Globalaffairs

Issue 20/April -June 2010
By Javier Delgado

Thailand has been severely hit by a deeply-rooted and now overly exposed social clash. The Red-Shirt demands, the camps’ raising factionalism, and the hidden agendas across the divide could be tracked down into the divisive figure of Thaksin Shinawatra.

His rise in 2001 to the premiership polarised Thailand’s society in a way unseen since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. By launching an ambitious range of pro-poor policies, Thaksin gained the unconditional support of north Thailand’s rural and working classes. This popularity posed an outright threat to the elites’ grip on the country affairs, what triggered a succession of questionable manoeuvres engineered to kick Thaksin out.

While in office, Thaksin also used his position to boost his numerous businesses, expanding an already vast fortune in a corrupt race that was eventually picked up by the army to oust him.

The following paper aspires to shed some light on the rights and wrongs of a man who has turned Thailand upside down.

Bangkok’s recent unrest illustrates a people’s legitimate (but way too ruthless) uprising against its elites’ neglect to the deprived. This empowers the Red-Shirts- a resolute grouping of Northern peasants and excluded city dwellers spearheaded by an assembly of leaders closely linked with former Prime Minister (PM) Thaksin Shinawatra.

This people’s resentment was fiercely untapped when Thailand top court seized half of Thaksin’s wealth. He was found guilty of having doubled his fortune during his time in office. His supporters received the judgment as plain state looting.

The ruling came against the backdrop of the Red-Shirts’ call for snap-elections. The current government lacks the mandate of the polls, having climbed to power by clearing its way of Thaksin and his proxies. The United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), the Red-Shirts official designation, demanded elections to take place almost immediately. Gradually, the Red-Shirts gathered strength, hijacking Bangkok’s financial and shopping hub for two-months.

The physical outcome is well-known. Thailand worst political violence in almost two decades left almost 90 people killed, thousands injured and the savage destruction of sections of the capital. Dreadful it may seem, the resulting social wounds look even scarier. As T. Fuller and S. Mydans from the New York Times pointed out, “it is a collapse of the political consensus (1).”

The divide between the Thai middle and upper classes (embodied by the Army, businessmen and civil servants), and pretty much the rest of the country is not necessarily wider than it was two months ago (what cannot be said in regard of the monarchy, though). The divide is, however, captured in a state of acrimony and bitterness. The current scenario may turn into a country-wide confrontation if elections are not held before the end of the year, the outcome honoured, and the ensuing leaders abstain from using their position for personal gain (too much to ask, may question the reader). Furthermore, Thaksin must walk away from his current role of exiled agitator and let Thailand heal.

The Thaksin’s years

The political ambitions of one of the country wealthiest businessman challenged the unfair social and political balance of Thailand. When Thaksin won the 2001 elections, he employed a populist agenda that, besides gaining the hearts and minds of neglected rural dwellers, threatened the military’s and monarchy’s behind-the-scenes commanding role.

Against most odds, Thaksin did well on his first term, winning a landslide victory on the 2005 polls. His popularity was underpinned on his cabinet favourable terms towards the poor, rather than the transparency of his premiership- few may challenge that Thaksin used his incumbency to favour his wide-reaching business interests. The last straw was served when his family sold his $1,8 billion stake in Shin Corporation (a Thai conglomerate heavily involved on the country telecom industry) to the Singaporean Temasek. Actually, the Thai regulations regarding overseas investments in the telecom sector had been relaxed just prior to the sale. It gives a sense of how thin was the line between the former PM private deals and the business of ruling the country.

Thaksin conflict of interests also clashed with the army’s and the monarchy’s investments. It is known that King Bhumibol Adulyade’s family runs business all across Thailand’s economic board. Less secretive are the army business interests. The military ample assets on the communications industry are complemented with holdings in airlines, construction, manufacturing, and agriculture. Thaksin‘s enterprises where involved in much of the above, laying a tangible menace to the army’s sources of finance.

The combination of profiteering and the threat Thaksin represented to the old guard was behind a well-orchestrated campaign to discredit him. As a result, the growing allegations of corruption forced a just re-elected Thaksin to call for snap-elections. The move aimed at easing the unbearable political pressure by proving that, in spite of the allegations of power abuse, an overwhelming majority of the population still trusted him with the government reins.

The new polls were boycotted by the major opposition parties and again, massively won by the Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT). In a carefully framed move, the Constitutional Court (endorsed by the King) declared Thaksin second landslide in a row invalid. According with the ruling, the opposition refusal to participate in the voting prevented the full formation of the lower house, as various constituencies’ seats could not be taken. Thaksin bloody counter-insurgency strategy on the mostly Muslim South and his bet against Bangkok’s elites prompted many in both of these constituencies to exercise the abstain option at the ballot box. That kept a number of seats unfilled, what fed the Constitutional Court judgement. In short, the monarchy-backed political class, along with the military and the judiciary ambushed Thaksin in an attempt to terminate his political race.

To unlock the lower house impasse, the TRT announced the holding of new polls (the third in less than 2 years). They never took placed, as Thaksin was ousted in a military coup.

The relentless road to chaos

Schemed to bring the political picture back to the old guard’s control, the military intrusion did eventually backfire. During the 15 months-old caretaker government, Thaksin was found guilty of breaking a conflict of interest law, corruption and abuse of power, and therefore, convicted in absentia.

With the former PM in a self-imposed exile, new elections were carried out. Although the TRT was outlawed, its successor, the Thaksin-proxy People’s Power Party (PPP), emerged as the most voted party. Back to square one. The coup had achieved little to nothing excepting throwing Thaksin away from Thailand, not his political clout, though.

The post-coup government was perceived by Bangkok’s elites as much of the same. With the complicity of the judiciary, the establishment was about to do whatever it takes to wash away any Thaksin influence from the country’s policy-making process. Such a mission was to be accomplished by an eventually mighty People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), better known as Yellow-Shirts (colour linked to the monarchy).

The Yellow-Shirts is Thaksin-despising group made up of affluent Bangkokians and Southerners. As put by G.M. Greenwood, an associate with Allan & Associates, a Hong Kong-based political and security risk consultancy “[the Yellow-Shirts are] created, funded and protected by the military, the aristocracy, the bureaucracy,… the urban professional and commercial classes… [The PAD] reflects an unwillingness to share status and wealth with the masses. (2)”

By staging a series of hysterical protests, the PAD exerted enough pressure to push the Constitutional Court to rule against Samak Sundaravej, Thaksin’s proxy post-coup PM. The Court could have not picked up a more laughable charge; Mr Sundaravej was found guilty of pocketing some extra income from his TV cooking shows.

The PPP ruling party placed Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-law, as new PM. This time, counting with the tacit compliance of the army and the quiet blessing of the King, the Yellow-Shirts cut Bangkok off from the rest of the world by seizing its major airports. The judiciary gave in to the movement’s demands and dissolved the PPP. A number of the just-abolished party lawmakers defected to the opposition Democratic Party, and here we go- Abhisit Vejjajiva, current Thai PM, came into scene. His illegitimate, unvoted ascension to the premiership sparked the outrage of millions, which culminated in last months’ urban battle.

The populist formula: Thaksin appeal

Thaksin years turned out to be not only the most contentious in Thailand’s wobbling democracy, but quite accomplishing as well. The polemic PM did not honour his successors’ line of standing aloof to millions of poverty-stricken Thais. In perspective, one may question what his real agenda was, but as a matter of fact, he swept the North of Thailand with a wave of programmes conceived to ease the live of millions.

Among others, his cabinet paved roads, set up a scheme of loans for small farms, expanded the electricity and water supply, introduced universal healthcare, and relaxed credit requirements. A poverty alleviation campaign that earned Thaksin livelong supporters. Many of these Thais are keen to welcome Thaksin back. The thinking may well go like follows: all Thai politicians profit from their positions to enrich themselves. Thaksin was not an exemption but at least, seems to care about us.

To be fair, it should not go unnoticed that, as the The Economist reminds, “much of [Thaksin] generosity has continued under today’s prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva. (3)” This gives us pure food for thought. If the current government has taken over Thaksin’s pro-poor policies- where does the Red-Shirts impatience for elections come from?; are they then simply concerned with the questionable way in which Mr Abhisit stepped in?

The answer rests on Thaksin’s initial leadership and funding of the Red-Shirts. Disguised on the otherwise genuine accusation of Mr Abhisit illicit shortcut to power, the exiled former PM looks as if is solely preoccupied to get back on the Thai politics scene -and recover his partly-sized fortune on the way.

But Thaksin’s machinations may prove flawed. As a correspondent from the Asia Sentinel pointed out, the Red-Shirts “appear to be evolving away from the billionaire former leader into something more ominous.(4)” Originally devised as a proxy movement to press the government and the military on his behalf, Thaksin no longer holds the reins of the Red-Shirts. In words of The Economist, “some protesters do not care if Thaksin is rehabilitated. (5)”

It is no longer about Thaksin

The Red-Shirts movement has outgrown its original master. Conceived as a Thaksin’s noisy mouthpiece, today we know that he underestimated the forces he worked so hard to unleashed.

If the struggle for the Thaksin version of justice is to cost lives and suffering, better to turn it into an endeavour towards truly democracy. The thousands of men and women who risked their lives in Bangkok (and other provincial seats as well) grew tired of championing the cause of a leader whose massive wealth swelled over his term in office.

Thaksin has unintentionally given a vital push to millions of Thais that were quietly seeking the confidence to raise their voices against the inequitable status quo. So evident is the shift on the country social dynamics, that even Mr Kasit, Mr Abhisit’s foreign minister, went further to state that “ordinary people, farmers, labourers, and workers participate in the political process as opposed to Thailand 15 years or 20 years ago, where political actors were confined to the bureaucrats, to some of the business people, to some of the professional politicians, to some of the military officers. (6)”

His last throes

As mentioned before, as the Red-Shirts took the streets, their key demand was the holding of elections to put an end to Thailand’s illegitimate government. They actually got it, when Mr Abhisit’s and the UDD leaders reached an agreement to call elections on November. The crisis appeared to be on its closing leg when suddenly, the Red-Shirts added an impossible demand: that the deputy PM surrenders to the police.

The protests’ leaders spoiled the hard-fought deal, condemning thousands of demonstrators to the reaction of a (following the failure in the negotiating table) strengthened army. “The reversal of the agreement was a sign of growing factionalisation of the protest movement, (7)” pointed out T. Fuller and S. Mydans from the New York Times.

Most likely, Thaksin’s interference lies at the heart of this factionalisation. As he was becoming increasingly irrelevant, he may have dictated to his royalist to harden their standing. Thaksin knew that, if he was to see his conviction revoked, a bargaining chip had to be gained. By claiming to hold Thailand’s deputy PM accountable of criminal charges, Thaksin was seeking to gain a new negotiating card to be used in his hypothetical comeback. His desired scenario: to trade the invalidation of his two years of prison sentence for the withdrawal of the deputy PM accusation. Today, he would have to add terrorist charges to the deal.

The man who broke up Thailand

For almost four years, the ousted (but still billionaire) PM has been in the run on his golden, self-imposed exile. Using the web and live-broadcasted speeches, he has shown a stunning resilience in fighting his foes from abroad. An all out race against Thailand’s establishment that has ended up putting the country on the brink of civil war.

By flagging a self-tailored banner of democracy and freedom, Thaksin empowered the wildest dreams of millions not used to articulate (even less to enjoy) their constitutionally-granted civil and political rights. Thaksin may be an advocate of the underprivileged, but he is also a reckless politician and an anxious businessman.

For weeks, he had the government where he always wanted: in an uneasy state of confusion on how to deal with the crisis’ apparently perennial deadlock. That drove the executive to toughen its approach and consequently eroded Thais’ freedoms by taking measures as the Emergency Decree, by which the “freedoms of assembly and press are curtailed and suspects can be locked up for 30 days without charge. (8)”

As a result, the¬ split between the haves and have-nots is not only wider but deeper-seated and regrettably, bloodier than ever before.

What next?

For the sake of Thailand’s tarnished democracy and now lacking stability, elections will have to take place. “New elections will not solve Thailand’s complex problems but they would go a long way to cool temperatures, (9)” believes H. Koyakutty, a freelance Southeast Asia correspondent based in Bangkok.

Nevertheless, hard times lay down the road if a Thaksin-minded political force wins the voting and replicates the whole process once again; launch a massive pro-poor programme that lures the support of millions. Nothing wrong till here. The trouble comes if the very same government incurs in Thaksin-like illegitimate practices of power abusing and pocket filling. If in spite of this, people keep backing such a government- how would the establishment be supposed to act?

This question targets a school of thought increasing attractive for some members of the establishment. It argues that the political fate of the country cannot be trusted to Thailand’s uneducated and easy-to-manipulate masses. Not a very democratic reflexion but one that exposes the backbone of the country’s plight.

For Thailand to be fixed, a new relationship among the establishment, the government, the urban middle and upper classes and the rural population must be conceived. “A new social contract, (10)” as nicely put by Otto F. von Feigenblatt, a fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.

The elites must recognise that the centuries-old status quo is not sustainable any more. Channels are to be created for the population to be better off, increase its chances of economic fulfilment, and assure than the political process remains competitive. The judiciary should step back from its current politicised shape. People’s rights (e.g quality before the law) and freedoms (e.g. of press) are to be threaded as religion-like. It cannot be bargained- nothing less will guarantee the stability that all Thais yearn for.

When he entered into politics, it was not in Thaksin’s plans to confront the two Thailands to the extent of having to rethink the country’s ‘social contract.’ His mission was rather self-centre, though in order to accomplish it, he did not mind to do some good and empower the weak in the way.

Javier Delgado Rivera
Freelance Journalist on Asia politics

Bibliography:

MYDANS, SETH and FULLER, THOMAS, “Thailand’s King Sees His Influence Fading,” The New York Times, May 15th 2010
. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/world/asia/16king.html?ref=world

GREENWOOD, G.M., “Thailand’s Multiple Revolts,” Asia Sentinel, May 4th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2441&Itemid=185

The Economist (staff writer), “Thaksin’s harvest: Where red shirts hang their hats,” May 13th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=16112030

Asia Sentinel (correspondent), “Thailand’s Chaos: No Way Out,” April 12th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2396&Itemid=164

The Economist (staff writer), “Thaksin’s harvest: Where red shirts hang their hats,” May 13th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=16112030

Asian Correspondent (column ‘Bangkok Pundit’), “Thai foreign minister calls for reform of the monarchy,” April 16th 2010
. Available at:
http://uk.asiancorrespondent.com/bangkok-pundit-blog/thai-foreign-minister-calls-for-reform-of-the-monarchy

MYDANS, SETH and FULLER, THOMAS, “The reversal of the agreement,” The New York Times, May 13th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/world/asia/14thai.html?hp

BELL, Thomas, “Thai government issues emergency decree after violence in Bangkok,” The Daily Telegraph, September 2nd 2008
. Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/2665859/Thai-government-issues-emergency-decree-after-violence-in-Bangkok.html

KOYAKUTTY, Haseenah, “The End for Thailand’s Abhisit?,” Asia Sentinel, April 12th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2393&Itemid=164

F. von Feigenblatt, Otto, “Thailand’s struggle over legitimacy,” UPI Asia, April 9th 2010
. Available at:
http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2010/04/09/thailands_struggle_over_legitimacy/2024/

The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs