Globalaffairs

Issue 11/October-November 2008
By Juan Luis Dorado Merchán

Nearly three years ago, an indigenous, unionised, coca-farming leader came to power in Bolivia: Evo Morales. What was at the time celebrated as a success of integration and an historical achievement, as Morales is the first indigenous president of the country, has become a constant source of tension, not only within Bolivia itself, but also in the rest of Latin America.

Evo Morales’ arrival in power was received with joy and distrust in equal measures. Joy from the growing Left, which is strong in the region, above all with the Chávez-Castro alignment of the first few years of the new century. Distrust came from the United States and many other countries, both European and Latin American, worried about the situation of their businesses and investments in the country.

The first moments of Morales were intensely scrutinised by international analysts, but they soon saw that the world realised that his campaign was becoming deflated. First came a series of unpopular decisions, like the nationalisation of hydrocarbons, and above all the creation of a Constitutional Assembly to create a new Magna Carta for Bolivia; a constitution to his liking. This new constitutional text, with a referendum attached to it, ended up leaving the country without a leader. It was approved in November 2007, in the city of Oruro, in the middle of a crisis and out war with the opposition over the legality or illegality of the whole process.

Now there will be two new popular consultations, but they seem complicated by the situation that the country is currently in; this August, President Morales had to face a revocation process - a new referendum in which his role and that of eight other state prefects were put to the Bolivian people.

Morales came out on top in the referendum with 67% of the votes, but this left the country feeling disenchanted. This was a difficult situation for Morales to manage and has since boiled over into continuous confrontations between regions, cities, employers and unions, and above all, between the central government and some of the richest areas of the country.

It is here that we find ourselves with one of the problems that runs through all of Latin America, from North to South: not just the inequalities that exist between its social strata, but also the fact that there are several regions that have a much higher average standard of living much higher than others. These regions, with their separate, autonomous governments, are asking for more of the same - greater autonomy and independence from the central government in La Paz in order to manage the resources that they generate.

After numerous disagreements, barricades in practically every city in Bolivia, army intervention, an emergency reunion of Mercosur (Southern Common Market) and threats from Hugo Chávez on all sides, Evo Morales’ situation has become complicated in the last few months. And the ghost of the Coup d’État still prays on the mind of the Bolivian leader.

It seemed that the detention of the Governor of the State of Pando, Leonardo Fernández, and his overthrowing was going to make people fed up and trigger conflict. But an emergency meeting between the government and the opposition, as well as the intervention of Argentina and Brazil, brought about a strained agreement that mainly played to the media audience, giving the impression of normality in the country.

Afterwards, Evo Morales declared a state of emergency in this Northern region after some violent clashes between government and opposition supporters that resulted in the death of around 20 people. This was a new stumbling block for the former indigenous hope of Latin America.

Evo Morales: disenchantment

What seemed to be a breath of fresh air for Latin America, the definitive step of indigenous towns throughout Latin America to establish themselves as an important part of the future of the region, has come to nothing and play second fiddle in Evo Morales’ policies.

The recently elected Bolivian president did no have much time to align himself with Chávez and Castro. It is not so much a question of discussing their ideological affinity, but perhaps he should have taken into account the amount of foreign interest invested in Bolivia (not only North American), especially in gas resources.

This alignment in the famous Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) quickly gave him a label in the international community, and it ended up breaking him.

Then the question of the nationalisation of hydrocarbons came, within his first three months as leader of the country. Out and out battle with the countries that play a large part in the Bolivian economy, and diplomatic tension with one of its main allies: Spain. Then confrontations with the United States came, although nowhere near the scale of those of his buddy Chávez, ending up with the expulsion of the US ambassador from La Paz.

What seems clear is that Morales’ foreign politics in two and a half years has been at least stable. And here comes one of the main problems of Evo’s management in these two and a half years that he has been in power: at first he paid more attention to foreign affairs than domestic ones.

When he came to power, he soon became a friendly face in the international arena. His famous jersey went round the world, causing sensation and even a fashion. He was pressured to go to Venezuela, to be photographed with Fidel, to fly to Europe, to be with Zapatero… before he was even sworn in; he had spent more time out of Bolivia than in it.

It is possible to question whether Evo Morales really had an overall vision of what he was going to have in his power. One of the main errors that could be blamed on him is that he has tried to lead Bolivia from the eyes of a cocoa-farming leader, giving priority to his people’s demands over those of society in his position.

He did not have an overall vision and he has never wanted to give in on any of his hopes. This has evidently let him down, resulting first in distrust and then in open battle. A country with as much social difference as Bolivia, with some very rich regions and others extremely poor, cannot be directed by a policy that is equal for all, much less one that gives a minority group priority in central Government decisions.

This article is not to say that the opposition is right, to the contrary, in fact. For a country to grow and come out ahead, it is necessary to launch state policies, common policies for all citizens.

And what was the first thing that Morales did? Announce the formation of a Constitutional Assembly that was going to create a new Magna Carta for the country. A text that was approved by the Assembly members hidden in a lost city in the North of Bolivia, when many Bolivian citizens were in the street protesting and raising barricades.

