Globalaffairs

Issue 17/October-November 2009
By Andrea Bonzanni

The United States does not seem to have much hope about the chances to strike a deal with Iran on the nuclear programme. In spite of the historic resume of negotiations with the 5+1 on 1st October in Geneva, the Obama administration is already working on a possible tightening of economic sanctions. At the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, President Obama denounced with unusual harsh tones the existence of a secret nuclear site in Qom, signaling a shift in US attitude towards the Islamic Republic.

The change of paradigm had already emerged on 9th September, when leaked intelligence reports to the White House and a statement by the American ambassador at the IAEA publicly acknowledged that Iran possessed the technology and the know-how to produce a bomb within a short time. These positions may be linked to a revaluation of the threat due to new information from recent intelligence activities. However, analysts interpret them as a way to put pressure on allies (in particular China and Germany, respectively the first and third exporter towards Iran) and to convince them to accept a stricter sanction regime against Iran.

The move seems to have little effect on the Russia Federation, major international sponsor of the Islamic Republic, and Moscow’s refusal to cooperate would sensibly reduce the effectiveness of new sanctions. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a negotiator in the 5+1, Russia can block any change to the sanction regime. Moreover, even in the case the US would manage to convince Moscow not to use its veto power, there is no realistic way to ensure Russia’s compliance to its commitments.

Russia is a fundamental ally for Tehran. It has provided key technical support for the nuclear programme since the early 1990s and its technology is crucial for the completion of the first reactor in Bushehr. Iran also purchased from Russia anti-aircraft system and it is negotiating the acquisition of S-300 surface-to-air missiles which, according to military experts, would seriously complicate the option of a quick American or Israeli air-strike against sensible sites. In addition, Russian backing means that Tehran can be relatively sure to maintain a supply of primary goods (especially much-needed gasoline) in case of commercial restrictions.

Recent developments in Iranian politics have even increased the role of Moscow in the controversy. Indeed, economic sanctions have potentially become a much more effective tool after the election which took place last summer. The worsening of economic conditions likely to result from the sanctions and the subsequent popular discontent may further weaken the contested Iranian leadership, favouring the takeover of less hardliner figures within the regime. Hence, support from Russia represents for the Islamic Republic a key factor in the bargaining balance with the United States. Convincing Moscow to align with the West should therefore be a priority for the Obama administration, although a positive outcome is not granted.

The axis between Tehran and Moscow is based on common geopolitical priorities and consolidated economic ties. Both countries have an interest in weakening the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia quite obviously intends to keep them as satellites, but also Iran benefits from the status-quo. Given the complex dynamics of ethnic politics in the region, Tehran particularly fears that strong Turkic-populated states in the north of its borders lead to a resurgence of nationalist movements within the conspicuous Azeri minority, which long represented a threat to stability under the Shah. Not surprisingly, Iran holds observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, whose primary goal is the stability and security of Central Asia. Moreover, the quasi-monopoly with Iran in arms and nuclear equipment is a substantial source of revenue for the influential post-Soviet industrial complex, which even the restored authority of the Kremlin may find difficult to confront.

Some analysts also argue the existence of a sophisticated strategic calculation by Moscow. An isolated Iran means in fact under-investment in oil and natural gas extraction and development, as well as a lack of maintenance of the existing infrastructure. Indeed, Iran is currently not delivering its immense gas reserves to market and may soon become a crude importer, despite possessing the second largest conventional oil reserves in the world. This situation undoubtedly benefits Russia, which does not have threats to its dominant position as European gas supplier and can enjoy the high prices of a tight oil market. Likewise, the support for an Iranian leadership little used to compromises perpetuates the situation of stalemate in the dispute about the legal status of the Caspian Sea and thus complicates the exploration and the extraction of Central Asian hydrocarbons.

At the light of such interconnections, it will not be easy to modify Russia’s stance vis-à-vis Iran. However, the reset in US-Russia relation gives room for a linkage between Iran and other issue-areas to which Moscow is particularly sensitive. The revision of Bush’s missile plan in Eastern Europe, anticipated in the “secret” letter sent by Obama to Russian President Medvedev at the eve of its presidency and made official on 17th September, may assume great relevance in this respect. Russia’s reaction has so far fluctuated between Medvedev’s collaborative position at the G20 in Pittsburgh and a stubborn rebuttal of sanctions by some diplomatic sectors and the Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. This indecisiveness can, however, be read in a positive light as a sign that support for Iran is far from being non-negotiable in Moscow. The United States may also have other cards to play, in particular on the Artic and the “rules of the game” for gas trade, although it will be more difficult to make concession on these issues, given the involvement of Canada and the European Union.

In Iran, those ready to exchange the nuclear programme for economic incentives are still a minority. Hence, the next steps of the negotiations are difficult to foresee and progress may not come immediately. However, the current coincidence of a weak Iranian leadership and all-around talks with Moscow represents an opportunity the United States cannot miss if it ever wants to effectively use sanctions against Iran.

Andrea Bonzanni
International Affairs at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies of Geneva.

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

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