NEW: The myth of separation in the Israel-Palestine conflict
08 - July - 2010 | 0By Guy Burton
Issue 21/July - September 2010
The past decade has seen a push towards separation and unilateralism on both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Following a decade of engagement under the Oslo process, the shift occurred after the outbreak of the second Intifada. It was a shift initially led by the Israelis under the premiership of Ariel Sharon (2001-06), during which construction of the Separation Wall began and an evacuation of Jewish settlements in Gaza took place.
The Palestinians’ drive for separation is more recent: August 2010 will mark the first anniversary of that official position, based on Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s programme for government. If fulfilled the plan, “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, will see a unilateral declaration of independence by the Palestinians by the end of next year. This marks a significant change from previous model to achieve Palestinian self-government through the Oslo process, which included Israeli involvement.
The shift from engagement to separation in the Israel/Palestine conflict is interesting for several factors. First, it goes against many of the assumptions concerning conflict resolution. Second, separation as a policy faces several challenges given the connections that exist between Israel and the Palestinians - despite efforts to achieve it through ‘facts on the ground’. Third, it poses questions about the feasibility of achieving separation, which are ultimately bound up in the relative positions and influence of the respective actors.
Separation as policy: running against the trend
That both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships have opted for a path of separation has been the main dynamic of the past decade. Yet it also comes in a period where globalisation constitutes the dominant trend. Globalisation has many facets, the most commonly associated of which is economic integration. But it also has significant political, social and cultural dimensions as well.
At a general level the response to globalisation has been greater engagement by different actors around the world. This has occurred at all levels, from the elite level including political leaders at various summits (e.g. G8, G20) and economic negotiators in the WTO talks to civil society; the most notable of which were those individuals, social movements and organisations at the World Social Forum. Perhaps the most institutionalised approach has been the European Union and its development of supranational governance. But even at the level of the individual globalisation has permeated our senses: despite restrictions on freedom of movement (most notably immigration barriers), society and culture appears to know no boundaries. The use of information technology and digital social networks enable communication and the sharing of cultural artefacts (e.g. film, music) across continents and facilitate mobilisation on behalf of others - one way in which the Israel-Palestine conflict has both attracted widespread attention and agitation.
Aida Camp, West Bank .In the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)'s Aida Camp for Palestinian refugees, a young resident bikes past a bullet-pocked wall of UNRWA's School for Girls. June 2003. UN Photo/Stephenie Hollyman
The Israel-Palestine conflict is one such recipient of this greater global connectedness. From the early 1990s until the early part of the 2000s the two sides were committed to the Oslo process, whereby the two sides would move step-by-step towards the creation of a Palestinian state and remove Israeli forces from the occupied territories (the two-state solution). This was to be achieved by undertaking parallel confidence-building measures. Towards the end of the process some of the most difficult aspects of the conflict would be resolved, including the borders between the two states, the rights of refugees, decisions on settlements in the areas and the status of Jerusalem.
However, that process has been effectively dead for much of the past decade. The failure of the US-mediated Camp David talks between then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 2000 contributed to a loss of faith by both sides. Provocative acts, including Ariel Sharon’s (Israel’s soon to be Prime Minister) visit to the Dome of the Rock, weakened trust further and eventually resulted in the start of the second Intifada. For the following few years acts of violence were carried out by both sides, including Palestinian suicide bombings in Israeli cities and the killing of civilians by Israeli troops in the West Bank and Gaza.
It was during this period that the Sharon government embarked on a unilateral process of separation. The most visible manifestation of this was the creation of the concrete parts of the Separation or Security Wall within the territory of the West Bank and the removal of Jewish settlements from the Gaza strip in 2005. But Sharon was not content with separating Israel from the Palestinians; rather he sought separation within Israel as well. This was most apparent in Sharon’s break away from the Likud party and the formation of a new political force, Kadima, which incorporated both Sharon’s supporters and those who felt disenfranchised by the political establishment. Although Kadima lost the 2009 election, the successor coalition government led by Likud remains similarly separatist in outlook.
The Palestinians’ response own turn towards separation and unilateralism was slow in coming. In part this involved an internal separation and schism occurring within Palestinian politics and society between Hamas and Fatah during the mid-2000s.
The second Intifada had effectively exhausted the Palestinians and achieved no substantial change for their situation. Matters were further compounded by the election of the Islamist party, Hamas, in February 2006 and rising tensions between it and the more secular Fatah party for control of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). This eventually resulted in civil war and the effective political and administrative disconnection of Gaza under control of Hamas and the West Bank by Fatah in mid-2007.
The separation of political control was exacerbated by the aversion of many in the international community, including the US and EU, to engage directly with Hamas. As a result, the EU adopted mechanisms to channel aid which bypassed Hamas while also promoting Fatah as its main partner for dialogue. It was at this moment, in June 2007 that the PNA president, Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas, appointed the technocrat Salam Fayyad as prime minister.
Despite the shift towards separation, both within and between Israel and the Palestinians, much of the rhetoric coming out of the international community has been concerned with getting the two sides back around the table. Although the main actors in the Quartet (the US, EU, Russia and the UN) did express their support for Fayyad’s 2009 plan at their meeting last March, they have also pressed for both Israel and the Palestinians to undertake proximity talks (1). These talks would be arguably seen as a step towards getting the Oslo process back on track, since they envisage a return to full bilateral discussion between the two sides regarding the final status of all outstanding differences.
The myth of separation in the Israel-Palestine conflict: becoming a reality?
Notwithstanding the wish of the international community, to what extent is the situation between Israel and Palestine becoming one of growing separation? While it is certainly apparent that there are growing divisions between the two sides, at both a physical as and metaphysical level (including both metal and rhetorical), it is also evident that there remains certain points of contact and connection beneath the facade. Whether these provide much of a basis for dialogue though is another matter.
Physically it is very much the case that in both the occupied territories as well as in Israel itself, Israel and Palestinians appear worlds apart. In the occupied territories although the removal of Jewish settlements from Gaza has not been matched in the West Bank, the latter is increasingly adopting a series of measures that ensure Israelis and Palestinians remain separate. The Separation Wall is one example of this, but it can also be seen in the creation of a parallel road network in the territory where settlers use one and Palestinians the other. Even where a Jewish settlement is located in the heart of a Palestinian community, as in Hebron, separation is paramount. Nowhere is this more explicit than the convoluted means of access to the mosque and synagogue that house opposite sides of the Tombs of the Patriarchs.
In Israel there is a significant Palestinian minority, around 20% of the population. While they do have some political representation in the Knesset (Parliament) they remain largely separated from the majority Jewish population on several counts. First, they are concentrated in the north of the country and east Jerusalem. Second, they feel discriminated against, owing to the Jewish nature of the Israeli state. For example, not only can Palestinians not take advantage of the Jewish ‘right of return’ law, but the 2003 Citizenship and Entry Law has also restricted the right to residency of foreign spouses (i.e. Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza) of Palestinian citizens in Israel.
Mentally, there is also a growing disconnection between Israelis and Palestinians. For many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, their main contact with Israelis extends no further than the soldiers and military or border police at checkpoints, which arguably limits Palestinians’ capacity to emphasise with Israelis beyond their experience at the wrong end of a gun.
Among Israelis and especially those who live in the ‘bubble’, there is an unawareness or willingness to understand the experience of the Palestinian experience, both among them as a minority and in the occupied territories. One example of this separation is evident in the use of language and the emphasis on ‘Arab’ rather than ‘Palestinian’. The denial of ‘Palestinian‘ indicates an unwillingness to acknowledge these people’s self-definition as such and consequently their right to self-determination on lands that they consider ‘Palestinian’. By contrast the label ‘Arab’ makes it easier for a clear-cut distinction to be drawn between Israelis and Arabs and a return to a pre-1967 mindset when Israel saw itself threatened from the outside, including Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. ‘Arab’ is a term to signify the other, as not part of Israel and therefore without any commensurate rights. The term also enables Israeli leaders and societies to imply that there are other homes for ‘Arabs’, outside of Israel and the lands taken in 1967. Acknowledging them as ‘Palestinian’ would mean accepting their differences from other Arabs and their nation states.
Despite these cases of separation though, the reality is that Israelis and Palestinians are more connected than their leaders will acknowledge - although the tendency is towards a more negative relationship than a positive one. The case of the Palestinian minority in Israel has already been noted above. In addition, there is the nature of the economic relationship between Israel and the occupied territories - although to the benefit of the former over the latter. Leila Farsakh has noted how this was done, including prevention of competition from Palestinian goods and factors of production, a one-sided customs union that allowed Israelis free access to Palestinian markets and denied them to Palestinian products (especially agricultural), restricted investment and capital flows and high taxation of Palestinians and a one-way flow of Palestinian workers into Israel (2).
Second, despite Israeli efforts to exert control, market forces remain prevalent. This is apparent both in the daily migration of thousands of Palestinian labourers passing through weak and unsecured points in the barrier between the West Bank and Israel in search of low-wage work. Meanwhile, within the West Bank and given the absence of other jobs, it is possible to find hundreds of Palestinians working in the settlements and their construction.
Third, separatist policies bring their own paradoxical pressures towards greater connection and engagement. The Israeli occupation and settlement of the West Bank has meant the creation of hundreds of checkpoints across the territory which ensure daily interaction (albeit it of a tense and polarising kind), mainly between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians. In Gaza the removal of settlements changed the dynamic of the relationship, from one that was a direct occupation into a siege. While the consequences and costs have undoubtedly been greater for the population in Gaza than for Israel, it has ensured a form of connection between the two sides, whether through Israeli restrictions on the supply of aid into the territory or the use of force, as occurred during its invasion of the territory in December 2008/January 2009.
Is separation feasible?
The previous sections have considered the extent to which Israeli and Palestinian leaderships have adopted separation as their main course of action and the extent to which this is a reality. Certainly there is a general acceptance that the Oslo process is dead, despite efforts by the international community to resuscitate it. At the same time the trend towards separation seems to be at odds with the nature of a more integrated world. In addition, there is the fact that while Israelis and Palestinians remain connected, it is questionable whether it can provide the basis for any positive engagement: the connection between the two sides is structurally imbalanced, benefiting one side over the other and underpinned by an occupier-occupied dynamic.
In such circumstances does Fayyad’s plan constitute the best course available for the Palestinians? If achieved the plan envisages a declaration of independence by that part of the PNA controlled by Fatah before the end of 2011. This would require the effective institutionalisation of governing organs and governance, sufficient social security coverage and programmes, a vibrant market-based economy and the development of necessary infrastructure (3). All of this will undoubtedly be a tall order to achieve, if limited to the main objectives laid out in the plan.
For Shlomo Avineri, a political science professor at Hebrew University, a Palestinian declaration of independence would certainly change the parameters of the conflict. In particular he says that while it would not end the conflict but change the dynamics from one that is between an occupier and occupied people into one that is between two countries which disagree on a number of issues. Avineri suggests this would make the conflict an inter-state one like that which exists between Israel and Syria. (4)
However, Avineri’s analogy may not be entirely accurate. Doubtless there would be a number of states that would respond positively to a Palestinian declaration of independence. But the likelihood that this would temper or even change the Israeli approach is scant. First, it is by no means certain that those states, such as the US and key European countries, will necessarily go along with independence, despite the Quartet’s support for the Fayyad plan. Second, it remains unclear what effect a (presumably) Fatah-announced declaration of Palestinian independence would have on the Hamas-controlled Gaza strip. Third, Israel’s response is by no means clear: the fact that it has been criticised by its peers in the UN on numerous occasions concerning its occupation of Palestinian territory has had little effect in changing its behaviour.
Indeed, Columbia University’s Joseph Massad sees the Fayyad plan as little more than a repeat of the Camp David proposals offered to Yasser Arafat in 2000. The main differences are that first, it is Americans’ Palestinian proxies that are making the deal rather than themselves and the Israelis and second, the land available for Palestinian sovereignty is less than was available in 2000 (i.e. 58% as opposed to 65% of the West bank). (5)
The responses to Massad’s charges are two. First, we cannot be certain what the outcome would be of a Palestinian declaration of independence would be. History is not always the best guide to politics in the region. The failure of Camp David heralded the end of the Oslo process and the resumption of confrontation and violence through the second Intifada. By contrast the current context is one of growing separation and isolation on both sides, coupled with Palestinian exhaustion and failure to achieve anything of substance as a result of the Intifada.
Second, Massad’s criticism arguably has an underlying assumption of determinism. Yet if Camp David was acceptable to the Israelis in 2000, it is not necessarily the case that the same offer would be accepted ten years after the event. Indeed, in April the Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, said that a declaration of independence could prompt his country to revoke parts of the Oslo process or even move to annex parts of the West Bank. (6)
Lieberman’s words were telling for reasons that were unsaid, namely the relative difference in power between Israel and the Palestinians. More specifically, this imbalance is what makes separation and unilateralism a more feasible policy approach by the Israelis than the Palestinians, the former benefiting from its greater autonomy and scope of action. These are at least two factors that are both present in the immediate past and historically.
First, Israel’s relative stronger position has enabled it to adopt a much more flexible policy course. This is apparent in its historical unwillingness to set down what the status of final political and administrative arrangements with its Arab neighbours (whether they be other countries or the Palestinians) would be. This is has been a dominant theme in Israeli diplomacy since before 1948 where its leaders have been prepared to compromise on the means without ever jettisoning the ends. For example the Jewish leadership expressed a willingness to support the 1947 partition plan while privately seeing it as a temporary measure. Similarly the Oslo process effectively became an end itself. This was apparent in leaving the main points of contention to the end which was never reached. Meanwhile, the process provided a way of subcontracting their security concerns to the Palestinians without ever giving way on settlement construction, refugees’ rights or the status of Jerusalem.
Second, Israeli autonomy of action is also reflected in both its ability to maintain the occupation (and siege of Gaza) without having to shoulder its cost. Instead, much of this is taken up by the international community in the form of international aid, donor assistance and humanitarian relief (e.g. UNRWA schools) to the Palestinians on one hand and continuing access to international markets and privileged financial and military assistance from key allies like Washington.
In sum then, for the goal of Palestinian independence to be achieved ultimately - and ironically - requires Israeli assistance. To do this it will be necessary to reframe the power dynamics that underpin this conflict, namely the inbuilt advantage that Israel has over the Palestinians. This could be achieved from within and without. Internally, it would require Israel’s leaders abandoning its ambiguous stance in favour of a clear statement of intent and what it envisages as the basis for a final agreement. Externally, pressure from outside could help to redress the imbalance through less preferential treatment by the international community in terms of economic markets and assistance to easy and low-cost finance for example. Another would be for the international community to oblige Israel to take on the financial burden of its occupation policies. How pressure might be exerted on Israel in the current setting will be difficult though. It was Israel that initially adopted unilateralism and separation, followed by the Palestinians several years later. But whereas the Palestinians operate from a weaker position and therefore have less room for manoeuvre, the Israelis do so from a position from strength: and are consequently less likely to adopt willing self-restraint.
Guy Burton
Research associate at the London School of Economics (LSE) Ideas Centre.
References
(1) QUARTET, Joint Statement by the Quartet. 19 March, 2010. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138583.htm [accessed 4 July 2010]
(2) FARSAKH, L. “The Political Economy of Israeli Occupation: What’s Colonial About It?” The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies, 8(Spring): 41-58, 2008.
(3) PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State. Program of the Thirteenth Government. August 2009
http://www.mideastweb.org/palestine_state_program.htm [accessed 4 July 2010]
(4) AVINERI, S. “Watch for Palestinian declaration of independence,” The Cap Times. 13 June, 2010. http://host.madison.com/ct/news/opinion/column/article_3647a1de-758d-11df-ad93-001cc4c03286.html [accessed 4 July 2010]
(5) MASSAD, J. “An immaculate conception?” The Electronic Intifada. 14 April, 2010. http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article11207.shtml [accessed 4 July 2010]
(6) FRIEDMAN, M. “Israel Warns Palestine Not To Declare State,” The Huffington Post. 6 April, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/06/israel-warns-palestine-no_n_526565.html [accessed 4 July 2010]
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