Evo Morales did not give in. Never. He stuck to his guns and did not create any possibility of integrating the opposition into this new Magna Carta. Perhaps he never saw himself as a new Hugo Chávez, or perhaps as a new Fidel Castro. But the truth is that he has a lot less support than these two in their countries and they do not even have the majority!

In the disturbances with the autonomous, regional prefects at the end of the summer of 2008 there was more of the same. A fixed idea: all of the power in La Paz and nothing of autonomy. Once again Evo governs for a few and does not take into account the real needs of the regions that are driving the economy of the whole country.

The Path to civil war

It is not an exact science, analysing what is going to happen - we are not trying to be mystics nor are we reading Tarot. We are simply analysing data and positions.

Evo Morales arrived as a new superstar, a new Allende said some, the Che Guevara of the indigenous people cheered others… But no one, not even Morales himself stopped to ask him something: he was elected in a democratic process, with a high rate of abstention and in a much damaged country.

Since his arrival in La Paz as president of the country, with respect to Bolivia itself, Morales was pressured from the off to answer to those who had brought him to power, especially the cocoa-growing sector. He soon threw himself into the hands of Chávez and tried to imitate him in several ways.

On an international level, his arrival was very well received, above all in Europe, where they saw the victory of an indigenous unionist as a signal that human rights were finally straightening out in Latin America. But what were at first applause, soon, thanks to his controversial decisions, became diplomatic tensions for many reasons, amongst those, some that we have previously set out in this article.

And as we have also commented, his submissiveness, not even an alliance, with Hugo Chávez has provoked great distrust over the personality and manner of dealing with international politics of Evo Morales. Also, he has not known how to work with the different political and social blocks because first he swore undying love to the Andean Community and over the months, after Chávez’ exit, he was looking to join the Southern Common Market.

A few moments of glory have held Morales in his two and a half years in power. It is probable that since his arrival there has not been a quiet day in his presidential seat.

But we are not talking about his foreign policies, this is another topic, which is perhaps more important. It is almost certain that with the passage of time, Evo Morales’ exterior politics will be studied as a small chapter in the biography of the Venezuelan President.

The great failing of Evo Morales, and what is leading him with more and more steadily towards a civil war, if he does not give up on his ideas, are his domestic policies.

As previously mentioned, Morales has never gone for a global vision of the country, and at every turning point in the conflict, he has not moved an inch, staying on the Magna Carta for a few bandwagon. Who knows if it was inspired, even written, by the ‘Bolivarismo’ that is spoken about so much in Caracas…

Now the brand-new first indigenous president in the history of Bolivia finds himself at a new crossroads. Tempers seem calmer and the situation with the government is controlled in some way.

Pure logic makes us think that he would opt for a new model of managing the State, giving autonomy to the regions that are asking for it, and seeking universal politics that benefits the whole country and not just a small group.
But we cannot wait for logical decisions from Evo Morales. The constitutional process is continuing full steam ahead, and the Governor of Pando is in prison and the opposition is still in the street. How to manage something that has been from the beginning in his hands?

At first many doubts were raised about the political capacity of Morales, and over whether he was a puppet of a few who could do good things for him and bring him easily to power. It is not known if this theory is anywhere near the truth, but it is certain that Evo Morales has not demonstrated all this time capacity for leadership and above all, initiative to bring the country out of this worrying situation.

This is the time to see if Morales is a good president, or if he will be another leader that announces hope for it to come to nothing. The Bolivian situation is reaching worrying levels, not because the opposition and their supporters are more numerous, but because they do have more means to arm themselves and above all the support and business interests of the United States.

The region has shown itself to be worried with several urgent meetings, one of Mercosur, another of the Organisation of American States and another of the presidents in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Why should Evo Morales really care about these leaders?

Reading between the lines, the main worry of the two great Latin American powers, Argentina and Brazil is purely economic. They want firstly to protect their investments, and secondly to guarantee their gas supply. For this they need a calm situation in Bolivia, and it is probably that for this, they will support another candidate in another future electoral process.

And what of Chávez? He is always threatening to intervene, that he has his tanks ready if they touch his friend, Evo. But in reality, is he interested in Evo Morales, or is he interested in Hugo Chavez? That is, does he do it because he believes in the political capacity of the Bolivian leader? Or is he simply a fundamental ally to keep selling the Bolivarian Revolution to the rest of Latin America. And of course, the gas supply.

These are some of the factors that Evo Morales will have to lead. A domestic situation that is less and less stable; a total incapacity to take positive decisions for the country and an international situation full of friends more interested in gas than his ideology.

But the most worrying is: it is not likely that Evo will give up on his ideas - The opposition knows this and so there will be more and more interests in taking power from him. And these are the ingredients in a recipe that ends up with a coup d’état.

Bolivia (and Morales) has taken a new opportunity for change. And it has been once again rejected. The best thing for the country would be for Evo to leave immediately, bringing about new elections and a Government that draws up politics that reinvigorate the country and make the innumerous natural and energy resources that the country has benefit all of society.

But we know that this is not going to happen. We are aware that Evo Morales will entrench himself, will want to leave a new Constitution that will ask help from his friend Chávez, that there will soon be ‘two Bolivias’, and that there will come a time when this will be ready to explode. Without a doubt, Evo Morales’ time has come…

Juan Luis Dorado
Specialist in Latin American Politics

Global Affairs is not liable for author’s opinion