US Military Bases in Columbia and the Arms Race in South America

25 - November - 2009 | 0

Issue 17/ October-November 2009
By Danny Mauricio Suárez


The military pact that is to be closed between Columbia and the United States through which the US military will cooperate with Columbia at seven military bases, is a dire necessity for Columbia in its battle against drug trafficking and the terrorism of the FARC guerrilla movement that have been wreaking havoc in the country for over 50 years, but at the same time is awkward for its neighbours.

The aid agreement and military collaboration between the two countries, however, are not new; contrary to what their neighbouring nations believe, the United States have been an unconditional ally of the Columbian government contributing military aid for over 10 years with the added total of six billion dollars. The collaboration has been decisive in cornering the FARC and disbanding several drug cartels headed up by Diego León Montoya also known as “Don Diego”, captured and extradited to the United States where he was sentenced to 45 years for drug trafficking, as well as disbanding the paramilitary groups led by Salvatore Mancuso; Diego Fernando Murilla known as “Don Berna”, Rodrigo Tovar Pupo known as “Jorge 40″; and José Ever Veloza García knows as “H.H.” amongst others, who were also extradited to the United States.

Due to the above, and following the closure of the US military base at Manta, Ecuador and the imminent change of direction within the US narcotics police that will result in a decrease in the resources allocated to Plan Columbia, the Columbian government saw an opportunity to strengthen the old military alliance with the US, allowing administrative personnel, contractors and US military to access seven Columbian military bases (Malamba, Atlantic; Palanquero in the Magdalena Medio; Apiay in el Meta; the navy bases in Cartagena and the Pacific; the Training Centre in Tolemaida and the military base of Larandia in el Caquetá).

This decision has already provoked several strong reactions from neighbouring countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador-countries with which Columbia has encountered serious diplomatic difficulties (withdrawal of its ambassadors and diplomatic personnel from Bogotá) as well as economic problems (restrictions on all Columbian products), all of this because the activities of the US military on the Columbian bases are considered a threat.

The neighbouring countries need not fear as the major topics and the rules have already been agreed upon. Firstly, the bases will not be American, but will remain Columbian; the commanding officers will be Columbian, the security will be in Columbian hands and Columbians will not be denied access to a single centimetre of the base. This is a major difference with other bases, such as the one in Manta, which were actually US territory. Secondly, there will be a maximum number of 600 military personnel and 800 contractors authorised to access each base. Thirdly, it is important to remember the number of bases that will actually be used. In reality, there is only one that is of importance to the United States namely the base of Palanquero in Puerto Salgar, Cundinamarca. Strictly speaking, this is the base the Americans were interested in order to replace the Manta base, because this base allows them to cover the Pacific, especially useful for the capture of planes and boats used for drug trafficking. In fact, it is the only base for which a budget of 42 million dollars was approved by the US Congress -accommodation for planes, equipment and military personnel-and the only one that appears as being of strategic value in the plans of the Pentagon. Actually, the Americans would have preferred a base closer to the Pacific such as Cali, but there the military base is located in the middle of town rendering this a nonviable option. The other six bases were requested by the Columbian government and are to be used in case of emergency. In reality, many were included because the Columbian military forces hoped to receive aid for improvements.

At the same time, monitoring the Pacific is of the utmost importance to Columbia. With the information of the Americans, this year 17 semi-submergible vehicles have been captured in the Pacific, all full of cocaine that were headed towards the United States via Mexico and Central America. Without this information not one of these vehicles would have been detected, as Columbia does not have the technology to monitor continental waters, where the drug cartels are comfortably and ingeniously going about their business (1).

Moreover, in order to further contribute to the tranquillity of the neighbouring countries and generally speaking to the whole region, the agreement states explicitly that no operations will be permitted in third countries. Because of the above, the vision the Columbian government has differs greatly from that of its neighbours and the following statement was made by to Freddy Padilla de León, Commander of the Columbian Military Forces whilst commenting on the military pact… “It is within this context of respect for the self-determination of the peoples, the inviolable sovereignties, the global aggressions against terrorism and drugs trafficking, that Columbia seeks to strengthen a respectful and modern collaboration with the people and the Government of the United States; in which only terrorists and drug traffickers need be fearful. We are convinced that the more successful we are in the noble fight against this universal evil in Columbia, the more we contribute to the tranquillity in the region” (2).

Notwithstanding, this agreement has been used as an excuse not just by Columbia’s direct neighbours, but by the whole region to increase its weapon supplies, with the help of several countries that attack the US hegemony against Russia, China and Iran, consolidating Latin America as a new global geopolitical operations centre thus bringing this part of the hemisphere to the forefront. The argument that these countries only pursue commercial interests is merely a partial explanation for their increased presence in these lands, as they are certainly interested in politically influencing the exclusive territories of the USA.

It is clear that some of Columbia’s neighbours, such as Venezuela, are worried about this military pact after American agencies and some of the most influential American newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post named them as protectors and helpers of the FARC, and as a sanctuary for drug trafficking; in particular because of the affinity and friendship of President Chavez and many of his collaborators with Columbian guerrilla leaders who have been key in the acquisition of arms (guns and rocket launchers), ammunition and money by the guerrilla. The assassination of Wílber Varela, known as “Jabón” in the state of Mérida, Venezuela, in January 2008 proves that drug traffickers are present in that country.

The Venezuelan president is the only one of his South American colleagues who has talked about war, but what fears or others motives would bring Hugo Chávez to use this word to talk about a friendly nation? Why would president Chávez think, using his infinite imagination, that he could call a war on Columbia? Perhaps as a response to the military agreement with the United States? Would it be a punitive war to keep Columbia from invading Venezuela? Would it be a preventive war facilitating the FARC and the ELN, their friends and allies, to take charge? Would it be a punitive war to regain the backing of the Venezuelan people amidst his growing unpopularity? Would it be a solitary war showing other countries in the area what will happen to them if they don’t bend to “Chavista-style” imperialism? Would it be a persuasive war to “free” the Columbian people from the “dictatorship” of Álvaro Uribe Vélez? Would it be a compassionate war? The former serves but to demonstrate that the war-hungry Venezuelan President has “more than sufficient” motives to declare a war on Columbia or on anyone else for that matter, inspired by his bipolar and peculiar personality.

His fears are even bigger now that his popularity has fallen noticeably, his natural resources are deficient and his country is rationing water and energy, his economy has entered a recession and his relationships are much closer to Cuba, Syria, Libya, Belarus and Iran.

Hugo Chávez has on various occasions met with the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has declared several times that “The Islamic revolution and the Bolivian revolution are one”, that Columbia and Iran have a “strategic alliance” that they will build a nuclear villa together and that both countries have promised to share their fate if one of them is invaded by Washington. Aided by Chávez, Teheran has been seeking closer contact with other Latin-American governments. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has visited the Nicaraguan Daniel Ortega and the Ecuadorian Rafael Correa and maintains good relations with Bolivia and Cuba.

As for Russia, Dimitri Medvedev became, at the end of last year, the first Russian president to visit South America. Around the same time, war ships of said country were carrying out manoeuvres together with Venezuela in the Caribbean Sea. Between 2005 and 2007, Moscow and Caracas signed weapons deals valued at 6,600 million dollars, which included 24 fighter planes Sukhoi, 12 military transportation planes, 53 assault helicopters, 92 tanks, 300 armoured cars and an undetermined number of antiaircraft missiles, 100,000 assault rifles Kalashnikov AK-47 and long distance rockets.

Bolivia also reached an agreement with Russia valued at 100 million US dollars which allowed the government of Evo Morales to buy Russian weapons and equipment for the Armed Forces. The former later stated: “If the United States do not want to sell to us, there will always be China or Russia”, complaining about having in vainly waited for several months for the US to approve the sale of 6 light military aircraft (3).

Ecuador is no exception and their plan to “modernise the armed forces” will receive a donation of 6 Mirage-50 planes from Venezuela and it has an investment plan of 400 million dollars for the purchase of 12 more planes from South Africa and 24 Super Tucanos light attack aircraft of Brazilian manufacture, that is without counting the purchases already realised and the materials it is already receiving, seven helicopters from India, six unmanned planes from Israel, two frigates from Chile, two helicopters from Russia and two radars from China.

However, Venezuela is not the only country involved; another problem is the power struggle in the region with Brazil as the main protagonist. Actually, Brasilia was hoping that with the end of the military base in Manta, Ecuador, the North-American presence would diminish in the region allowing it to strengthen its role and posture as an emerging power. With this aim, it has strengthened its military apparatus, with the purchase of 36 French attack aircraft, 50 military transport helicopters and five submarines, one of which will be nuclear (the first of its kind in Latin America) with a total value of more than 12,000 million dollars, without counting the previous arrangement with Russia which will send 12 combat helicopters Mi-35M to Brasilia. Furthermore, in 2005 the government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva approved a defense policy with regional ambitions which stems from the hypothesis of protecting the Amazons, for which it seeks to build military alliances in South America. The bases in Columbia are, according to Celso Amorin (Minister of External Affairs for Brazil) something they did not anticipate and they are well aware that this event will change the distribution of power in the region.

The key word in this discussion is persuasion. Obviously, Columbia not only seeks to strengthen its internal battle but also aims to persuade its neighbours who are tolerant with the FARC that they shouldn’t be (Ecuador and Venezuela). Columbia does not know how to cope with the race for arms in Venezuela, but it does know how to send a persuasive message with the backing of its North American neighbour. At the same time, the US wants to dissuade the governments who are enthusiastically making military agreements with Russia, Iran or China (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela).

Let’s hope that irrespective of the political, economic and military interests that are relevant to these South American countries, diplomacy will be the main driver thus ensuring peace in South America, the most peaceful subcontinent in the world, and let us hope that all of this will lead to a true structural and technological improvement for the armed forces of said South American countries and not to the confirmation of staging a confrontation of powerful nations such as the United States and Russia and the replaying of the Cold War.

Danny Mauricio Suárez M.
International Affairs Expert

Bibliography

(1) Semana magazine 08/08/09 Edition 1423
(2) Website of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces available from http://www.cgfm.mil.co/CGFMPortal/index.jsp?option=noticiaDisplay&idNoti=2685&globalLang=ale
(3) Dinero magazine published on 27/08/09
Semana magazine published on 07/11/09 Edition 1436
Semana magazine published on 19/09/09 Edition 1429
Website Headquarters of the Armed Forces
BBC World.com.



The views and opinions of contributors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of Global Affairs

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