Globalaffairs

Issue 15/June-July 2009
by Esteban del Sar

The past May 18, the President of the government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa, announced the end of the civil war that devastated the country for 26 years.

This conflict involved, since 1983, on one side the forces of the government (Sinhalese and Buddhist) and on the other the “Tamil Tigers” (LTTE, Liberation Tigers of Eelam Tamil), an insurgent group that fighted for the independence of a part of Sri Lanka’s territory to establish a state of their own (from the Tamil ethnia and practicing Hinduism). It left behind itself between 75/100 thousand victims and nearly 100.000 refugees, according to United Nations.

The conclusion of this conflict was possible because of the unprecedented ongoing of the Army over the LTTE during the last months in the northeast region, that left them with no escape, and had as the final strike the assassination of the historic leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran. With their army destroyed, no control over any part of the territory and their leader dead, the only exit left was to announce a ceasefire and silence their weapons.

Far from being an historical essay, to understand this peace process that is coming up, first we must see how we arrive at the present situation, and highlight some basic characters of it. After that, some key elements that emerge from the twenty-six years civil war will be outlined and analyzed to be introduced in the peace process.

History of the conflict

The Sinhalese, that represent 73% of the population and the Tamil, approximately 8%, have lived in permanent conflict for long time. In the late 6th century B.C., the island was populated by the Sinhalese, who came from northern India, and it was not until the 15th century that the first Tamil dynasty settled down in the Northern region, coming from Southern India. After being under Portuguese and Dutch domination, it ended under British control in 1796. At this stage, being a minority Tamils got favored by the colonist and they were used as labor force in coffee and tee plantations. Tamil elite settled down in Colombo.

It was not until 1948 that the situation turned around. When the island went independent (it was called Ceylon at that time), the Sinhalese nationalist groups that existed started to gain place in the political scene. In 1956, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) won the presidential elections, and Solomon Bandarnaike took office, (he was, obviously, Sinhalese).

Here the history of excluding policies against the Tamils starts, that includes obstacles to gain access to sectors in the government and education, among other things. The president was murdered in 1959 by a Buddhist extremist, outlining from now the situation of violence and assassinations that were to come in the next fifty years. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, (widow of the ex-president) was prime minister during 1972 (she already had been in 1960 the first woman in the world to become prime minister), when a new constitution was proclaimed for the now Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. This meant the definitive dominance of the Sinhalese majority over Tamils. The Sinhalese as language and Buddhism as religion took the category of official, and at the same time a centralized state is proclaimed that brings to an end all the discussion for autonomy and federalism that the Tamils pointed. The Constitutional Assembly, dominated by Sinhalese, did not give any space for those demands. In this situation, exclusion, along with the absence of a federal and autonomous solution, made possible an atmosphere in which together with Tamil political parties, armed groups raised.

Between them, in 1976 the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) where born, and soon dominated over the other groups as the ultimate representation of the Tamils cause. They are born with support from India, where they got trained, resulting this more than a paradox in sight of upcoming events. Their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, already had participated in 1975 and being only twenty years old, in the assassination of the mayor of a northern city in Jaffna. They had as their goal the search for an independent Tamil state, with a Marxist-Leninist ideology as a background. In 1977, the FULT party (United Front for Tamil Liberation), that gathered some Tamil political parties, won elections in the northern and eastern provinces. But the situation for the Tamils did not change so much. A little step forward was taken in 1978, when a new constitution recognized the Tamil as a national language. In 1983, political violence unraveled with the so called first war of Eelam. At this stage the conflict was internationalized, because of the training that the LTTE soldiers received in India. In 1985, the Indian government tried to mediate with the Thimpu negotiations, but these ended with no success because of the unacceptable conditions proposed by the LTTE that the Sri Lankan government did not accept (for example, the need of some lands to be recognized for the Tamils).

With the peace agreement between India and Sri Lanka signed in 1987 by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi and the President Junius Jayewardene, a peace keeping force is deployed in the island, the IPKF (India Peace Keeping Force) that supervised the ceasefire. They are based on the island until 1990. A paradox occurred at this point so that “differing from other Tamil groups, the LTTE doesn’t give up its weapons, and goes on to fight its old mentor” (1). Previously, in 1988, the recently elected president Ranasinghe Premadasa (from the Party of National Unity, UNP) urged the IPKF to withdraw from Si Lanka. With this withdrawal started the second war of Eelam, and two assassinations took place: first, in 1991, a suicide attack of the LTTE killed former Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Ghandi, and in 1993, president Premadasa is murdered.

When Chandrika Kumaratunga wins the presidential elections in 1994, peace conversations began in the northern city of Jaffna between the government and the LTTE. Her project of a state reform presented at the Parlament in 1995 didn’t succeed, despite having obtained previously the approval of the tamils, because of the contemplation in it of conceding to many of the demands, like the autonomy for some regions. When those conversations ended and the ceasefire in 1995, the period that goes on till 2001 is known as the third war of Eelam. An outstanding number of attacks carried out by the LTTE takes place, like the car bombing in front of the Central Bank of Colombo in 1998, the bombing of the Palace of the Theeth in 1998, the failed attempt of assassination against president Kumaratunga in 1999, and the bloodiest of all, the attack against the airport at Colombo in 2001, that left the economy shattered. After all this, United States decided to declare the LTTE a terrorist group, and so did Sri Lanka after that.

In 2001, the parliament elections are won by the UNP of Ravil Wickeremesignhe, and with Norwegian mediation negotiations are started. In December 2002, an agreement between the government and the LTTE seemed to show that peace was possible. They had agreed to share power under a federal system and finish the civil war. Sponsored by the norwegen government, this decision was unprecedented. This way the tamil minority would have autonomy over their regions. Since February that same year, a ceasefire already existed signed by president Kumaratunga.It is important to notice that this time the LTTE now mentions and speaks about autonomy and not about independence. At the final months of 2003, a deep political crisis emerged in Sri Lanka, in part because of a disagreement between the president Kumaratunga and the Prime Minister Wickeremesignhe in the way the peace process should be carried out. The UNP already was in control of the parliament since 2001 and Wickeremesignhe showed a concealable tone with the Tamils. The prime minister was leading himself the peace talks, and he was trying to bring the Tamils back to the negotiation table after they had left accusing the government of not giving it the importance it deserved. The president was very critical about this process, considering that the tamils should first put down their weapons and that they were asking too much. He also said the the prime minister was making to many concessions to them.

She decided to dismiss three ministers and close the parliament for two weeks. Clearly, what she was seeing was that the security situation was at risk and declared the state of emergency. The military supported the president in her decisions, mobilizing around Colombo to prevent unwanted confrontations. Kumaratunga already had raised tensions between the government and the negotiators when she asked for the Norwegian general, who was supervising the ceasefire, to step down, accusing him of benefiting the Tamils. The only thing she achieved was that Norway abandoned its place as mediator and the prime minister abandoned the peace process.

The tsunami that devastated Sri Lanka in December of 2004 generated a new peak of tension between the government and the LTTE, this time because of the distribution of the humanitarian aid. The LTTE accused them of making a political operation with the situation and threatening them with military presence in the refugee camps. They stated that the affected zones were completely ignored and this way the peace process was in danger.

In august 2005, the chancellor Lakshanan Kadirgamar was murdered in front of his own home. He was a Tamil, and a close collaborator of the president. Police sources stated that the LTTE was behind this, in what seemed to be a demonstration that not even being a Tamil could save them from the attacks and political violence. Nevertheless, the government declared that the ceasefire was still in place.

The election of Mahinda Rajapaksa, in 2005, as president did not contribute to sustain a calm situation. Even though he stated that he would negotiate with the Tamils; ones in office, he decided to take a firm position against them and support a solution based on a unified state. He ended up refusing to give autonomy to the Tamil regions. This “hard line” policy contributed to a scenario where violence raised again. From 2006 to 2007, attacks from the LTTE increased, with many suicide bombings and combats with government forces.

At the beginning of 2008, the government decided to abandon the ceasefire and combats definitely reinitiated. After taking control, between December of that year and February 2009, of the Jaffna peninsula, the city of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivi (this one was their last refuge were they had an air base), the LTTE was found surrounded in little villages and jungle areas. Although they responded to the loose of Kilinochchi with a suicide bombing, the end was close. When Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed, this eventually happened.

Importance of domestic politics and nationalism

There is no doubt that the strong presence of Sinhalese nationalism since the nation’s independence in 1948 is one of the major factors that explain the civil war started in 1983. Decided to control the country since the British retired from it, they shaped the state following there own ideas, excluding the Tamils and imposing their language and religion as officials over all the territory. Example of the strength this factor has is the crisis of 2003, and the political differences that emerged during the peace process taking place at that time. President Kumaratunga saw a peace process that was conceding too much to the Tamils, according to her point of view, so she decided to change this situation, first of all dismissing three ministers and after that closing the parliament. With this she could impede the talking that was being lead by the Prime Minister Wickeremesignhe. Threatening the stability of the country institutions, nationalism, and in this case political confrontation stopped the peace process that seemed promising. In 2005, the nationalist position appears again with president Rajapaksa, leading to the end of the ceasefire and renewed violence, although this time there is no signs of political confrontation.

A peace process must see these elements contained, so situations that have stopped earlier conversations don’t reappear.

External interference

Another interesting characteristic seen in this conflict has been the low level of external interference. We only have the case of India during the late eighties and early nineties as an external power with participation in Sri Lanka´s territory. First, training LTTE´s troops in Indian ground, and after that, deploying the IPKF after a pact with the Sinhalese government, and fighting the troops that were once trained in their own country. This force operated from 1987 till 1990.

Far from being useful to the conflict, “the failure of the Indian intervention only made thing worse, leaving the following governments facing negotiations against a LTTE reinforced, allowing them to initiate new military operations after failure of negotiations”(2).

Clearly India can find it useful for its national interest to intervene in Sri Lanka during the peace process, because of the community of interests that exist between them, and also because of the sharing of the same region and security zone, and finally to avoid a wave of refugees that could arrive if the institutions of its neighbour collapse. Also, they can try to play the roll of an hegemonic state in the region, and move into the international level as a nation that wants to get involved in security and regional situations that imply risks

Some main features of the LTTE

The LTTE has been one of the world’s biggest generators of suicide terrorism, together with Hamas and the Kurds PKK. The suicide terrorism distinguishes itself from other ways of terrorism because of the fact that the attacker does not expect to survive, and also he will cause death to anyone who is near him. His method consists in attacking with a belt with the bomb attached, and this way it transforms into the bloodiest and most aggressive form of terrorism. It has as its goal to coerce the government, in this case the Sri Lankan, but it was also exercised against the IPKF.

This type of terrorism has its origins in Lebanon during the eighties, more precisely with the car bombing attack perpetuated by Hezbollah against US Marines barracks in 1983. From this moment it expanded across many regions of the world, including Sri Lanka. This way, “from the 9th of July of 1987, with an attack that killed forty soldiers in Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers, with Hinduism as there religion, refined the technique copied from the Lebanese and Chiita Hezbollah.” (4).

Following Robert Pape´s work, and to give ourselves an idea of the magnitude of the suicide terrorism in Sri Lanka, “from 1980 till 2003, there are registered 316 suicidal acts in the entire world, and 76 of them were committed by the LTTE, even more than Hamas”. (5)

One of the most cutting edge elements of the LTTE and that makes us aware of their level of organization is the existence of the “Sea Tigers”, a fleet of small boats that transformed itself in a real danger for the patrol boats of Sri Lanka, and the “Air Tigers”, that bombed Colombo earlier this year .

Some of the more relevant attacks of the LTTE

1991 - Assassination of Rijav Ghandi , ex - prime minister of India. .
1993 - Assassination of President Ranasinghe Premadasa.
1994 - Opposition leader and presidential candidate of the UNP, Gamini Dissanayake, together .with fifty eight persons are murdered by a woman in a suicide mission in Colombo.
1996 - 1.200 soldiers are assassinated in Mullativu.
- Explosion of a car bomb in the Central Bank of Colombo.
1998- Bomb attacks to the Temple of the Theth.
- 36 civilians and two policemen are killed, while 270 civilians are left injured after an explosion of a truck in front of the police station in Colombo.
1999- Assassination attempt that fails against President Chandrika Kumaratunga.
2001- Attack at the airport of Colombo.
2005- Chancellor Lakshman Kadirgamar is murdered in front of his home.
2006- At Anuradhapura, 25 people are killed, including Grl. Janaka Perera, who held a long history serving the army and as leader of UNP.
2007- Attack at a commercial area in Colombo, leaving 16 dead.

Another chance for peace

The final victory over the LTTE must not serve as an excuse to hide other key questions that made this conflict possible and that still today are not resolved: the ones related with the exclusion that the Tamils have suffered since the independence of Sri Lanka in 1948. Also we shouldn’t forget the complaints made over the situation of the civilians and the murdering, from both the LTTE and the Army of Sri Lanka. The large number of refugees that this conflict left behind is also another element to be considered seriously in this post-conflict scenario. We don’t have to forget the Tamils’ community around the world, possibly a source of new fighters and claims if there is not a quick solution that includes recognition and inclusion.

The peace process that has begun is a novel and encouraging one, but it must not let these key factors aside to sustain. Singhalese nationalism can not make this process fail again as it has passed in recent times, and this situation shouldn’t be wasted to discuss the status of the Tamils and achieve once and for all a real inclusion of them, that can make the menace of terrorism fade away forever and bring prosperity to the island. The Tamils must necessarily renew their leadership and face this new era far away from weapons and adopting characteristics of a political movement. With no doubt the construction of an inclusive frame for the Tamils, missing since the independence in 1948, is an urgent condition. The international community must also take place as a primary actor to bring the parts together and make a lasting peace possible.

Esteban del Sar
Political Science, University of Buenos Aires (UBA), Buenos Aires, Argentina

Bibliography

(1) GOUVERNEUR, Cédric, The state in formation of the Tamil Tigers, Le monde diplomatique, South Cone Edition. Num.56-Feb.2004

(2) PALACIOS, Jorge Alberto, Terrorism in the global village. Ed. Policial, 2003

(3) LEWER, Nick y WILLIAM, Joe, The peace process in Sri Lanka: historic, economic and political perspectives and of resolution of the conflict, Anuario Asia-Pacífico 2004- www.anuarioasiapacifico.es/anuario2004/pdf/ASIA_CID_231_240.pdf

(4) CONESA, Pierre, World terorism: globalist and nationalist kamikazes, Le monde diplomatique, South Cone Edition, Num.60-Jun 2004

(5) PAPE, Robert, Dying to win. Strategies of suicide terrorism. Ed. Random House, 2005

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