Globalaffairs

Issue 21/ July-September 2010
By Yusuf Yerkel

Today there are large-scale of literature on IR theories dealing state’s behaviours with regard to international structure, in particular the notion of mutual dependency. These theories tend to take cultural, historical and religious element for granted and make these elements hardly an issue in utilizing for state’s behaviour. Putting emphasis merely to the structure in which states are seen as dependent can never be sufficient on its own to account for the orientation of states. In fact, one would be left without any explanation for the sudden policy change caused by the domestic change. This is well illustrated when someone looks to the case of Iran after the fall of Shah or policy changes that occurred even without such a regime shift (Egypt’s stance from a pro-Soviet to pro-US policies in 1972). Similarly, it is hard to understand, for example, why Turkey during the time of Erbakan started to give priority to Islamic countries (his first visit was to Iran and then Libya and he was the leading figure of the construction of D-8).

While capturing this dimension, the importance of decision-makers’ perception relates not only to such material or political interest but also to their perception of the nature of regional and international policies, and of their own identity and role as well as those of their state, which eventually feed into policy-making. At this juncture, the fundamental component, which in my opinion is to large extent not appreciated, is that each objective challenge faced by states is interpreted on the basis of decision-makers’ worldview. As Ayoob argues, even in the case of providing security of a state, which is one of the fundamental driving force of state’s behaviour, could be closely linked to the basic driving components of domestic politics.

In this regard, I find these theories inadequate in revealing the driving force of foreign policy notably in those countries which has undergone a profound transformation in their domestic structure. Turkey, in this sense, constitutes a unique example because of its geographical position and most crucially its uncertainty on whether it belongs to the Western or Islamic civilization causing a deep identity crisis. It is exactly because of this identity crisis why Turkey has had conjunctural threat definition derived by the salience of certain sub-national identities which in turn have determined Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. Therefore, it is a fundamental step to look inside actors’ Weltanschauung if one wants to penetrate into the driving force behind Turkey’s recent proactive policy.

The Concept of Identity: Identity is a concept that is constructed in the social and historical context as the outcome of social interaction between self and other. It plays the role of highlighting the similarity between some actors and their differences from others. It helps individuals to handle complex situations and provides a schema for the individual which ‘allows individuals to overcome the inherent deficit in short-term memory and other information-processing capacities by organizing an otherwise overwhelming amount of incoming stimuli into categories based on prior experience‘[1]. On the one hand it refers to a persistent sameness within oneself; on the other hand it implies a continual sharing of some sort of vital character with other. This is to say that an individual or a group of people possesses some qualities which in turn set him or her apart from others[2].

On top of that, an individual’s identity is the engine that creates and recreates the discourse and social cognitive structure and simultaneously constrained and limited by the social product which they live in[3]. If an individual wants to be understood then she must identify who that other is, what the other and the self expects from each other and at the end decide how to act[4]. Once an individual assigns an identity to someone else the other is assumed to have a set of associated discursive practices which in turn ascribes ‘intentions and motives according to the identity classification schemas in use’[5]. Therefore, identity is an inherent part of cognition, and makes life more predictable and less inchoate, inexplicable, and random by giving actors more of a sense of how their behaviour will affect others’ behaviour towards them[6].

Identity and Foreign Policy Orientation: State action is performed through the individuals that hold the position in the decision-making process. When referring to state identity, we actually imply the identity that is held by the individual or group acting on behalf of the state. As states do not have apparent equivalents to selves, it is the nations that construct collective identities which in turn are projected at the international level[7]. Hence, the inclusion of the perception of political leaders and social groups at decision-making level is important in understanding a state’s foreign policy orientation. Decisions-makers articulate the conception of state identity with the greatest political salience. Before interacting with other nations, they have a set of framework within which some states are defined as friends and others as enemies, specific institutional norms as salient and binding and historical memories as a background for their policies.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (right) meets with Abdullah Gul, President of Turkey. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

It is also fundamental to bear in mind that without knowing what constitute the other in the domestic scene and how state identity is constructed at home it is almost impossible to understand a state’s preferences and foreign policy. As Deniz Kandiyoti argues, ‘the question of what and who constitutes the West, or any other Other, often has less to do with the outside world than with the class, religious, or ethnic cleavages within the nation itself’[8]. For example, pan-Arab identity profoundly shaped Egypt’s domestic and foreign policies and drawing a general framework of what kind of policy is permissible or unthinkable. The change in Egypt’s identity from pan-Arabism to Egyptian nationalism, therefore, created the fertile ground for the Camp David accords [9].

Consequently, each sub-national identity holds an inter-subjective meaning of the self which in turn determines its interpretation of the other and eventually foreign policy which is why ‘foreign policy is often a product of such domestic contentions of sub-national identities, and the state is hardly a unitary entity’[10]. As a result of the clash among various sub-national identities, state identity is defined and redefined over time, according to its own ideological values and psychological belief systems. In the light of events an actor evaluates the reality through his subjective understanding and draws a framework that indicates what kind of role he has to play [11]. In this sense, role identity of an actor is an essential part of interest formation and helps actor how to behave in a given situation. Because of that foreign policy is not the only a platform where a certain code of conduct is implemented, rather it functions as a construction of identity in whose name it operates [12].

One needs to be also aware of the fact that the formulation of national interest and foreign policy is a direct result of the internalization of identity preferences that are shaped by cultural and patterns of social and economic life [13]. In short, identity tells you not only who you are, at the same time they refer to ‘a particular set of interest or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors’[14]. The identity of a state suggests its preference and subsequent actions which is why identities are the main bases of interest. As Wendt puts it, interest presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interest[15].

Turkey’s Strategic Mentality of the Middle East: At the end of nineteenth century, Turkey tried to confront western challenge by adopting Western and modern values. By adopting these principles, a shift in national identity was in place which caused a great deal of identity conflict within the society. Turkey has still been under the process whether it belongs to Western civilization or to Eastern civilization. This identity conflict has paved the way for a contested foreign policy orientation, particularly in regard to the West and the Middle East. Nevertheless, when analyzing Turkey’s foreign policy since the establishment of Turkey we observe that Turkey’s foreign policy has always been designed in a way that gives priority to the West rather than Middle East.

For example, Turkey has been a member of the organization of Economic Cooperation and Development since 1948, of the Council of Europe since 1949, and NATO since 1952. It has been an associate member of the European Union since 1963. These institutional ties are the manifestations of self-perception in Turkey and its adherent to democratic, secular and modern values which closely linked to their state identity. Due to the predominance of Kemalist ruling elite in decision-making Turkey’s foreign policy orientation was not interrupted and continued to be on the line of a pro-Western foreign policy while distancing itself with other former Ottoman regions notably the Middle East despite the fact that her interests were periodically at stake.

The reason why Turkey had largely ignored the Middle East must be attributed to the Turkish state identity that is chiefly defined by Kemalist values and belief system. In terms of foreign policy, Kemalist identity tends to externalize domestic issues and possess a cognitive map that is mainly shaped by Kurdish separatism and Islamism who regards these two elements as great threat to the establishment of the Republic and Turkish identity. This has an influential implication since having a narrow set of perception in domestic politics made foreign policy harsher, less sensitive to change and less flexible in regional policies. For instances, according to this paradigm, the rise of Islamism is as a result of Iranian goal of exporting Islamic revolution and the rise of Kurdish separatism is largely attributed to the Syrian support. Interpreting these two facts in this way made foreign policy objectives hostage to the domestic elements and thus putting constraints on Turkey’s relations notably towards Iran and Syria.

Furthermore, Kemalist’s security consciousness conceives the Arabs through the lens of historical events that has direct bearing in the way they formulate national interest regarding the Middle East. The memory that keeps Turkey holding a negative image derives from the Great Arab Revolt of Sharif Hussain of Mecca in which its collaboration with Britain aimed to weaken the Ottoman Empire. Although its low-scale impact in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, it is deeply resented by the Kemalist bloc. ‘The Arabs stabbed us in the back’ is the constitutive element that characterises the resentment among Turks notably the Kemalists elites. This image is still regularly invoked prescriptively, as a sharp reminder of the inadvisability of the Turk placing too much faith in the Arab support [16].

It also important to note that Kemalist paradigm is more inclined to protect the territorial integrity and the boundaries of Turkey basing their foreign policy on preservation of status quo. Taking that point as a reference to the conduction of foreign policy, the Kemalist elites established a balance by cutting ties with the Middle East and not interfering in any regional affairs. Therefore, starting from the Republic era until the mid 1980s the security culture was mainly based on defensive realpolitik, implying non-involvement in its bordering regions [17].

Nevertheless, Turkey started to play a more active role in the Middle East that has been started since the Cold War and gained momentum after 2002. One explanation would be to refer to the realistic approach and simply argue that the post-Cold War era and the new multi-polar international system facilitated and enabled Turkey to pursue an active foreign policy. This argument, however, holds to some extent truth but cannot penetrate to the driving forces. In this regard, in order to have a comprehensive analysis it is essential to look at the political transformation of Turkey and social actors’ identity that defines Turkish state identity distinctively and draw the framework in which the policy and national interest is defined and formulated.

Turkey has been going through a process of democratization, which accelerated after Turkey’s official recognition as a candidate country by the European Union in 1999. This reform process initiated changes in Turkey’s national security priorities and a shift from bureaucratic-authoritarian tradition of the 1990s to civilian and societal foreign policymaking. Democratization at the domestic level have triggered a change in perceptions through which securitized issues such as minority rights have started to be downplayed. It is also important to note that these changes promoted a decline in the role of the military in the securitization of political issues, paving the way for narrowing the range of “others” both at domestic and international levels and redefining friends and enemies in the region.

Due to the domestic political alteration, AKP’s new political identity came to center of decision-making holding normative, descriptive and theoretical ideas that differ from those of the Kemalist elites. In order to understand the implication of the new identification one needs to refer to the parameters of the strategic depth doctrine written by Ahmet Davutoglu who is the architect of AKP’s foreign policy. Ahmet Davutoglu argues that Turkey’s new position has both an ideational and geographical basis. In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. For him Turkey should be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities which cannot be limited just to one unified character. Unlike the Kemalist elites’ perception of Turkey which was chiefly based on the idea that Turkey belongs to the West, Davutoglu defines Turkey on a basis that rejects this notion and argues that Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally within one single region [18]. Because of Turkey’s geographical position, it gains a specific central status. Turkey’s history also brings the central country definition to the fore. Some countries play the ‘central country role in their region as a reflection of their cultural and historical heritage’ [19].

In the strategic depth doctrine the central concept is the policy of ‘zero problems with neighbours’. This policy indicates a revolutionary change in the Turkish perception of the international environment since it is not in the line with the belief that Turkey is surrounded with enemies who constantly try to weaken and disintegrate Turkey [20]. In this new understanding, Turkey’s boundaries have transcended the homeland and created frontiers stemming from the new policy-makers’ cognitive map. In other words, the strategy of limiting Turkey within its territory was replaced with a perception that included neighbouring countries within the frontiers of Turkey [21].

Putting that in a theoretical framework is to say that if we deem Turkey the self and the surrounding nations the other, with the new understanding Turkey’s boundary of the self was expanded so that the other became a part of the self. Therefore, the security of the other becomes the security of the self as well. In this sense, the change in perception leading to a change in security culture ultimately affects foreign policy-making. As Aras put it, in the new paradigm ‘national security culture enters into a bilateral formative interaction with the geographic imagination, which re-configures the formulation of national security and integrates new factors into the foreign-policy making processes [22]. Therefore, with the new vision, Turkey assumed a role of peace promoter in the surrounding regions, particularly the Middle East.

Moreover, unlike the Kemalist paradigm, AKP is keen to come to the terms with Turkey’s Ottoman and Islamic heritage both at home and abroad. Therefore, this policy entails an active foreign policy ranging from the Balkans at the west, Middle East and Africa at the south and Caucasus and Central Asia at the east. In Kemalist identification, the Middle East was a part of backwardness and a potential enemy that constantly tries to undermine the integrity of Turkey, whereas in the new identification this region is seen as its cultural and imperial heritage. Rather than seeing as a detrimental element, the new identification regards it as an enrichment of Turkey.

As a result of aforementioned identification and threat perception, a new vision emerges out of this which is self-confidence in foreign policy. According to this vision, Turkey is considered as a regional power which in turn leads Turkey to pursue more pro-active foreign policy in diplomatic, political and economic role in surrounding areas [23]. Besides, given the belief that Turkey is the most powerful state in the region, Turkey assumed responsibility to provide security and peace in the surrounding regions [24]. The last aspect of the new identity is also inclined to incorporate simultaneously both the West and the Islamic world in terms of foreign policy. They adopt a dual-centric foreign policy which sees both Western and Eastern foreign policy as complementary [25]. Given these new parameters of the Turkey’s foreign policy making, it is more comprehensible why Turkey has commenced to play active role in the Middle East region.

The implementation of the new Strategic Mentality: Turkish - Iraqi Relationship Before the Iraqi invasion broke out Turkey initiated a gathering of Iraq’s neighbors in Istanbul in 23 January 2003. The aim of this meeting was to avert hostilities in the wake of the Second Gulf War. The foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey convened in Istanbul to call on Iraq’s former president Saddam Hussein to cooperate with arms inspectors from the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency [26]. According to Murinson, the timing and place of the Istanbul conference with Turkey as a convener demonstrated Turkey’s new foreign policy understanding and the willingness to become a regional leader and mediator of the conflict in the region which was once ruled by the Ottoman Empire [27].

Moreover, Turkey’s refusal of the motion that would let US troops use Turkey’s territory and air bases marked a historical juncture as it showed that Turkey is a country in which principle of democratic legitimacy are shaping their policies. The refusal was made on the basis that international community considered the war illegitimate [28]. According to Aras, Turkey’s policy toward Iraq showed a clear departure from the traditional foreign policy. Indeed, Turkey’s new orientation indicates more flexibility and accommodation to the newly emerging challenges in Iraq. Not only Turkey tries to develop initiative concerning the emergence of an Iraqi state but also provide security for Kurds and Turcomans in Northern Iraq [29]. In the same way, the refusal of motion signaled a shift in Turkish foreign policy from a Hobbesian realism to a Kantian approach that is based on diplomacy, negotiation and other civilian instrument such as economic and multilateral cooperation[30].

The new understanding of Turkish policy makers tries to implement impartial policy to different segment of Iraqi society regardless of ethnicity and sect. For Aras, this pragmatic policy account not only for Turkey’s response to the Kurdish autonomy in the region, but also Turkey’s break from the traditional threat perception. Through the democratization process Turkey is now able to pursue a foreign policy that is more flexible and not limited to the so-called red lines of the traditional Kemalist policy[31]. In order to provide unity and stability Turkey used several tools such as the UN Security Council, Organization of Islamic Conference and most importantly the Platform for Iraqi Neighbours. The platform functions as finding common peaceful solution which met for the first time in Istanbul on 23 January 2003[32]. With the help of the platform all members agreed on the territorial and political unity of Iraq.

Furthermore, for instances, Turkey also brought the Americans and the Sunnis together in order to make sure Sunni participation in Iraqi national election on 30 June 2005 and convinced them to take part in the political process. Turkey also organized training programmes for 350 Iraqi politicians from various political parties in order to contribute to the democratic process [33].

On another occasion, Turkey in early 2007 was involved again during the Sunni-Shia division ensued due to the tension in Iraq. Turkey played an active role in mediating both side by maintaining balanced policy towards both sides. Turkey, according to Davutoglu, did not implement a passive policy rather an active policy in this sectarian division [34]. Moreover, in the fall of 2007, Turkey used diplomatic channels in order to provide support before using unilateral force in the recent crisis in northern Iraq concerning Turkey’s cross-border operations against the PKK. For Onis, highlighting multilateralism is a remarkable element of the new era [35]. It has been particularly evident in dealing the Kurdish issue. To use hard power, Turkey first prioritized multilateralism which in turn produced significant international support for its policy [36]. All these constructive policies were appreciate by the Arabs that culminated by calling Erdogan to the Arab league as a special observer.

Giving the traditional Kemalist foreign policy towards the Middle East, taking part in an Arab organization can be explained only through the identification of the policy makers [37]. As a result of Turkish policy in Iraq, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani by implying to PKK stated that they are not willing to worsen their economic and cultural relations with Turkey due to a terrorist organization. Even the leader of the Kurdistan Regional Government declared that Iraq should not be the ground where PKK attacks emanates. On top of that, Kurdish leaders occasionally stressed upon their positive attitude towards Turkey and send positive messages to Turkey [38]. What is striking here is that, the new decision makers are taking such a stance in foreign issues especially towards the Kurdish issue that one that remembers the Kemalist understanding will easily acknowledge that it is a complete change of perception. In short, Turkey’s diplomatic ties and dialogue with the Kurdish leaders is one of the best indications of the change in Turkish state identity which made such cooperation possible.

Moreover, in September 2009 Turkey hosted the two-day meeting which was the first ministerial gathering between the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, a mechanism of joint meetings of the Iraqi and Turkish cabinets. Executive ministers from both sides were dealing with technical aspects of cooperation in the fields of politics, economy, energy, water, culture and security. Turkey stated that Iraq needs a wide range of professionals in every field that would contribute to the stability of Iraq. In this regard, Turkey will open up around 400 schools that will educate Iraqis. Likewise, Turkey will build hospitals and help to modernize the irrigation system in Iraq [39].

Yusuf Yerkel
SETA DC (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research)

References:

[1] Chafetz, Glenn, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel. 1998/1999. “Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy”, Security Studies 8(2-3) p.vii
[2] Paul A. Kowert, ‘National identity: Inside and out’, Security Studies (1998),8:2, p.4-5
[3] Ted Hopf, Social construction of international politics: identities & foreign policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999, (Ithaca, N.Y. ; London : Cornell University Press, 2002) p.1
[4] Ibid. p.5
[5] Ibid p.6
[6] Chafetz, Glenn, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel. 1998/1999. “Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy”, Security Studies 8(2-3) p.ix
[7] Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J.Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 59
[8] Ted Hopf, Social construction of international politics: identities & foreign policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999, (Ithaca, N.Y. ; London : Cornell University Press, 2002) p. 10
[9] Stephen Saideman, ‘Thinking Theoretically about Identity and Foreign Policy’ in Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East ed. Shibley Telhami & Michael Barnett (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2002)p. 178
[10] Hasan Kosebalaban, ‘ “Torn Identities” and foreign policy: the case of Turkey and Japan’ , Insight Turkey 10, 1 (2008), p.10
[11] Glenn Chafetz, “The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia,” Political Science Quarterly 111 (1996-97)p.664
[12] Dox Waxman, ‘Turkey’s identity crises: Domestic Discord and Foreign Policy‘, Conflict Studies 311, p.14
[13] Bulent Aras, ‘Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East: peace building in the periphery’, Journal of Balkan & Near Eastern Studies, Vol.11, No.1, p.30
[14] Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23 (Summer 1998)p. 175
[15] Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1999) p.231
[16] Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (London: Hurst, 2003), p.97
[17] Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, ‘The evolution of the national security culture and the military in Turkey’ Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, No.1 (Fall, 2000)p.208
[18] Ahmet Davutoglu, ‘Turkey’s foreign policy vision: an assessment of 2007‘ Insight Turkey 10, 1 (2008), p.78
[19] Ibid., p.79
[20] Ihsan Dagi, ‘Davutoglu: Turkey’s new foreign policy chief’, Todays Zaman (May 2009), available at http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-174256-davutoglu-turkeys-new-foreign-policy-chief.html
[21] Bulent Aras, ‘Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East: peace building in the periphery’, Journal of Balkan & Near Eastern Studies, Vol.11, No.1, p.33
[22] Ibid., p.34
[23] Omer Taspinar, ‘Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism’ Carnegie Middle East Centre, No.10 (September, 2008)p.15 available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar_final.pdf
[24] Ibrahim Karagul, ‘Davutoglu,”düzen kurucu” ülke ve yeni osmanlicilik!’, Yeni Safak, (September 9, 2009) available at http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/Default.aspx?t=09.09.2009&y=IbrahimKaragul
[25] Omer Taspinar, ‘Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism’ Carnegie Middle East Centre, No.10 (September, 2008)p.16 available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar_final.pdf
[26] Alexander Murinson, ‘the strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.42, No.6, p.954
[27] Ibid., p.954
[28] Bulent Aras, ‘Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East: peace building in the periphery’, Journal of Balkan & Near Eastern Studies, Vol.11, No.1, p.38
[29] Ibid., p.38
[30] Rusen Cakir & Senem Aydin, ‘Political Islam in Turkey‘, CEPS Working Document No.265 (April 2007)p.3
[31] Bulent Aras, ‘Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East: peace building in the periphery’, Journal of Balkan & Near Eastern Studies, Vol.11, No.1, p.38
[32] Ibid., p.39
[33] Ibid., p.39
[34] Ahmet Davutoglu, ‘Turkey’s foreign policy vision: an assessment of 2007‘ Insight Turkey 10, 1 (2008), p.81
[35] Ziya Onis, ‘The new wave of Foreign Policy activism in Turkey‘, DIIS Report, January 2009:05, p.18
[36] Ibid., p.18
[37] Bulent Aras, ‘Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East: peace building in the periphery’, Journal of Balkan & Near Eastern Studies, Vol.11, No.1, p.39
[38] Ibid., p.40
[39] Todays Zaman, 19 September, 2009 available at http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-187578-turkey-urges-syria-iraq-to-unite-in-fight-against-terrorism.html

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