurance of a more extensive freeze than the Israelis are prepared to offer. The US will continue to explore ways of trying to get the two sides to talk to each other, if not directly then perhaps through parallel bilateral meetings between themselves and each of the two sides - much as they were doing before the halted direct talks in September took place.

At the same time, President Obama’s credibility, which was already weakened by the switch from a harsh line to a more accommodating stance over the course of the year, will find it much harder to find a way forward with a newly elected Republican Congress in place. Meanwhile all this will happen against the backdrop of new settlements being planned and built while those that already exist will be expanded.

The question of the settlements along with those other seemingly intractable problems - the right of return and the status of Jerusalem - could reach a critical point later in the year when the two-year state-building plan put in place by the Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad comes to an end. In addition to putting in place a virtual state and institutions, the Palestinian government has been actively courting international support to recognize an independent Palestinian state.

In December Argentina and Brazil joined the campaign, followed by Chile in January 2011. The aim of creating this Palestinian ‘fact on the ground’ is directed towards achieving sufficient diplomatic recognition so as to pressure Israel to reach a final agreement with the Palestinians. It is a possibility, but given past experience of the international community’s unwillingness to offer more than words of support to the Palestinian cause and criticism of Israel’s occupation, it is only a slight one.

Guy Burton
Researcher at the Centre for Development Studies, Birzeit University and Research Associate at the Ideas Centre at the London School of Economics.

VOTE: What could be the solution for settlements?

References

(1) PALESTINE MONITOR, “Israeli Settlements, 15 March 2010. http://www.palestinemonitor.org/spip/spip.php?article7 [accessed 15 January 2011]

(2) SCANLON, O, “Confusion over US-Israel settlement deal,” Open Democracy, 19 November 2010. http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/security_briefings/191110 [accessed 15 January 2011]

(3) WORLD BANK, “Population growth rate,” World Development Indicators, 2009. http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wb-wdi&met=sp_pop_grow&idim=country:WBG&dl=en&hl=en&q=palestine+population+growth+rate#met=sp_pop_grow&idim=country:WBG:ISR [accessed 15 January 2011]

(4) SHAVIV, M, “”The betrayal of the settlers,” Jewish Chronicle, 7 August 2008. http://www.thejc.com/comment/columnists/the-betrayal-settlers [accessed 15 January 2011]
LEWIS, J, “Israel failed Gaza settlement evacuees,” Jewish Chronicle, 16 June 2010.
http://www.thejc.com/news/israel-news/33078/report-israel-failed-gaza-settlement-evacuees [accessed 15 January 2011]

(5) FREEDLAND, J, “The Israeli right has a new vision - Jews and Arabs sharing one country,” Guardian, 27 July 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/27/israeli-right-vision-jews-arabs-share [accessed 15 January 2011]

(6) GVIRTZMAN, H, Maps of Israeli Interests in Judea and Samaria: Determining the Extent of the Additional Withdrawals, 8 February 1998. http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/books/maps.htm [accessed 14 January 2011]

(7) HASSON, N, “Settlers push to evict two more East Jerusalem families,” Haaretz, 7 April 2010. http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/settlers-push-to-evict-two-more-east-jerusalem-families-1.954 [accessed 15 January 2011]
ZIRULNICK, A, “Five Controversial Jewish Neighborhoods in East Jerusalem,” The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, 11 January 2011. http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=23028&CategoryId=5 [accessed 15 January 2011]

(8) WILLIAMS, D, “Israel says enforcing West Bank settlement moratorium,” Reuters, 30 November 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AT29520091130 [accessed 15 January 2011]

(9) BBC, “Netanyahu holds talks with Obama amid settlement row,” 24 March 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8583589.stm [accessed 15 January 2011]

(10) BLOMFIELD, A, “Palestinians reject Israel settlement compromise,” The Telegraph, 11 October 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/8056820/Palestinians-reject-Israel-settlement-compromise.html [accessed 15 January 2011]

(11) KURTZER, D, “With settlement deal, U.S. will be rewarding Israel’s bad behavior,” Washington Post, 21 November 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/19/AR2010111903000.html [accessed 15 January 2011]
BBC, “Israel ponders US incentive office on settlement freeze,” 14 November 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11751713 [accessed 15 January 2011]

(12) FISHER-ILLAN, A, “U.S. drops push for Israel settlement freeze,” Reuters, 7 December 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6B65QT20101207 [accessed 15 January 2011]

(13) CHARBONNEAU, L, “U.S. not convinced on settlements: Palestinian envoy”, Reuters, 10 January 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE7095JX20110110 [accessed 14 January 2011] CROWLEY, P, “Daily Press Briefing,” 13 January 2011. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2011/01/154607.htm [accessed 15 January 2011]
AFP, “Palestinian resolution on Israel to be put to UN Council,” 18 January, 2011. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j5P4plt_7wMGhISblnllmmkbaJcg?docId=CNG.9085d46ff045cb783c6f6c8d90769bf0.931 [accessed 19 January 2011]
CROWLEY, p, “Daily Press Briefing,” 18 January 2011. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2011/01/154747.htm [accessed 19 January 2011]

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

Issue 23/January-March 2011
By David Criekemans

In January 2011, Belgium broke a record. It became the country in Western Europe that needed the most days ever in order to form a new federal government. Since the federal elections of June 2010, seven political parties are trying to form a new government and are attempting to reorganize the Belgian federation via a process called ‘state reform’.

In Flanders, the nationalist party N-VA of Bart De Wever won the elections, which is a centre right party. But in Wallonia, the socialist party PS of Elio Di Rupo won the elections. Both “big guys” today still try to reconcile ‘water’ and ‘fire‘, but until now this has only produced a lot of steam and a political impasse, instead of a political deal. The clock is already counting more than 215 days, and today it seems that the politicians are even much further away from a political deal than ever. What is happening? Is Belgium a non-government country? Is the Belgian federation about to break up?

Belgium at a glance: institutions

The Belgian federation has a complex structure. At the national level, Belgium has a federal government. At the regional level, there exist so-called ‘Communities’ and ‘Regions’. This is a result of history. From the 1960s onwards, the Flemish economy in the northern part of the country developed quite rapidly. At the same time the economy in Wallonia (southern part of the country), mainly based on a so-called ‘heavy industry‘, experienced a severe crisis. This element formed the first impetus for Wallonia to aspire to get political control over the economical policy-instruments, so as to be able to shape its own future with tailor-made policy-tools.

Brussels. Source: Carlos Correa Loyola

Flanders initially developed another reasoning; it wanted in first instance to protect its own language and culture (Dutch). Thus, the Flemish political elite initially aspired to get political control over the culture-based policy-instruments in the country.

These dual aspirations led to the development of the so-called Belgian Regions and Communities, which overlap territorially.

The Belgian Communities ‘manage’ the so-called ‘person-bounded competences’ such as language policy, cultural policy, education, welfare, preventive health care, etc. The Belgian Regions ‘manage‘ the so-called ‘territorially-bounded competences‘ such as economy & employment (but some parts are still federal), infrastructure, environmental planning, renewable energy, etc. The Belgian federal level is still competent in areas such as the army, justice and police, social security, the national energy portfolio, justice and home affairs, health care (except preventive health care), development cooperation (although the Regions and Communities also develop their own development cooperation on their own material competences), the national debt, etc.

There does exist however an important difference in the northern and the southern part of the country. The competences of the Flemish Community and Flemish Region have in practice been merged. They are being managed by one Flemish Government and monitored by one Flemish Parliament. In the southern part of the country, there are still two different governments; the Walloon Regional Government and the French-speaking Community Government. As a result of this, the Belgian federal model has often been labelled an “a-symmetric model”.

Federal governments in Belgium comprise a parity linguistic basis. This means that the number of Dutch speaking (Flemish) ministers is equal to the number of French speaking (Walloon) ministers. Moreover, there exist a multitude of extra safeguards within the country to protect the rights of the minority, the French speaking people. Every change in the political institutions and governance of the country can only move forward if all the parties around the table agree. In order to make changes in the country, an overall two thirds majority is needed and a majority in each language group.

Over the past decades, this has given rise to the so-called “Belgian compromise” in which every party can claim victory, but which produces extremely complex political agreements. But the political minds in the country have changed compared to a few decades ago. Politicians of this political generation do not know their counterparts intimately as was once the case in the 1960’s, when there still existed national political parties and one public opinion. Today, Flemish and Walloons live in their own political landscape, have their own public opinions, and their own economic realities. The different results in the last federal elections also reflect this. Those are other reasons why it is becoming increasingly difficult to generate a synthesis at the federal political level. In many aspects, from economy, over culture and even matters of migration, the overall basic political analyses and positions are different.

Belgium at a glance: territory, population and economy

Some basic geopolitical and geo-economic data can also shed a bit more insight into the basic Belgian parameters :

• Belgium has a surface of 32.545 km² (Flanders: 13.522 km² / Wallonia: 16.844 km²)

• Population: 10.5 million (until the 1970s officially “bilingual”, but not in practice)

• 6.1 million Flemish / Dutch-speaking (but sometimes they feel as a ‘minority’ since every political decision has to be taken by consensus at the federal level, which gives Wallonia a de facto veto-power in all matters of political importance)

• 3.4 million Walloons / French-speaking (but sometimes they feel ‘second class’-citizens since they no longer constitute the bulk of the economic & political elite)

• 1 million people Brussels (a population which has become international since 1957. French and English are now the two most important languages here. Although Brussels used to be a Flemish city in the nineteenth century, it has become a political entity in itself. For the Flemish nationalist parties, this is difficult to accept)

• 88.000 German-speaking people (in the east, close to the German border)

• GDP/head : $47.108 (but great differences within the country!)Flanders generates about 60% of the total Belgian Gross National Product (GNP), 81% of the total exports, and attracts 60% of the foreign direct investments in Belgium. Since the financial crisis, these figures have somewhat evolved in favour of Wallonia. Nevertheless, Flanders is still the most outward looking in its economy. It is not a coincidence that trade relations are considered very important in the external relations of the Flemish economy;

As a consequence, Flanders is richer than Wallonia, but during the past years it has suffered a lot from the ‘dialectics of progress’. Wallonia is in some economic niches advancing more rapidly compared to Flanders (for instance in renewable energy). Furthermore, Wallonia has invested a lot in its economy via the so-called ‘Marshal Plan’.

The national debt is currently 101% of the country’s GDP. However, that figure is in relative terms much lower than in the beginning of the 1990s, when the national debt comprised 123% of the country’s GDP. Since the economic crisis, the country’s debt rose only moderately, a result with which the country scores best of all European countries. The allegation that Belgium can be seen as a “problematic country” in economic terms like Greece of Ireland, is thus hardly valid. Moreover, the Belgian federal state finances most of the debt via the Belgian population, not via the international money markets. However, today “political instability” is mentioned by credit institutions such as Moody’s to refer to Belgium, and to lower the country’s credit worthiness. As a result, the national debt can only be refinanced via higher interest rates. The spread between what Germany pays versus Belgium is around 1% extra.

What is the fuss all about?

So, what is happening today? In short, Belgium in all its complexities is trying to find a new internal balance. This political process is called a “state reform“. In fact, the current debate is already the sixth major state reform debate in the country since the 1970’s. In that sense, what is happening in the country today is nothing out of the ordinary. Previous state reforms have devolved more and more competences from the federal level to the two regional levels. But the process via which this has been realised was through difficult compromises. Often only some aspects of competency areas were devolved, so that in fact most competency areas are in part federal and in part regional. Shared competences do not exist in the Belgian model.

This has made the governance of the country extremely difficult. Already since the 1980’s, there has been a cry to create ‘homogeneous competency areas’, for instance in economic matters. Flemish politicians would very much like to see that the regions (both Flanders and Wallonia) receive all economic competencies, the “Full Monty” as Flemish nationalist politician Siegfried Bracke recently suggested. However, this proposal is met by extreme resistance at the Walloon side. Walloon politicians fear that devolving the rest of employment competencies (such as the reactivation of jobless people) or aspects of social security to the regions, in fact means ending the solidarity at the federal level. Those competencies, they claim, contain the essence of the solidarity mechanisms within Belgium. But Flemish politicians on the other hand claim that exactly those competencies should go to the regions so as to develop a tailor made economic policy for each of the regions.

Of course, also symbols play a role in the current political stalemate. Flemish politicians would like to see the language law of 1962 applied fully on Dutch speaking territory, including in those communities around Brussels which have evolved over time into largely French-speaking ones. They only want to give more money to Brussels if the language laws are respected. Flemish politicians have a lot of trouble in accepting that Brussels “is lost forever” as a Flemish, Dutch-speaking city and refer to the Flemish living in those communities, who almost feel like a minority within their own territory…

The problem in the negotiations today is that the maximum the Walloons are offering in the devolving of competencies does not link by far to the minimum the Flemish are ready to accept. The question who is to blame for this, is not very relevant. Are the Flemish nationalists to blame, because they ask too much? Or are the Walloon socialists to blame, because they live in the illusion that Belgium can stay as it was forever? From the point of political science, what is relevant is that it still seems difficult to make a synthesis. The traditional Belgian compromise is yet more difficult to achieve than ever. Perhaps the method of negotiation which was used these last 215+ days, should be different.

Up until now, politicians have talked starting from the federal competencies, and looking at which competency area could be devolved to the regions. This produces a zero sum game - a negotiation in which Flanders scores one point extra when a certain competency-level is (partly) devolved, which should then be compensated by another claim from the Walloon point of view. It is clear that a zero sum game negotiation will never produce a real result. But there is a solution, and the key can be found in article 35 of the constitution. This article states that the process can also be different; namely by identifying all the competency-areas that are federal, and then supposing that all the rest of the competencies are regional.

From a political point of view, such a negotiation is much easier to conduct for the political parties than the current one. It could be a way to create a positive sum game. Let us be clear, every competency area that is devolved to the regions, is not only devolved to the Flemish government, but also to the Walloon regional government and to the French-speaking community government. Moreover, the Belgians need to make a new contract with one another what the key areas are upon which they agree that they should be governed at the central level. Only via creating a consensus on the core competencies of the central level can the rest be also resolved.

Towards a Belgian confederation?

Institutional changes always come later - after de facto, political changes. My claim is that the current crisis does not mean the end of Belgium as a country. It is virtually impossible or very difficult to break the country up because of Brussels. But what the current crisis shows is that the political reality in the country has changed so drastically that it has become, in effect and in the facts a confederation - a loose cooperation of different regions and communities who do things together, but who also try to develop policies that are specifically tailor made to themselves.

In 1970, the then Belgian Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens stated before the House of Representatives that “the unitary state was superseded by the events, and that a federation now took its place”. It may be that a future Prime Minister by analogy will claim that “the Belgian federation is superseded by the events, and that a new confederation will take its place”. How much time will be needed before the current parties realize this?

Dr David Criekemans
Senior Researcher at the Flemish Centre for International Policy (FCIP), an Assistant Professor in Belgian and Comparative Foreign Policy at the University of Antwerp, and a Lecturer in Geopolitics at the International Centre for Geopolitical Studies in Geneva (Switzerland). This article reflects the author’s personal vision.

What do you think could be the solution for Belgium?

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs