Globalaffairs

Issue 18/December-January 2010
By Paul Pryce

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), more commonly known as North Korea, is fixed with many labels on the international stage. It has been accused repeatedly of “…unpredictable behaviour…” (1) and assigned the nickname of the Hermit Kingdom by American policymakers. (2) The imagery is quite clear. The portrayal of North Korea is one of a madman running amok in the international system, acting irrationally with impunity and bordering on absolute and institutionalized insanity.

Yet is there some form of rationality evident in North Korean foreign policy? Is North Korea truly as capricious as the public rhetoric of diplomats and political leaders would have us believe, or are the actions of the regime based on careful calculations about what kinds of interaction would best serve the state’s interests? If there is some rationality to the manner in which North Korea interacts with its environment, the Northeast Asian region, what can be done to reduce tensions and achieve something approaching normalized relations on the Korean peninsula?

Much of the focus of recent relations between North Korea, its neighbours and the global hegemon, the United States of America, has been the matter of North Korea’s nuclear program. The prevailing mindset from the other side of the negotiating table to the North Koreans is that the DPRK pursues nuclear weapons capabilities for the purposes of “…continued blackmail”. (3) The perceived strategy is to use the threat of North Korea acquiring these weapons as a means for leveraging economic aid and other such concessions from the US and states sharing the Northeast Asian region. A classic example of this strategy presumably being applied was North Korea’s refusal, in 1993, to allow the IAEA “…to inspect two nuclear waste sites to check whether that country had been secretly separating plutonium for nuclear weapons”. (4) After intensive negotiations, the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework was produced and “…North Korea agreed to halt the… development of its nuclear program in return for… two light water reactors, financed and supplied by an international consortium…” (5)

While it is certainly true that North Korea was able to use its non-compliance with the IAEA to extract considerable benefits from the US, a long-term strategy of nuclear blackmail would actually be quite irrational. Considering North Korea generally now seems to be recognized as a “fully fledged nuclear power” (6), the so-called nuclear blackmail has evolved into a form of nuclear brinkmanship. Kissinger, a realist and “initially a proponent of the ‘limited’ nuclear war option…” came to see nuclear brinkmanship as a flawed strategy of exerting power in international relations after the experience of the Cuban Missile Crisis. (7) After all, the potential cost of nuclear brinkmanship with such powers as China, Russia and the US would be utter and complete destruction of not just the North Korean state and its structures but also much of the people who identify with that state. Contrasted with the potential benefits of nuclear brinkmanship, like the 1994 Agreed Framework, the policy of brinkmanship and blackmail is revealed to be foolish. The potential costs, any reasonable person could agree, outweigh the potential gains.

Understanding the sheer fallaciousness of continuing a strategy that rendered a temporary success in 1994, one might be inclined to agree then with the portrayal of the North as the Hermit Kingdom, a state gone mad through its self-isolation from the periphery of the international system. However, it is important to note that much of the brinkmanship carried out by North Korea since the initial period of resistance to inspection in 1993 has matured into a coherent strategy not fixated merely on economic aid and other temporary benefits but on the regime’s long-term survival.

At the beginning of 2003, “…the North announced its withdrawal from the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty].” (8) Naturally, intensive negotiations were held to attempt to bring North Korea’s nuclear program back into a framework of international regulation. In these talks, “the DPRK proposed that it would abandon its nuclear program if the United States provided security guarantees…” (9) This has been a consistent demand from the North Korean side in all negotiations. Once again, though, this North Korean position has been misinterpreted, either by error or by design. The latest call for a peace treaty for the Korean peninsula was recently questioned by South Korean political leaders and alleged as “…being intended to buy time, distract attention, and continue nuclear weapons development…” (10)

there is the viewpoint held by South Korean policymakers that North Korea sees nuclear weapons as the only security guarantee necessary, the threat of a nuclear weapon being deployed on Seoul

Thus, there are two prevailing misinterpretations of North Korean foreign policy and that state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons development. On the one hand, there is the viewpoint, espoused by American policymakers like Hillary Clinton, which holds that North Korea intends to follow a policy of nuclear brinkmanship and nuclear blackmail for as long as it remains profitable. On the other hand, there is the viewpoint held by South Korean policymakers that North Korea sees nuclear weapons as the only security guarantee necessary, the threat of a nuclear weapon being deployed on Seoul serving as sufficient deterrent to conventional military operations directed against the North.

While the viewpoint of South Korean political leaders is closer to the truth than the American position, there are still some incorrect assumptions that must be challenged. What North Korean leaders consider to be fundamental security threats to their state are “…the U.S. policy aimed at overthrowing the North Korean regime, the U.S. forces stationed in Korea and the South Korea-U.S. military alliance.” (11) The nuclear option serves as a deterrent to these threats becoming realized in the form of renewed military hostilities. But the nuclear option is also unsustainable. Japan “…is steadily moving toward the deployment of a more robust missile defence system…” (12) Meanwhile, South Korea is “…pushing to establish its own air defence unit, exclusively to detect and intercept North Korean ballistic missiles, by 2012.” (13) Even Russia, which would not usually be considered a threat to the regime survival in the DPRK, “…has placed an anti-missile defence system close to its border with North Korea…” (14) Contrary to South Korean assertions, time is not on North Korea’s side as its nuclear deterrent is being gradually reduced in potency by its neighbours’ expanding missile defence capabilities.

This can leave only one possible explanation for the North Korean negotiating position, and it is ultimately the simplest and most rational one. Rather than the repeated calls for peace treaties and written security guarantees being part of a deception, distraction or set of delaying tactics to buy North Korea time to pursue a veritable ‘road to nowhere’, the peace treaty itself is the end that is being pursued through nuclear means. A legally binding promise from the US that will not seek to undermine the North Korean regime nor act against it militarily would, at least at some level, guarantee North Korea’s security. All of the aforementioned three perceived security threats would be dispelled through a peace treaty.

This translates to an even deeper level of state interest for North Korea. As Morgenthau indicated, power is always the immediate aim of international politics. (15) North Korea is a struggling state entity surrounded by either declining or emerging powers- states that have considerable influence over the international system itself through raw economic, political and military power. The possession of nuclear weapons allows North Korea to exert some kind of power over its immediate environment and immediately places it on a level that, in a sense, allows some measure of control over Japan and South Korea, which do not share its nuclear capabilities. Extracting the security guarantee of a functioning peace treaty has added urgency for North Korean leaders because the expanding missile defence capabilities of South Korea and Japan not only nullify the security guarantees bestowed by possessing nuclear weapons but also substantially restrict North Korea’s ability to exert power over its environment. Essentially, the greater the missile defence capabilities of its neighbours, the weaker the North Korean state becomes.

But, to once again return to Morgenthau’s assertion on the nature of power in international politics, this leads one to a sinister thought. If nuclear weapons will at some point in the near future offer North Korea no purchase or sway over the policies of its neighbours, and if the accumulation of power is the central aim of all states, then it follows that North Korean leaders will begin to invest in other means of ensuring regime survival and exercising power over the region. This could come in the form of state-sponsored terrorism, for example.

Perhaps still worse, North Korea might seek, in an environment where the threat of its own nuclear arsenal no longer holds much weight, to sell its weapons technology to other states, attempting to draw away the attention of the US to other regions and thus temporarily reduce the amount of power being brought to bear against itself. This policy could already be part of the North Korean strategy of regime survival. In 2004, North Korea attempted to sell advanced missile technology to Nigeria. (16) In 2002, the Spanish Navy intercepted a North Korean vessel set on delivering SCUD missiles to Yemen. (17) Nuclear proliferation, or at least the threat of the technological know-how proliferating to additional states, creates further need for the US to exert its influence elsewhere from the Korean peninsula, diluting American influence by spreading it across a greater area.

Ironically, the race by Japan and South Korea to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear advantage actually perpetuates and continues the established system of relations in Northeast Asia rather than radically altering the security dynamic in such a way as to eliminate North Korea’s leverage. This system that is being perpetuated is “…as old as political history itself” and is “…a natural and inevitable outgrowth of the struggle for power”: the balance of power. (18)

The balance of power, according to Morgenthau, “…creates a precarious stability in the relations between the respective nations…” but this “…stability… is always in danger of being disrupted and, therefore, is always in need of being restored”.. (19) In this light, the way politics is carried out in the inter-state relations of North Korea and its neighbours becomes clear and understandable. To South Korea, the nuclear development program of the North is seen as a security threat and an attempt by the North to gain some measure of control over the South, rather than understanding the pursuit of a nuclear arsenal by the North as an attempt to counter the South’s conventional warfare capabilities and security alliance with the US. Once the South develops missile defence capabilities to counter the North’s nuclear weapons program, the North will attempt to find some new means to, in turn, neutralize the South’s perceived strategic advantage.

The degree to which this balance of power could be sustainable in Northeast Asia is questionable. On one level, it appears to most closely resemble what Hobbes calls “a war of all against all” (20), or a war of all against North Korea. With its nuclear weapons rendered relatively useless- and eventually unmarketable as well- North Korea may find itself entirely lacking in options to guarantee its own security. From the North Korean perspective, conventional military operations, or the very tangible threat of applying military force on the South through the Korean People’s Army, could eventually be perceived as the only remaining means of ensuring regime survival and the elimination of the South’s accrued strategic advantages.

North Korea sees its sovereignty at stake, its regime at risk of dissolution and its state on the verge of absorption into the South in a manner not unlike the German unification that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union

There is some measure of hope for the Korean peninsula, however. In Morgenthau’s examinations of the balance of power he proposes the existence of the “…balancer, the ‘holder’ of the balance” in successful balance of power systems. (21) Britain is posited to have held this role on the global stage until at least the start of the Cold War. In Northeast Asia, a regional balancer could be China. Chinese foreign policy with relation to North Korea has been based on the principle of “waisong neijin”, which is “…being soft in ones external appearance, hard in ones internal resolve”. While the North might feel challenged by the increasing security capabilities of Japan and South Korea, and while it might see American rhetoric as provocative in nature, the North has been able to turn to China as a reliable strategic partner. Whether this might translate into China providing an alternative to the security guarantees that North Korea seeks, substituting a regional or bilateral security framework for the ever-elusive peace treaty, is unclear.

What is clear, though, is that the balance of power in Northeast Asia must be preserved. North Korea sees its sovereignty at stake, its regime at risk of dissolution and its state on the verge of absorption into the South in a manner not unlike the German unification that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is where it would seem Morgenthau’s realism differs from the worldview held by North Korean leaders- the nature of sovereignty. Morgenthau contends that “sovereignty is not actual independence in political, military, economic or technological matters” and sees interdependence as something which is generally positive and does not undermine a state’s sovereignty. (23) North Korea, on the other hand, sees sovereignty and independence as synonymous, with interdependence as something entirely contrary to these two principles. In fact, the governing ideology in North Korea, “juche sasang”, can be understood as advocating for the state’s complete political, economic and military self-reliance. (24)

With its regime survival at stake as its nuclear brinkmanship is answered by sophisticated missile defence technology, the North should be quite open to compromise on this concept of self-reliance. The caveat lies in what particular states propose compromise. Compromise with the South would be unthinkable as that kind of compromise carries with it the risk of an eventual integration that will subordinate the North. Compromise with China, alternatively, would be seen as carrying no such risks as China has demonstrated itself to be a reliable partner through its waisong neijin approach and the considerable military assistance rendered in the Korean War. China wants a leading role on the international stage; pushing for a leading role in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia in recent months, for example. (25) Addressing the deepening security dilemma on the Korean peninsula will not only allow China to assert itself as the regional leader in Northeast Asia but it will also lend extra legitimacy to the Chinese desire to take centre stage in global affairs. In order for this to happen, it might be necessary for the US to acknowledge that China and its approach to the Korean peninsula might be better suited to reducing tensions, stepping aside in the region to allow China to fully exert its influence on North Korea. It remains to be seen if American policymakers will find this option palatable.

It would seem that North Korea is in actuality a rational state actor, despite accusations that it is otherwise. Even the rather extreme attitude toward the nature of state sovereignty conveyed through the Juche ideology could be understood as a reaction to the many forces being exerted upon North Korea by its neighbours. Inherent in every action the North takes in its region lays the fear of the North being absorbed into the South, or regime collapse under a barrage of centrifugal forces in the political and economic dimensions while the threat of US invasion looms in the backdrop. Normalization can only be possible if the balance of power is sustained, and this in turn requires China and the US to understand their respective roles as balancers. For the foreseeable future, the South, as well as Japan, will gain a strategic advantage over the North. Increasing China’s role and decreasing the role of the US could help the system re-attain equilibrium following the completion of the South’s missile defence system. But beyond the horizon, as China becomes increasingly confident in its role as a global and regional leader, a restored US influence might once again become requisite for the preservation of the Northeast Asian balance of power.

Paul Pryce
Master of Arts (International Relations) at Tallinn University, Estonia.

Sources Used:

(1) Pleming, Sue. (2009, April 22). Clinton says US ready for talks with North Korea. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE53L4IT20090422

(2) Kelemen, Michele. (2009, February 20). Clinton’s Brand of Diplomacy on Display in Asia. National Public Radio. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100919589

(3) Gilinsky, Victor. (1997). Nuclear Blackmail: The 1994 US-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Agreed Framework on North Korea’s Nuclear Program. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2007). US-DPRK Agreed Framework/Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Retrieved from: http://www.nti.org/db/china/kedoorg.htm

(6) Parry, Richard Lloyd. (2009, April 24). North Korea is fully fledged nuclear power, experts agree. Times Online. Retrieved from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6155956.ece

(7) Guzzini, Stefano. (1998). Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold. New York: Routledge.

(8) Scalapino, Robert A. (2006). “US-DPRK Relations in the Kim Jong Il Era” in Kihl, Young Wahn & Kim, Hong Nack (Eds.), North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. (145-160). Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Lee, Chi-dong. (2009, December 2). South Korea questions North Korean demand for peace treaty. Yonhap News. Retrieved from http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/

(11) Ha, Young-sun. (2005, October 13). Meeting the North’s Demands. The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development. Retrieved from http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0583Ha.html

(12) Toki, Masako. (2009, January 16). Missile Defence in Japan. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved from http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/missile-defense-japan

(13) Agence France-Presse. (2009, February 15). South Korea to Complete Missile Defence by 2012. Defence News. Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3949088

(14) Harding, Luke. (2009, August 27). Russia deploys anti-missile defence unit near North Korea. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/27/russia-north-korea-nuclear-missile-defence

(15) Morgenthau, Hans. (2006). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Seventh Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.

(16) Washington Times. (2004, January 28). North Korea offers Nigeria missile deal. Washington Times. Retrieved from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/jan/28/20040128-114425-6730r/

(17) Shapir, Yiftah S. (2002, December 22). North Korean Missiles for Yemen: Is There a Missing Link?. Tel Aviv University, The Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies. Retrieved from http://spme.net/cgi-bin/facultyforum.cgi?ID=1318

(18) Morgenthau, Hans. (2006). Ibid.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Martinich, A.P. (Ed.), Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press.

(21) Morgenthau, Hans. (2006). Ibid.

(22) Kim, Byung-Kook. (2007). “North and South Korea: Unlikely Challenger, Unlikely Mediator” in Kim, Byung-Kook & Jones, Anthony (Eds.), Power and Security in Northeast Asia: Shifting Strategies. (197-224). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

(23) Morgenthau, Hans. (2006). Ibid.

(24) Kang, Kwang-Shick. (2001). Juche Idea and the Alteration Process in Kim Il Sung’s Works: A Study on How to Read Kim Il Sung’s Works. The Academy of Korean Studies, Monash University. Retrieved from http://arts.monash.edu.au/korean/ksaa/conference/33kwangshickkang.pdf

(25) Pflanz, Mike. (2009, November 10). China wants a lead role in fight against Somali pirates. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/6538997/China-wants-a-lead-role-in-fight-against-Somali-pirates.html

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs